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Over the last three decades of the Chinese economic reform with a focus on the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) restructuring, one striking phenomenon is the rise of the mixed ownership enterprises (MOEs) in China. The objective of this thesis is to analyse the factors that can explain the emergence and the rise of the MOEs, to explore the corporate governance of the MOEs, and to assess the performance of the MOEs. The research finds that the unique experiments and practices of China’s SOEs reform in the past 30 years have formed the China Model of SOEs reform, China’s mixed ownership has its roots in the China Model. One major explanation to the rise of the MOEs is the synergy effect gained from the combination of the different advantages of both the private enterprises and the state enterprises. The private enterprises have better operational mechanisms and the state enterprises have better access to business resources and political support. The thesis has looked at 5 issues of the institutional arrangements of MOE’s corporate governance, named as the SCORE. It is found that the largest shareholder in most of the MOEs is still the state, but the control structure is not always corresponding to the shareholding structure, and the governmental intervention in the business of the MOEs has been reduced although the reduction is limited. The thesis shows that there is no noted relationship between corporate performance and mixed ownership, but the transfer of corporate controlling powers is very important for the ownership-transformed companies from whole ownership to mixed ownership to improve the performance. On this basis, the thesis argues that China needs to push forward the further commercialization of the corporate governance of the MOEs in the future

In the last decade Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become increasingly important and multiple corporations that have been exposed for unethical behavior have been harshly penalized by the market. This study aims at evaluating wealth effects of unethical corporate behavior by doing a case study, in which an in-depth analysis is conducted on four infamous corporate scandals; Wells Fargo, HSBC, Danske Bank, and Volkswagen. Share prices are compared to an approximation of what the prices could have been, had the scandals not been revealed, to give an indication on abnormal returns around the announcement of the corporate scandals. The approximation is based on the share’s previous correlation with market returns. Results of the study are then contrasted to and analyzed with regard to findings of previously conducted event studies on the wealth loss suffered due to exposed unethical behavior. It is found that the corporate scandals resulted in substantial direct wealth losses in terms of market cap value and shareholder wealth for two of our cases, Wells Fargo and Volkswagen. The value decrease that Danske Bank suffered was also substantial, but had a lag in discernible market reactions in comparison to Wells Fargo and Volkswagen. HSBC has in recent years been lagging behind our price approximation, but any direct negative effect from the scandal announcement cannot be observed.

The text discusses the concept of 'internal investigations' in legal contexts, emphasizing the lack of a specific legal definition in the USA, Germany, and Austria. It explains that internal investigations, often triggered by suspicions of legal violations by company employees, aim to systematically process and resolve such cases. The distinction between compliance (prevention) and internal investigations (response to suspected violations) is highlighted. The article explores the role of external investigators, often lawyers or auditors, in conducting internal investigations, emphasizing the need for coordination between auditing and legal aspects. It discusses the historical development of internal investigations in the German-speaking countries and their increasing importance in recent years. The second part of the text delves into the importance of company behavior in response to suspected violations. If the offense benefits the company, the focus is on exoneration, with potential benefits such as penalty suspension through active repentance or self-disclosure. The article also discusses legal conditions for penalty annulment, emphasizing timely actions in internal investigations. The text addresses the role of the public prosecutor's office and legal considerations in refraining from prosecuting a company based on its behavior during internal investigations. It stresses that a positive impression, compliance measures, and transparent cooperation can influence the decision to refrain from prosecution. The final section outlines criminal liability risks for internal investigators, citing potential offenses such as coercion, violation of correspondence secrecy, unlawful use of a computer system, violation of telecommunications secrecy, and abuse of audio recording or listening devices. The discussion includes legal considerations and justifications for certain actions, emphasizing the importance of balancing interests and goods, especially in legal proceedings.

隨著2016年巴拿馬文件(Panama Paper)的曝光，社會對避稅天堂的關注度在此時達到高峰。由於使用避稅天堂是一種法律及道德上處於灰色地帶的商業手段，因此本研究欲探討是否具有不端行為的企業會較容易使用避稅天堂。過去研究指出，一間具有不端行為而導致形象轉為負面的企業，會因此失去商譽、銷售下跌或失去合作夥伴等。而為了挽救上述影響所帶來的損失，有過不端行為的企業有較高機會再次利用具有爭議性的方法來彌補虧損。由於避稅天堂通常具有低稅率或完全免稅的特徵，也具有極高的資訊隱蔽性，因此面臨經營困難的企業可以容易利用避稅天堂來降低交易成本，如匯集資金、避稅，甚至用來隱藏賄賂等不法行為。 本研究採用台灣上市公司做為樣本，進行量化實證分析，結果顯示，企業不端行為件數、勞資關係不端行為件數及企業犯罪件數皆與企業到避稅天堂設立的子公司數呈現正向關係。曾具有勞資關係不端行為的企業，設立在避稅天堂的子公司數愈多，尤其是經主管機關處以罰鍰的企業，與避稅天堂的關聯性也愈高。 / The public’s concern about tax havens has peaked as the leak of “Panama Papers.” Since setting up subsidiaries in tax havens is an ethically dubious and controversial business practice, this study would like to examine whether there is a relationship between corporate wrongdoing and the usage of tax havens. Prior studies have shown that corporate wrongdoing would lead to impairment in goodwill, reduction in sales or losing partnership. In order to recover from the losses occur from the effects mentioned above, companies would have a higher incentive to involve in controversial behaviors. Tax haven, with its unique characteristic such as extremely low tax rate or tax free, and a high degree of concealment regarding sharing information with other governments, enables companies to avoid some market transaction costs and gives them an opportunity to easily pool money, evade tax, and even hide illegal conducts such as bribery. This study uses a quantitative method to investigate on listed companies in Taiwan. The result shows that the amount of corporate wrongdoing, labor related misbehavior and illegal corporate behavior all have a positive relationship with the possibility that corporates use tax haven. Also, corporates, which have past records in labor related dispute, tend to set up more subsidiaries in tax havens; especially those fined by the authorities.