The purpose of this thesis is to present a history of the founding, operation, and growth of the credit union movement in the United States, with special emphasis placed on the benefits and services such an organization can render to the thousands and thousands of employees who are classed in the realm of small or moderate income brackets.

German banking is distinguished from neighboring European banking systems by the influence of its public sector banks. Nearly 50 percent of German banking is carried out by government owned state banks (ländesbanken) and regional savings banks (sparkassen) whose roots date from the 18 th century. German banks play a particularly important role in the economy and exert more control over firms and corporations than do their American counterparts. German banks tend to be less profitable than foreign counterparts. German public banks were originally founded to foster local and regional business. However, the operations of German public sector banks now extend into all forms of international investment. German public banks are currently seeking new business models to increase profits as they are being forced to compete in the global financial market under liberal market practices dictated by the European Union. Turbulence in the global financial market precipitated by the U.S. sub‐prime mortgage meltdown has severely impacted German public sector banks, precipitating a banking crisis that leaves German taxpayers exposed to staggering losses. These global financial pressures dictate the restructuring of the German financial system. This restructuring has forced a breaking point in the traditional German corporatist banking model and is associated with significant risks to the stability of the German banking system.

Cette thèse met en exergue les spécificités de la gouvernance des banques coopératives et du comportement financier de leurs parties prenantes (clients/employés). Le premier chapitre montre que les banques coopératives européennes (Allemagne, Autriche, Danemark, France, Italie) ont un pouvoir de marché plus faible que les banques commerciales. Les différences s’expliquent par des prix plus faibles pour les banques coopératives. Ces résultats suggèrent que les banques coopératives contribuent à améliorer la concurrence et le bien-Être des clients.Le second chapitre montre que les clients des banques coopératives (Allemagne, France et Italie) supportent des « switching costs » moins élevés que les clients des banques non-Coopératives. Ces résultats corroborent la spécificité de la gouvernance des banques coopératives. Cette étude montre que les « switching costs » ont un effet négatif sur la concurrence bancaire. Le troisième chapitre trouve que les motifs financiers expliquent l’achat des parts sociales. Ces résultats contredisent les « explications officielles » avancées par les instances représentatives des banques coopératives qui indiquent que les parts sociales sont achetées par les clients dans un but non-financier.Le quatrième chapitre montre que les employés des banques coopératives sont sujets au biais de familiarité et investissent dans les actifs financiers de leur banque (actions, parts sociales, obligations). Nos résultats suggèrent que la connaissance financière ne réduit pas ce biais comportemental. / This dissertation deals with the characteristics of cooperative banks’ governance and the financial behavior of their stakeholders (clients/employees). Chapter 1 shows that European cooperative banks (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and Italy) have a lower market power than commercial banks. Differences are explained by lower prices for cooperative banks. These results suggest that cooperative banks contribute to enhance competition and customers’ welfare.Chapter 2 stressed that clients of cooperative banks (France, Germany, and Italy) have on average lower switching costs than clients of commercial banks. This result is in line with the governance of cooperative banks. In addition, this study shows that switching costs impact negatively banking competition.Chapter 3 shows that financial motives explain cooperative member shares purchases. These results contradict the official reasons given by the representative institutions of cooperative banks which indicate that non-Financial motives dominate when clients decide to become member of their cooperative bank. Chapter 4 shows that employees of cooperative banks are prone to familiarity bias and invest in financial assets of their own bank (Bonds, member shares, stocks). Our results suggest that financial literacy does not reduce familiarity bias.

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La tesi di dottorato si occupa della riforma delle banche di credito cooperativo introdotta col D.l. n. 18/2016, conv. in l. n. 49/2016 (cfr. artt. 37-bis ss. t.u.b.), e mira al raggiungimento di tre obiettivi: individuare gli spazi riconosciuti all’autonomia negoziale e/o operativa nell’ambito dei gruppi bancari cooperativi cui, oggi, devono necessariamente aderire le b.c.c. per mantenere la forma della cooperativa bancaria; individuare le peculiarità del g.b.c. – caratterizzato dalla presenza di una s.p.a. capogruppo che controlla le b.c.c. attraverso un contratto “di coesione” e il cui capitale è partecipato in misura maggioritaria dalle medesime controllate – in rapporto alle figure più generali del gruppo “bancario” e del gruppo “comune” di cui agli artt. 2497 ss. c.c.; capire se le suddette peculiarità siano espressive di statuti eccezionali fondati sulle speciali esigenze del settore creditizio, in cui le bcc si trovano ad operare, o se, piuttosto, possano evocare principi già rinvenibili nel diritto comune dei gruppi di società. Il lavoro si divide in tre capitoli: il primo capitolo si occupa delle ragioni alla base della riforma delle bcc; il secondo capitolo si occupa dei confini dell'autonomia privata nell'ambito dei gruppi (principalmente contrattuali) "comuni" e "bancari"; il terzo capitolo, infine, si occupa delle differenze tra gruppi bancari (e comuni) e gruppo bancario cooperativo. Nel tentativo di comprendere i riflessi sistematici dell’istituto di recente introduzione e di colmare le fratture tra diritto comune e diritto bancario, il presente lavoro si contrappone a quegli studi e contributi attraverso i quali, al di là delle classificazioni nominalistiche, sono state proposte soluzioni interpretative volte a riconoscere, sempre o nei soli casi di perseguimento di finalità prudenziali, un potere (anche in parte) sottratto ai principi di diritto comune, tale da ridurre le b.c.c. a "meri sportelli bancari della capogruppo". / This Phd thesis deals with the italian reform of the Cooperative Credit Banks, introduced by the D.l. n. 18/2016 (see article 37-bis of the T.U.B.). In an effort to understand the systematic symptoms of the Cooperative Banking Groups and to bridge the fractures between common law and banking law, the research aims three goals. First, identify the space of contractual and operational autonomy within the Cooperative Banking Groups to which, today, the CCB must necessarily adhere to maintain the form of cooperative banks. Second, identify the peculiarities of the CBG - characterized by the presence of a lucrative bank group leader who controls CCB through a "cohesion" contract, whose majority of capital is participated by the same subsidiaries - in relation to the disciplines of the "banking" and "common" groups. Third, understand whether the aforementioned peculiarities are an expression of exceptional statutes based on the special needs of the credit sector or if they rather evoke principles already found in the common law of the group companies. The work is divided in three chapters: the first chapter deals with the reasons behind the reform of the CCB; the second chapter deals with the boundaries of private autonomy within the "common" and "banking" group (mainly contractual) laws; the third chapter, finally, deals with the differences between banking groups and cooperative banking groups. The present work is opposed to certain studies that reckon to the group leader of the CBG a nearly ilimited power, always or only in cases of pursuit of prudential purposes, to controll the subsidaries, even if on prejudice of the subsidiaries’ creditors and shareholders, risking to convert them into "mere branches of the parent company".