This three-essay dissertation first examines the impact of tax enforcement on the incidence of stock option backdating. Consistent with the theoretical prediction that tax authority enforcement can operate as a valuable monitoring tool by narrowing the scope for managerial entrenchment, we find robust evidence that the incidence of stock option backdating is lower when firms are more likely to be subject to IRS audits. Our results reinforce calls in the public policy discourse for institutions that protect investors by curtailing companies’ “degrees of freedom” to engage in corporate misbehaviour. The second essay examines how the market reacts to announcements of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by well performing acquirers and evaluates the results in light of three hypotheses: 1) managerial ability, 2) empire building, and 3) chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence. Our results indicate that an empire building motive drives the relationship between past superior operating performance and M&A announcements. Long-term operating performance drops significantly for acquiring firms with past superior operating performance. Our evidence also indicates that the presence of insider directors helps to alleviate the negative perception of acquisitions made by firms with better operating performance or empire building CEOs. The final essay investigates the controversial issue of whether information asymmetry affects the cost of equity capital. We re-examine this unanswered question using a unique and simple measure of information risk rooted in the growing literature on geographic proximity. Relying on their distance from financial centers to gauge when firms are better known, we provide robust evidence that information risk shapes equity pricing. In particular, we find that firms located in remote areas exhibit a higher cost of equity capital. / Thesis (Ph.D, Management) -- Queen's University, 2012-08-15 18:48:04.361

The traditional model of corporate governance is comprised of three main players: the board of directors, the management, and the shareholders who own of the corporation. This model has received a wave of criticism. The two most important complaints were that the directors had little to do with the day-to-day business of the corporation, and in their decision making the interests of the shareholders were not being taken into account. This situation has led to the creation of what has been called the "expectation gap" which is defined as the gap which exists between the shareholder's expectation, and the performance and actions of the board of directors. / To reduce this gap, the corporate governance actors have called for an increase in the independence of the board. / The purpose of this study is to give advisors to the French government a comparative understanding of the way that corporate governance in general, and in particular, the way the issue of the independence of the board has been dealt within the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

In 1958, Modigliani and Miller initiated an important debate in modern corporate finance literature, when they stated that in the absence of taxes, the cost of capital of a firm is independent of its capital structure. They modified and then corrected their view in 1963 when they stated that the introduction of corporation taxes into their model implied that there is a tax advantage to leverage and therefore taxes influenced the cost of capital. Subsequently, in the 1970s and 1980s, this debate has focused on the interaction of personal taxes and corporation taxes with the cost of capital and on the determination of whether taxes influence the cost of capital at all. This thesis contributes to this debate by addressing the following issues: (a) Do personal taxes matter at all for calculating the cost of capital. How sensitive is the influence of personal taxes to differences in the capital structure and pay out policies of the firms. (b) How can more realistic features of the tax code be incorporated in the determination of the cost of capital. (c) Taxation systems can be classified into 4 main types according to the degree of integration of personal and corporation taxes. These systems are the Classical, Imputation, Two-Rate and the Integrated systems. The cost of capital, in the presence of uncertainty as well as corporation and personal taxes, is derived for each of the above systems in this thesis. (d) Taxation systems can also be classified into 2 main types according to the taxable base used. These are the Comprehensive Income Tax and the Expenditure Tax systems. The cost of capital, in the presence of uncertainty as well as corporation and personal taxes, is derived under both the above regimes. (e) Application of the results of (a), (b) and (c) above to address practical issues such as using the cost of capital equation to determine the effect of changes introduced by the 1988 Budget on the cost of capital. (f) Application of the results of (d) above to contradict the claims made in the Meade Committee regarding the tax neutrality issue. A system that is tax neutral even when uncertainty is taken into account, is proposed. All the above issues have the common theme of the determination of the appropriate cost of capital in the presence of both uncertainty as well as corporation and personal taxes. The conclusions reached are stated at the end of the relevant chapters.

Following the case study research strategy, this thesis has investigated the implementation of corporate environmental policies in subsidiaries of transnational corporations in Brazil. More specifically, it investigated six subsidiaries from three countries of origin - the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany - operating in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors. This comparative study has resulted in a theoretical framework to explain transnational corporations' environmental practices. This framework follows an interdisciplinary approach, consisting of four levels. First, at the international level, an overview of the constraints regarding transnational corporations and environmental issues is addressed. The second level is represented by the environmental regulatory policies in the home and host countries. The third level accessed the influences from the industry's structure (in both international and Brazilian contexts). Finally, the fourth level is centred on the companies, which specifically discusses the home-host dilemma in the management of transnational corporations. The most important conclusion is that the main source of pressure over subsidiaries' practices is the environmental regulation of the host country. Nevertheless, there are cases of non-compliance and cases of overcompliance regarding Brazilian environmental legislation. However, these contradictory results are explained by the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. That is, poor environmental performance was explained by lack of control from the headquarters. Otherwise, good performance was explained by tight control from headquarters over subsidiaries' practices in Brazil. Additionally, there is indication that regulation is the main driving force in the home countries. However, attempts at self-regulation are in progress in the chemical industry in order to balance these external pressures for environmental improvements. Finally, there is evidence that the nationality of the selected companies is a relevant aspect of their environmental policies and practices. This is mainly because the legal requirements and management approach of the home countries are incorporated into their environmental management.

Bolagsstyrning är ett angeläget diskussionsämne efter finanskrisen, särskilt beträffande hur en god bolagsstyrning kan uppnås i banker. Det råder konsensus om att god bolagsstyrning är av högsta betydelse för näringslivet och även övriga delar av samhället. Emellertid skiljer sig uppfattningarna om hur man på bästa sätt ska uppnå detta.                                           I uppsatsen har de viktigaste bolagsstyrningsteorierna behandlats. Agentteorin tar sikte på relationen mellan principalen och agenten samt de problem som uppkommer inom den relationen. Principalen har ett intresse av att övervaka agenten för att tillförsäkra sig att agenten utför uppdraget i enlighet med principalens intressen. Agenten har däremot intressen som skiljer sig från principalens intressen. I den aktiemarknadsrättsliga kontexten betraktas aktieägarna som principaler i förhållande till styrelsen respektive verkställande direktören. Dessutom betraktas styrelsen som en principal i förhållande till verkställande direktören. Nära relaterad till agentteorin är teorin om separation av ägande och kontroll. Den teorin förklarar agentproblematiken i de moderna aktiebolagen där ägandet och kontrollen av bolaget har separerats. Teorin utvecklades i USA genom att studera följden av spritt aktieägande. I Sverige finns det kontrollägare som engagerar sig i bolagets styrelse, vilket är ovanligt i USA där den verkställande ledningens makt är stor. Separation av ägande och kontroll kräver särskilda kontrollprocesser för att förhindra att beslutsmakarna i bolaget beslutar på ett sådant sätt som strider mot aktieägarnas intressen. Transaktionskostnadsekonomi är en teori som erbjuder en förklaring till varför bolag existerar. I princip bedrivs verksamhet i form av bolag pga. transaktionskostnaderna blir mindre än om verksamheten bedrivs via externa kontrakt. Stakeholder-teori innebär att aktieägare inte betraktas som den enda intressen i förhållande till bolaget. Istället anses ett bolag ha många intressenter vars intressen bör beaktas av ledningen.                                                                                                                                                            Det svenska bolagsstyrningssystemet innehåller både allmänna regler för aktiebolag och särskilda regler för banker. Utöver detta finns det även särskilda regelverk för börsnoterade bolag. ABL innehåller de grundläggande reglerna för aktiebolag och ur ett bolagsstyrningsperspektiv finns det viktigaste reglerna för bolagsorganen i ABL. LBF är en särskild lag riktad mot banker i Sverige. LBF innehåller många olika bolagsstyrningsregler för banker. Syftet med LBF:s bolagsstyrningsregler är att skapa väl fungerande banker och framför allt att soliditeten hos dessa banker är tillräcklig. En annan del av det svenska bolagsstyrningssystemet utgörs av vad som kallas för den svenska modellen för bolagsstyrning. I och med att de börsnoterade bolagen under en lång tid oftast haft en kontrollägare, betraktas detta som normaltillståndet. Reglerna i ABL syftar till att främja aktiva ägare som tar ansvar för bolaget genom att engagera sig i bolagets styrelse. Beträffande självreglering finns de viktigaste reglerna i koden och regelverk för emittenter. Av dessa två är koden den viktigaste eftersom koden har haft ett stort inflytande om vad som utgör god bolagsstyrning i börsnoterade bolag. Koden bygger på ”följ eller förklara”-modellen, vilket innebär att börsnoterade bolag kan göra avsteg från reglerna om de motiverar varför de har valt att göra det.                                                                                             Analysen av det svenska bolagsstyrningssystemet har visat att den är uppbyggd av olika teorier. Särskilt agentteorin kommer till uttryck i de grundläggande reglerna som finns i ABL. Stakeholder-teorin kommer däremot till uttryck främst i de regler som särskilt riktar sig till banker.                                                                                                               De nya reformerna från EU syftar till att återskapa både förtroendet till den inre marknaden och stabiliteten i det finansiella systemet. Reformerna har dock kritiserats av både näringslivet och akademin för att vara alltför långtgående. Kritiken noterades redan innan införandet av reformerna. T.ex. kritiserades förslagen om styrelsen sammansättning som presenterades i grönböckerna av EU-kommissionen. Många av förslagen från grönböckerna återfinns emellertid i CRD IV och CRR. De nya reglerna måste betraktas som stränga mot styrelsen i börsnoterade banker eftersom det ställs höga krav och samtidigt kan styrelseledamöterna och bankerna bli föremål för administrativa sanktioner och administrativa åtgärder om de inte följer de nya reglerna.                      Uppbyggnaden av de nya reglerna utmärks av stakeholder-teorins närvaro. Detta är överensstämmande med tidigare bankregler i Sverige som också var uttryck för stakeholder-teorin. Detta ligger väl i linje med bankverksamhetens särskilda natur enär samhället har ett befogat intresse av att ställa krav på bankerna. Dock har de nya reglerna förskjutit aktieägarna som den viktigaste intressenten medan samhällets intressen har fått alltför stort utrymme enligt mig.                                                                                                                         Trenden inom bolagsstyrningsområdet kan sägas bestå av flera aspekter. En aspekt är att bolagsstyrningen blir alltmer reglerad i form av detaljregleringar. En annan aspekt är att bolagsstyrningen har blivit allt viktigare och detta märks genom att det har införts många nya regler för bolagsstyrning i banker. En tredje aspekt är att reglerna skapas på EU-nivå istället för nationell nivå, vilket kan medföra svårigheter då bolagsstyrningen är väldigt olika inom EU.                                                                                                                                              Följderna av de nya reglerna kan bli digra. Med detta avses främst samhällsekonomiska aspekter som konkurrenskraft och bankers möjlighet att locka till sig kompetenta styrelseledamöter.  Vad som kommer att hända är inte skrivet i sten, men det finns anledning till att vara orolig för risken att EU:s konkurrenskraft tappar mot de nya expansiva ekonomiernas som t.ex. Kina. Vidare kan det ifrågasättas om de nya reglerna verkligen kommer att förebygga nya finanskriser inom EU. Avslutningsvis är min bedömning att de nya reglerna inte kommer att förbättra bolagsstyrningen inom EU utan istället leda till en försämrad bolagsstyrning pga. alltför detaljerade regler och dessutom alldeles för stränga mot bankerna.

The thesis proposes a theoretical perspective for the analysis of public institutions. The key element is the incorporation into such institutions of conflicting and conflict-generating epistemological positions. The presence of certain epistemologies, particularly empiricism and critical theory, is taken to account for failures within the institution to conduct rational, critical debate on certain policy proposals. Empirically, the thesis considers examples of the failure of Strathclyde Regional Council to conduct effectively its policy of 'setting its own house in order', i.e. improving its own service delivery, this being intended as the main component of its policy for tackling urban deprivation. The background to this policy is established in chapters reviewing national policy initiatives on deprivation; the rise of corporate planning in British local government; the documents which influenced Strathclydes' own management structures; and the development of policy on deprivation in the first years of the authority's existence. Philosophically, the thesis examines critical rationalism (Karl Popper), critical theory (the Frankfurt School) and empiricism, in so far as these positions each suggest different answers to the question 'how should criticism of society proceed in society?'. It concludes that both critical theory and empiricism tend in practice to produce a dogmatism which aborts open debate. Against this background policy documents from Strathclyde are re-examined alongside texts of interviews conducted with senior officers and members. Philosophical positions are identified in the texts which are substantially in agreement with those examined philosophically. Exposition focuses in particular on the vocabulary of the texts, using the philosophical texts' own identification of key elements of vocabulary (e.g. 'all the facts', for empiricism, 'reality' for critical theory, 'learning from mistakes' for critical rationalism).

Thesis (M.B.A.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2009.

This dissertation consists of three papers that examine how aspects of public policy may impact private sector corporate governance. The first two examine the relationship between personal-tax policy and corporate agency costs. The first paper is a theoretical analysis based on an agency model of managerial behavior. A unique element of this paper is that it assumes a discontinuous compensation function, which reflects the occurrence of performance thresholds associated with the dismissal incentive and many common bonus plans. The analysis results in three main findings. First, the relative magnitude of proportional taxation has an indeterminate effect on managerial performance. Second, an increase in tax progressivity is associated with reduced managerial performance and increased agency costs. Third, the inclusion of performance thresholds and compensation discontinuities can cause tax system changes to have surprisingly large impacts on managerial performance. The second paper is an empirical investigation of the relationship between personal-tax progressivity and corporate operating efficiency. The analysis is based on variations in across-state tax policy and utilizes a sample of US-based firms. Using matched-pair testing and regression analysis, evidence is found that is consistent with the hypothesis that increased personal-tax progressivity negatively impacts managerial performance. Together, the analysis contained in the first two papers suggests a need to further examine the relationship between personal taxation and corporate agency costs, an issue that is largely absent from the research literature. The third paper investigates whether variations in state corporate law affect firm value. Previous research in this area generally treats all states other than Delaware as having homogeneous corporate law. I relax this assumption and analyze a large panel sample of US firms. Evidence is found that Delaware firms are worth more, on average, than non-Delaware firms. However, this effect is not consistent across all non-Delaware jurisdictions. The valuation differences are correlated to differences in statutory law. Specifically, corporate law that provides greater entrenchment of management is associated with reduced firm value. The results indicate that corporate law does affect corporate governance. Furthermore, the findings are inconsistent with the “race to the bottom” theory of corporate law.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2009.

This study analyses the financing decisions of listed non-financial corporations in France, Germany and the UK over the period 1969 to 2000. These countries represent satisfactorily different financial structures of their classes, Le., Latinic, Germanic and Anglo-Saxon traditions, respectively. Thus, this thesis attempts to shed light on the impact of institutional differences (accounting and taxation systems, bankruptcy laws, corporate governance structure) on corporate financing mix policies. The empirical investigation comprises three main themes; capital structure (debt versus equity), debt maturity structure (short-term versus long-term debt), and debt ownership structure public versus private debt). It is obvious that factors influencing financial strategies of firms change overtime and firms are expected to adjust themselves to their target financing structure according to random events. For these reasons we use dynamic panel data and choose Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) as an appropriate estimation procedure for our autoregressive-distributed lag model GMM methodology overcomes the problems of endogeneity, heteroscedasticity, normality, simultaneity and measurement errors, which are common for studies using firm-level data. The empirical evidence shows that corporate financing decisions are determined by both firm-specific (profitability, tangibility and maturity of assets, growth, quality, size, liquidity, payout policy, corporate tax rates, and earnings volatility), and market-related factors (term structure of interest rates, market equity premium, interest rate volatility, stock return volatility, stock price performance). However, the strength and nature of the effect of these factors are dependent on the financial environment and tradition of the countries of interest. Therefore, our research argues that financing mix decisions of firms are not only the product of their own characteristics, but also the outcome of environment and traditions in which they operate.