Thesis (Ph.D.)--Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1974. / Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

The Ph.D. thesis is focused on using the fuzzy logic for control of a parallel manipulator based on a Stewart platform. The proposed mechanism makes possible to simulate the physiological movements of the human body and observe degradation processes of the cord implants. Parallel manipulators such as a Stewart platform represent a completely parallel kinematic mechanism that has major differences from typical serial link robots. However, they have some drawbacks of relatively small workspace and difficult forward kinematic problems. Generally, forward kinematic of a parallel manipulators is very complicated and difficult to solve. This thesis presents a simple and efficient approach to design simulation model of forward kinematic based on Takagi-Sugeno type fuzzy inference system. The control system of the parallel manipulator id based on state-space and fuzzy logic controllers. The proposed fuzzy controller uses a Sugeno type fuzzy inference system (FIS) which is derived from discrete position state-space controller with an input integrator. The controller design method is based on anfis (adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system) training routine. It utilizes a combination of the least-squares method and the backpropagation gradient descent method for training FIS membership function parameters to emulate a given training data set. The proposed fuzzy logic controllers are used for the control of a linear actuator. The capabilities of the designed control system are shown on verification experiment.

No description available.

This study covers the sliding mode control design for a class of nonlinear systems, where the control input affects the state of the system linearly as described by (d/dt)x=A(x)x+B(x)u+d(x). The main streamline of the study is the sliding surface design for the system. Since there is no systematic way of designing sliding surfaces for nonlinear systems, a moving sliding surface is designed such that its parameters are determined in an adaptive manner to cope with the nonlinearities of the system. This adaptive manner includes only the automatic adaptation of the sliding surface by determining its parameters by means of solving the State Dependent Riccati Equations (SDRE) online during the control process. The two methods developed in this study: SDRE combined sliding control and the pure SDRE with bias terms are applied to a longitudinal model of a generic hypersonic air vehicle to compare the results.

The dissertation aims to develop an understanding of the outcomes and limitations of formal and informal control of the Swedish state, and of the positions and strategies of the social agents involved in this field. The dissertation contributes with new perspectives on controls directed at the state, comparing various control organs (the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice, the United Nations, the European Court of Human Rights and NGOs) and focusing on a wide range of wrongs and harms by the Swedish state. Paper I explores incidents for which the Swedish state and its agencies have been judged to be responsible by formal control organs. Paper II analyzes the accounts used by state representatives in judgments from formal control organs on issues related to migration. Paper III examines the characteristics of those who hold the state accountable via the European Court. Paper IV explores how formal and informal control organs frame problems in relation to the Swedish state’s treatment of residence permit applicants. The studies demonstrate that formal domestic control organs mainly direct criticisms at state agencies that focus on particular and procedural issues. International bodies of formal and particularly informal control publish criticisms of the state that focus on general and systemic issues. The dissertation highlights how control organs offer limited access to accountability, and how controls of the state may be perceived as both ineffective and counterproductive. Another conclusion is that the positions and strategies of the agents in this field are dependent on their specific capital (resources, knowledge and support). Control of the state is understood as a field of struggle for recognition and legitimacy, in which accusations are denied by representatives of the state and control organs balance their criticism in order to maintain credibility. Both informal control organs and those who hold the state accountable must adjust to the rules of the game or risk being defined out. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following paper was unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 4: Manuscript.</p>

Submitted by admin tede (tede@pucgoias.edu.br) on 2016-09-12T18:12:44Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TEREZA RODRIGUES MONTALVÃO.pdf: 9607074 bytes, checksum: 6ea36d21caa8910b18e54b7871ad6f84 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-12T18:12:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TEREZA RODRIGUES MONTALVÃO.pdf: 9607074 bytes, checksum: 6ea36d21caa8910b18e54b7871ad6f84 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-04-06 / This dissertation aims at analyzing the social control and participation in the policies of social assistance by examining their constitution, competence, possibilities and limits of implementation in the context of the Goiânia City Council of Social Assistance (CMASGyn), in the State of Goiás. It also investigates if CMASGyn enables democratic participation, discussion for consensus and decision of the city social assistance public policies of social control or if its agency is exclusively limited to norms of accreditation and disaccreditation of the entity. In this analysis the direct and indirect representations are problematized through the view of values, ethic, culture and citizenship. It is a research guided by the dialectical and historical materialism reference. The conception of State and civil society developed in this study assumes the perspective of the amplified State, Gramscian legacy, formed by the political and civil society. The perspective of social control as civil society control over the State assumes centrality in this study. The working methodology was developed from the documenting technique and as researching instruments council documents were used: meeting minutes, resolutions, creating laws, bylaws and complementary others, the city social assistance plan and the annual management report. Empirical data collected from documental resources demonstrate how CMASGyn enables democratic participation and constitutes consensus and decision of social control in the social assistance policies of Goiânia city. Among the obtained results, it is evident that the social control is a contradictory process, which may or may not guarantee effective change of social public policies of social assistance, demanding struggle for the organized civil society hegemonic politics along with public spheres and social movements. / Esta dissertação objetiva analisar o controle social e a participação na política de assistência social, examinando sua constituição, sua competência, suas possibilidades e limites de implementação no contexto do Conselho Municipal de Assistência Social de Goiânia, Goiás (CMASGyn). Investiga ainda se o CMASGyn possibilita a participação democrática, a discussão para o consenso e a decisão do controle social da política pública de assistência social no munícipio ou se sua atuação limita-se, exclusivamente, à normatização de credenciamento e descredenciamento de entidade. Na análise, problematiza-se a representação direta e indireta na ótica dos valores, da ética, da cultura, do direito e do dever. Trata-se uma pesquisa orientada pelo referencial do materialismo dialético histórico. A concepção de Estado e sociedade civil desenvolvida no estudo assume a perspectiva de Estado ampliado, de legado gramsciano, formado pela sociedade política e sociedade civil. A perspectiva de controle social como controle da sociedade civil sobre o Estado assume centralidade no referido estudo. O lócus da pesquisa foi o CMASGyn, através da participação da sociedade civil nesse espaço. A metodologia de trabalho foi desenvolvida a partir da técnica documental, tendo como instrumento os documentos do conselho: atas, resoluções, lei de criação, regimento interno e outros complementares, plano municipal de assistência social, relatório anual de gestão. Os dados empíricos coletados nas fontes documentais demonstram como o CMASGyn possibilita a participação democrática e constitui o consenso e a decisão do controle social da política de assistência social no município de Goiânia. Entre os resultados obtidos, evidencia-se que o controle social é um processo contraditório, que pode ou não garantir mudança efetiva da política social pública de assistência social, demandando a luta pela hegemonia política da sociedade civil organizada junto às esferas públicas e aos movimentos sociais.

Si tous les juges sont appelés à appliquer la Constitution, le Conseil d'Etat, a une situation particulière. Il a, à apprécier, plus souvent que les autres juges, la conformité à la Constitution de l'action administrative. La soumission des actes administratifs à la Constitution ne doit pas nécessairement passer par une juridiction constitutionnelle. Le Contrôle de constitutionnalité des actes administratifs doit se superposer et même se confondre avec le contrôle de légalité. Le système de contrôle de constitutionnalité introduit en 1990, a privé les juridictions ordinaires de la faculté d'exercer le contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois. Le régime du Conseil Constitutionnel offre sans doute moins de garanties du fait que la porte du Conseil Constitutionnel est étroite et demeure interdite aux particuliers, ainsi qu'aux juges ordinaires. Ce régime considère le juge ordinaire comme incompétent pour assurer un contrôle de constitutionnalité de la loi. En effet, l'article 18 de la loi 250/93 du 14 juillet 1993 relative à l'institution du Conseil constitutionnel dispose que le Conseil Constitutionnel contrôle la constitutionnalité des lois et textes ayant force de loi. Nonobstant toute disposition contraire, nulle autre autorité judiciaire ne peut exercer ce contrôle par voie d'action ou d'exception d'inconstitutionnalité ou de violation du principe de la hiérarchie des normes et textes. Ainsi, le Conseil constitutionnel ne contrôle pas la constitutionnalité des lois promulguées avant sa création, le juge ordinaire y compris le Conseil d'Etat ne peut exercer un tel contrôle par voie d'action ni par voie d'exception. Le juge ordinaire ne peut donc plus refuser d'appliquer une loi sous prétexte de son inconstitutionnalité et n'est plus autorisé, à quelque titre que ce soit, à opérer un contrôle de constitutionnalité de la loi. L'intervention du juge administratif statuant comme juge constitutionnel peut contribuer à résoudre le problème de déni de justice existant dans le système juridique libanais. Les règles constitutionnelles s'imposent au juge administratif qui doit respecter ses principes dans les décisions qu'il prend. Etant la norme suprême, la Constitution s'impose donc de manière immédiate aux autorités administratives. Pour cela les normes constitutionnelles sont incorporées dans les sources de légalité que le juge administratif se doit de faire respecter. Le Conseil d'Etat est chargé du contrôle de la conformité des actes normatifs par rapport à la Constitution. Cette fonction de contrôle induit la fonction d'interprétation des normes constitutionnelles. Le juge administratif exerce des fonctions similaires : il assure le contrôle de la conformité des actes administratifs par rapport à la Constitution et il est interprète de la Constitution. Le Conseil d'Etat ne peut pas contrôler tous les actes administratifs, puisque certains d'entre eux violent la Constitution du seul fait qu'ils appliquent une loi inconstitutionnelle. Mais selon la théorie de l'écran législatif, la loi fait écran entre la Constitution et l'acte contrôlé. La mission du Conseil d'Etat est-elle, de mettre en cause l'application de cette loi inconstitutionnelle. Cette mission ne peut se concrétiser que si le Conseil d'Etat agit comme juge constitutionnel, c'est-à-dire que s'il est amené à contrôler la constitutionnalité des actes administratifs En France, le système de contrôle de constitutionnalité instauré par la Constitution de 1958 limitait le contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois à un contrôle de priori. Tout juge, ne pouvait qu'appliquer la loi, même inconstitutionnelle. Ce problème a été résolu en France en 2008 par la réforme constitutionnelle opérée par la loi constitutionnelle n°2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 qui ajoute un article 61-1 à la Constitution. / If all judges are required to apply the Constitution, the Council of State, has a special status. He has to appreciate more often than the other judges, compliance with the Constitution of the administrative action. Submission of administrative acts to the Constitution need not go through a constitutional court. Control of the constitutionality of administrative acts must overlap and even merge with the judicial review. The system of constitutional review introduced in 1990, has deprived the ordinary courts of the power to exercise control of the constitutionality of laws. The regime of the Constitutional Council has probably less guarantees that the door of the Constitutional Council is narrow and is forbidden to individuals, as well as ordinary judges. This scheme considers the ordinary courts incompetent for a constitutional review of the law. Indeed, Article 18 of the law 250/93 of 14 July 1993 on the establishment of the Constitutional Council provides that the Constitutional Council reviews the constitutionality of laws and instruments having the force of law. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, no other court may exercise this control by action or unconstitutionality or violation of the principle of hierarchy of norms and texts. Thus, the Constitutional Council does not control the constitutionality of laws enacted prior to its creation, the ordinary courts including the State Council may exercise such control by action or by way of exception. The ordinary courts can no longer refuse to enforce a statute on the grounds of its unconstitutionality and is no longer allowed in any capacity whatsoever, to exercise control of the constitutionality of the law. The intervention of the administrative judge acting as a constitutional judge may help solve the problem of denial of justice existing in the Lebanese legal system.Constitutional rules apply to the administrative judge must respect its principles in the decisions it makes. Being the supreme law, the Constitution is therefore required immediate way to administrative authorities. For that constitutional standards are incorporated into the sources of legality that the administrative judge must enforce. The State Council is responsible for monitoring the compliance of normative acts with the Constitution. This control function causes the function of interpretation of constitutional provisions. The administrative judge exercising similar functions: it supervises the compliance of administrative acts with the Constitution and is interpreter of the Constitution. The Council of State cannot control all administrative acts, as some of them violate the Constitution merely because they apply an unconstitutional law. But according to the theory of legislative screen, the law shields between the Constitution and the controlled act. The mission of the State Council is she to question the application of this law unconstitutional. This mission can only be achieved if the Council of State acts as the constitutional court, that is to say, if it is required to review the constitutionality of administrative acts In France, the system of constitutional review introduced by the 1958 Constitution limited the constitutionality of laws to control a priori. Any judge could not apply the law, even unconstitutional. This problem was solved in France in 2008 by the constitutional reform made by the Constitutional Act No. 2008-724 of 23 July 2008 which adds Article 61-1 of the Constitution.