Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Stabilization and Reconstruction))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Johnson, Thomas H. ; Ear, Sophal. Description based on title screen as viewed on November 03, 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Civil operations and revolutionary support; Vietnam; pacification; Afghanistan; provincial reconstruction teams; counterinsurgency; stability operations Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-101). Also available in print.

This thesis analyses the United States Marine Corps’ counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam between March 1965 and November 1968, filling a major gap in the existing literature by forensically examining the primary source records maintained by the United States Marines to produce an assessment of the effectiveness of the strategy. It provides a useful corollary to the diplomatic and military histories of the war because not only does it examine operational-level thinking about the war but it analyses the intellectual antecedents of the Marines’ counterinsurgency strategy to answer the important questions about why the Marines chose to emphasis pacification and the ‘ink blot’ strategy rather than conducting a more conventional campaign that focused upon the destruction of enemy forces. The Marines’ own experience of counterinsurgency in the early part of the 20th Century, as well as the work of counterinsurgency theorists of the 1950s and 1960s, had a considerable impact upon their approach to the Vietnam War. The decision of the senior Marine commanders to adopt a pacification strategy along the lines of the ‘ink blot’ approach promulgated by these French and British counterinsurgency experts was partly the result of their view of the political nature of the war and partly the result of the reality they faced on the ground. At the time the Marines deployed to Vietnam their mission was to protect three bases on the coast in the northern provinces of South Vietnam and the Marines realised that the security of these establishments could be greatly improved if the population supported the Marines (and, by extension the South Vietnamese government) rather than the insurgents. Therefore, the ‘spreading ink blot’ of pacification was a product of the need to improve security as well as an attempt to challenge the political nature of communist revolutionary warfare. The metrics used to measure progress in the war were flawed, but there are other indicators within the Marines’ records that show they were conducting an effective and appropriate counterinsurgency campaign, within the limitations imposed by lack of resources and general inability to influence the war as a whole. When the Tet Offensive was launched in early 1968, the Marines use of pacification as ‘defence in depth’ allowed them to successfully defend the coastal enclaves by countering both the political and military efforts of the North Vietnamese in those areas.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, August, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references.

The United States was throughout the history engaged in several conflicts which had a character of counterinsurgency. These are - among others- War in Vietnam and second War in Iraq. These two conflicts are examined in this diploma thesis. Author poses a question how did counterinsurgency tactics evolved in both conflicts. The second question is whether the United States implemented counterinsurgency experiences from Vietnam War in Iraq War and if so, how they were implemented. The United States developed several counterinsurgency programs and the most of them were successful - they prevented Vietcong from spreading its influence in South Vietnam. However these programs were often poorly financed, or they did not gain enough support from The US Army, because the Army prefered conventional approach in fighting against communists. The United States fought a conventional warfare in the first few years of Iraq War and it had not succeeded in garnering popularity among civilians. The change came with a new commander- general David Petraeus. Petraeus was inspired by the experiences from the Vietnam War (and other conflicts) and he concentrated his effort on providing safety to Iraqi population. This strategy paid off and the Army had much less losses during his command then during the pre - 2007 period....

This master's thesis deals with the development and implementation of counterinsurgency warfare by the military and government of the United States during the Vietnam War. The main point of this work revolves around the fact that the United States did not develop a successful and comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine during this period. However, certain counterinsurgency units and programs were developed that did achieve success in deterring the guerrilla war waged by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army. The Phoenix Program and especially the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program, which was developed and operated by the U.S. Army Special Forces, proved that counterinsurgency warfare could be waged successfully against an elusive foe. As the Vietnam War escalated, the United States relied upon the technology, the mobility, and the firepower of America's conventional military to try and destroy an unconventional enemy. This reliance upon conventional military strategies and tactics eventually led to the withdrawal of American troops and the defeat of the Republic of Vietnam by the communist forces of North Vietnam. I believe that the United States and the Republic of Vietnam could have prevented a communist victory through the proper development of counterinsurgency warfare doctrine. This doctrine would include a combination of counterinsurgency tactics and strategies I social reform, economic assistance, military training, and political stability. The United States learned many valuable lessons in Vietnam, including the importance of maintaining specialized units that could be used to fight a limited war against a dedicated enemy with a political agenda. Warfare has never been an exact science, and a nation must be prepared to deal with any contingency. / Master of Arts