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As evident from recent changes in NYSE and Nasdaq listing requirements, board independence is considered an important constituent of firms?? corporate governance structures. However, the empirical evidence regarding the impact of board structure on firm performance is mixed. Since firms employ a variety of governance mechanism to control agency problems, the significance of board independence may depend upon the strengths of other governance mechanisms. I study the importance of board independence from the viewpoint of an investor by examining the market reaction to board member resignation announcements. I then examine this market reaction in the context of each firm??s existing governance structure and business environment. I find that investors react more negatively when an outside director resigns from the board than when an inside or gray director resigns. More importantly, I find that investor reaction to outside director resignation is less negative when insider or non-affiliated blockholder stock ownership is high. This evidence suggests that board independence and insider ownership and non-affiliated blockholder ownership may serve as substitutes. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that firms may require higher board oversight when a large part of managerial compensation is based on stock incentives. This finding suggests that overly high levels of stock-based managerial compensation may exacerbate agency problems. Taken together, these results have important implications for choosing an effective set of governance mechanisms that may work independently or in combination with each other to mitigate the agency cost of equity.

Is there any requirement for the optimal governance system in Taiwan? Without focusing on the pure relationship with variable and index, the study started from developing a model to explain the sample in Taiwan We try to simulate the corporate governance mechanisms from the idea of John and Kedia (2003). The three primary forces came from (1)aligning the manager¡¦s incentives with that of shareholders,(2) monitored debt, and (3) takeovers. In the model, we divided the sample of Taiwan listed company in 1996-2004 into four groups: Alignment-Based(AB),Pre-Commitment-Based(PB),Intervention-Based(IB) and Well-Divided(WD). From our observation, the ratio of IB company is arising, AB and PB are decreasing. Therefore, we infer that the external governance mechanisms are well developing in Taiwan, like external shareholder and takeover markets. Also, we established the transformative model of governance system in order to explain the index variation result from changing in governance system. Past study indicated that the governance systems in Taiwan are family-based systems. We found that the external and intervening mechanism, growing with the developing financial market, could be more powerful in corporate governance today.

Thesis (M.S.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1991. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-70). Also available via the Internet.

Diss.--Universität Mannheim, 2001. / Notes bibliogr. Bibliogr. p. 155-165.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 251-262). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - Simon Fraser University, 2005. / Theses (Faculty of Business Administration) / Simon Fraser University. EMBA Program. Also issued in digital format and available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Cleveland State University, 2009. / Abstract. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Dec. 18, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-80). Available online via the OhioLINK ETD Center and also available in print.

Zugl.: Zürich, Universiẗat, Habil.-Schr., 2009.

Thesis (PhD (Organizational Behaviour))--University of Pretoria, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references.