Thesis (M.S. in Operation Research and M.S. in Applied Mathematics)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008. / Thesis Advisor(s): Jacobs, Patricia ; Zhou, Hong. "June 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on August 25, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-64). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008. / Thesis Advisor(s): Gregg, Heather. "December 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 30, 2009. Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-74). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis and M.S. in Information Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Tucker, David. "June 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 13, 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Norwegian Armed Forces, NAF, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency Operations, COIN, Information Operations, Nation building. Includes bibliographical references (p. 135-141 ). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, Decembor 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Anna Simons. Includes bibliographical references (p. 49-50). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis) --Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007. / Thesis Advisor(s): Peter J. Gustaitis II. "June 2007." Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-76). Also available in print.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Malaysia does not seem to follow the conventional pattern of a larger power that uses stronger military force to gain a better security posture. Instead, Malaysia has chosen to adopt the more encompassing approach that defines national security as "the capacity of the society to protect individuals, groups and the nation from physical and socio-economic danger". Given this approach, which is almost anthropological in nature, Malaysia has been able to promote a form of national ideology acceptable to all communities, and has thereby provided a common basis for achieving and maintaining peace and harmony. A stringent internal security law was also enacted in 1969 to sustain this peace, as well as to curb any threat from future insurgents and terrorists. In addition, the government created a development and security plan known as KESBAN to win the hearts and minds of the population and launched massive border operations with Thailand to block the egress and exit routes of communists. As a result of such efforts the Malaysian government's overall containment policy was successful and the Malaysian government managed to secure the communists' surrender in December 1989. What it took to reach this point is what this thesis hopes to reveal. / Lieutenant Colonel, Malaysian Army

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Local Defenses are view by many counterinsurgency strategists as an essential element in defeating an insurgency. Providing a population with a local defense organization will strongly support the government's strategy of extending its security and control over the rural areas affected by insurgent organizations. However every insurgency is unique and demands a unique counterinsurgency strategy to be defeated. There always will b e an important commonality: insurgent organizations need popular support to subsist. The final success of the government or the insurgents will be determined by the capacity of either both to win and retain the support among the rural population. The analysis of the four cases presented in this study clearly demonstrates each government's approach to the insurgent problem, including the use of local defenses to protect rural populations from insurgent attacks and influence. The organization of localdefenses during the Malayan Emergency, the El Salvador's Civil War, as well as the Vietnam War and the Terrorist Epoch in Peru proved to be a force multiplier for the government's effort, at least during the time period in which they were effectively implemented. The contribution of this analysis is not that of providing a framework or recipe for strategists to implement this kind of organizations. Rather, the contribution of this study is on a set of variables to be considered when planning the implementation of local defenses as part of a counterinsurgency effort. / Lieutenant Commander, Peru / Major, United States Army

Colombia's four decades-old insurgency has been largely forgotten by the United States. With U.S. attention diverted towards Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East, Colombia has undertaken a new strategy to deal with problems of the insurgents, paramilitaries, and narco-terrorists which have plagued the country since 1948. The current administration of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has shifted strategy from one of negotiation and concessions to an active campaign to restore security and state control throughout Colombia. Under the Democratic Security and Defense Policy, the Uribe administration has made great strides against the insurgents and their supporters. This thesis analyzes President Uribe's efforts to end the insurgency and those of his predecessor Andres Pastrana. It also analyzes U.S. aid in the form of Plan Colombia which is largely tied to counternarcotics efforts. The highest U.S. priority is to stem the flow of illegal narcotics from Colombia into the U.S. Colombia's priority is to restore security and state control first, thereby providing a stable foundation to battle the narcotraffickers. Uribe has shown there is hope for Colombia to end the insurgency through his efforts. The U.S. should shift its priorities to mirror Colombia's and thereby earn a valuable, peaceful, and stable partner in the Western hemisphere.

The United States is and will continue to be engaged in a form of warfare in which the enemy finds shelter among and gains intelligence from the population. This is not a new form of warfare, but, given the advances in technology and increased globalization of the modern age, it has become an exponentially more lethal form of conflict. This thesis examines current U.S. unconventional warfare doctrine to determine its origins and assess its feasibility in different environments. Drawing upon the military theories of Clausewitz, this paper attempts to lay out a new approach and broaden the spectrum of American unconventional doctrine and irregular response. An examination of the American â hearts and mindsâ approach to unconventional warfare, based largely upon British colonial experience, suggests that current doctrine could be based on a faulty interpretation of history. Newly emerging knowledge points to the need to adopt an unconventional strategy focused more on establishing authority than gaining popularity. This approach, dubbed â authoritative control,â has both a historically successful track record and is fairly easy to implement. For the United States to be successful in future unconventional conflict, an expansion of doctrine must occur immediately.

This analysis examines the information dimension of the ongoing Maoist insurgency and counterinsurgency in Nepal. The paper follows two lines of research: first, it presents an analytic framework that properly conceives the challenge of counterinsurgency and calibrates government actions through the use of information systems and operations; then, it applies this framework to the contemporary crisis in Nepal to postulate effective counterinsurgency strategies for the Nepalese government and its supporters. The paper analyzes the environment, structure, and dynamics of the insurgent and counterinsurgent systems in Nepal to determine the extent to which information is or could be employed in the fight. Based on the conditions identified in the research, the paper proposes information-based strategies and tactics that favorably affect conflict dynamics on behalf of the Nepalese government. Finally, the paper offers constructive and appropriate ways for the United States to support Nepalese information operations efforts in the counterinsurgency. This research focuses primarily on the use of information in insurgencies, but it also realizes that information strategies must be balanced and blended with other important dimensions of insurgent conflict. Thus, the insights gained here are intended to support further analysis of the larger set of dynamics that shape the conflict in Nepal.