No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

This article explores the corporate governance in the developed countries and China from a comparative perspective. Following the analysis of principal-agent model, this article examines the dispersion-to-concentration ownership span to explore its influence on the majority/minority ownership and the shareholder/manager conflicts. It compares the positive and negative edges of concentrated shareholding with empirical analysis of Canada, the U.S., and China, and finds the different roles of institutional shareholders in various countries. This article then turns to two-tier agency model which is another way to enhance corporate governance. Compared with the vertical construct with the vanguard of Germany, it illustrates that the supervisory board in china is situated parallel to the board of directors and loses the supervising purpose. This article finally explores the independent director system which has obtained credits in the developed countries. While in China, it lacks legal protection and is not effective as expected.

This article explores the corporate governance in the developed countries and China from a comparative perspective. Following the analysis of principal-agent model, this article examines the dispersion-to-concentration ownership span to explore its influence on the majority/minority ownership and the shareholder/manager conflicts. It compares the positive and negative edges of concentrated shareholding with empirical analysis of Canada, the U.S., and China, and finds the different roles of institutional shareholders in various countries. This article then turns to two-tier agency model which is another way to enhance corporate governance. Compared with the vertical construct with the vanguard of Germany, it illustrates that the supervisory board in china is situated parallel to the board of directors and loses the supervising purpose. This article finally explores the independent director system which has obtained credits in the developed countries. While in China, it lacks legal protection and is not effective as expected.

While the Bay Area’s history has shaped today’s culture, there is little written about how corporations affect their immediate communities. This thesis focuses on the largest corporations in the Bay Area to determine if these corporations have any effect on the surrounding communities. The study focuses on Fortune 500’s list of Largest Corporations for 2011, and within that list, the top 30 companies located in the nine Bay Area counties. These nine counties include: Alameda County, Contra Costa County, Marin County, Napa Country, San Francisco County, San Mateo County, Santa Clara County, Solano Country, and Sonoma County. Using each corporations’ headquarter address as the reference point, a 1-mile radius surrounding each of the 30 companies was assessed. Data was gathered for the years 2000, 2010, and projected 2015. These data are available via ESRI’s Business Analyst Online application, which is accessible through the Texas A&M University Library’s website. Demographic information such as population, income, education, and related characteristics were reviewed. To understand the population’s lifestyle and possible implications for real estate development opportunities, the study reviewed the local demographic spending patterns, what these people do for recreation, their occupations, whether they rent or own their home, how they travel to work and their commute times, and other lifestyle variables. There were 40 variables tested and 53-percent of those variables produced statistically significant results. While the Demographic variable yielded a 56-percent statistical significance rate and the Consumer Spending variable yielded a 43-percent statistical significance rate, the Business variable did not produce any statistical significance. The most significant variables drawn from the reports were Demographics and Income Comparison, House and Home Expenditures, and Recreation Expenditures. This analysis provides important information regarding whether there is a statistical significance between characteristics within these companies’ 1-mile radii and the overall MSA. In the future, if a company would like to expand and build another headquarters, this analysis may provide insight on what metrics to focus on for future development. There may also be important information for future development opportunities around these 30-companies.

This dissertation consists of three papers that examine how aspects of public policy may impact private sector corporate governance. The first two examine the relationship between personal-tax policy and corporate agency costs. The first paper is a theoretical analysis based on an agency model of managerial behavior. A unique element of this paper is that it assumes a discontinuous compensation function, which reflects the occurrence of performance thresholds associated with the dismissal incentive and many common bonus plans. The analysis results in three main findings. First, the relative magnitude of proportional taxation has an indeterminate effect on managerial performance. Second, an increase in tax progressivity is associated with reduced managerial performance and increased agency costs. Third, the inclusion of performance thresholds and compensation discontinuities can cause tax system changes to have surprisingly large impacts on managerial performance. The second paper is an empirical investigation of the relationship between personal-tax progressivity and corporate operating efficiency. The analysis is based on variations in across-state tax policy and utilizes a sample of US-based firms. Using matched-pair testing and regression analysis, evidence is found that is consistent with the hypothesis that increased personal-tax progressivity negatively impacts managerial performance. Together, the analysis contained in the first two papers suggests a need to further examine the relationship between personal taxation and corporate agency costs, an issue that is largely absent from the research literature. The third paper investigates whether variations in state corporate law affect firm value. Previous research in this area generally treats all states other than Delaware as having homogeneous corporate law. I relax this assumption and analyze a large panel sample of US firms. Evidence is found that Delaware firms are worth more, on average, than non-Delaware firms. However, this effect is not consistent across all non-Delaware jurisdictions. The valuation differences are correlated to differences in statutory law. Specifically, corporate law that provides greater entrenchment of management is associated with reduced firm value. The results indicate that corporate law does affect corporate governance. Furthermore, the findings are inconsistent with the “race to the bottom” theory of corporate law.