Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, 1963. / "April 1963." Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-72). Also issued in microfiche.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008. / Thesis Advisor(s): Roberts, Nancy. "December 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 29, 2009. Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-64). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2008. / Title from PDF title page; viewed on Oct. 17, 2008. "03 April 2008." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 66-69).

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Simons, Anna ; Jansen, Erik. "June 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 10, 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Awards, Counterinsurgency, Reward Systems, Department of Defense Hall of Heroes, Army Stories of Valor, Army Silver Star Recipients. Includes bibliographical references (p. 137-141). Also available in print.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies. / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 21, 2003). "June 1999." Includes bibliographical references.

U.S. air bases in Iraq have been attacked over 1,000 times in just the first two years of the conflict. This prompted the U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations to declare in October 2004 that air base defense was one of the five critical problems without a solution currently facing the U.S. Air Force. Yet a solution exists, but not in current air base defense doctrine where the threat to air bases is presented as a conventional force or saboteur. Instead, the history of air base attacks reveals a different but consistent enemy over the last 50 years: the insurgent. Unlike conventional forces which seek decisive military victory and the destruction of the adversary's military resources, the insurgent seeks primarily and ultimately a political victory. To do this, among other efforts; the insurgent must wage an "information war" in order to expand the growth and power of the insurgent organization, often through acts of symbolic violence against targets of strategic value. As such, the air base is a leading target of choice for insurgents. Air bases are key operational and strategic terrain to the United States military - arguably the most critical terrain in the current American way of war. With each air base attack, no matter which specific tactic used, the insurgent attempts to strengthen their hold over their own center of gravity - the local population - while attacking the U.S. center of gravity - the political will of the American public. Only a base defense doctrine that targets the insurgents' center of gravity in the physical, informational, and moral spectrum will succeed at disrupting insurgent operations and protect the air base, the local population, and the U.S. center of gravity. Counterinsurgency provides a foundation for this proposed doctrine.

Thesis advisor: Dr. Hiroshi Nakazato / Thesis advisor: Dr. Gerald Easter / Losing By Winning: America's Challenge Waging Counterinsurgency Warfare is an analytical study of America's experience waging counterinsurgency warfare in the Philippine- American, Vietnam and Iraq Wars. In each war, counterinsurgency warfare was applied to achieve the strategic objectives of American Foreign Policy as outlined by the President of the United States at the outset of each war. Initially, large swaths of the American electorate and political class favored achieving the strategic objectives of each war studied. Over time, as counterinsurgency tactics were put to use, and made headway towards achieving the strategic objectives of the conflict, public support for each war precipitously declined over time and either jeopardized the ability of the United States to complete its counterinsurgency campaign or lose them altogether. This occurred because images of atrocities and perceptions of violations of the laws of warfare (both real or imagined) were formed in the minds of Americans which created a political dynamic where the American public and their elected leaders in Washington D.C. could no longer legitimize continuing to support the ongoing war. The analytical insights drawn from this study give one an understanding of the unique challenges that confront the United States in employing counterinsurgency warfare to achieve the strategic objectives of the United States in the wars its fights. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Lee, Doowan. Second Reader: Giordano, Frank. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 27, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Repression tactics, population alignment, movements, game theory, agent-based models, Anbar Awakening, counterinsurgency (COIN). Includes bibliographical references (p. 123-128). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007. / Cover title. AD-A475 568. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis) --Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007. / Thesis Advisor(s): Peter J. Gustaitis II. "June 2007." Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Mar 21, 2008). Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-76).