No abstract available. / Thesis (LL.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1981.

No abstract available. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1991.

This document is submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of Architecture (Professional ) to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, school of Architecture and planning, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2017 / The Judicial system has existed in society since ancient civilization. It resides in our subconscious and plays a part in our decision making process taking the form of a moral conscience. Furthermore, the judicial system is realized spatially through the visualization of the Court. These institutions are located across all our major cities and suburbs often occupying prime territory. The judicial court is a public building which should promote civic pride and identity, however, it is a building type which has become highly restricted and walled off from society. It was once a space of public and community participation. It is an integral institution in a democratic society. It has now become associated with crime and violation of law. It is a space perceived by many to be avoided. Through this research and design report I wish to challenge the current court typology and explore the potential of the judicial court and the significant impact it can have on society as a great public building which promotes civic pride. Themes of identity, jurisprudence, conscience and boundaries are explored to develop a new court type and a precedent for future judicial buildings. The design proposes a Magistrates Court of a multi-disciplinary nature for the city of Kliptown and the greater Soweto. It is a hybrid of program interlaced together in response to the context and the broader network age we find ourselves in. / MT2017

Under the 1956 Labour relations Act, parties who were dissatisfied with decisions of the then Industrial Court, could appeal to the old Labour Appeal Court, and then if still further unhappiness persists, to the former Appellate Division. Such appeals entailed placing before the court the complete record of the Industrial Court, and requesting it to decide if on the evidence, it would have come to the same conclusion. Sometimes the courts of appeal decide that they would, sometimes that they would not. When planning the new Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, the Cheadle Commission decided that this process was too slow, too technical, too cumbersome and too expansive. So it recommended that, at least in the case of the most common disputes, the issues should be decided quickly, informally and finally by arbitration. Unless the parties agree to private arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 42 of 1956, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration (CCMA) would supply the arbitrators, who would exercise their powers, not under agreed terms of reference, but under the LRA itself. Like private arbitrators, those of the CCMA are also meant to dispose of matters with a minimum of legal formalities (see section 138(1) of the LRA). But the drafters of the LRA did not mean to insulate arbitration awards entirely from the watchful eye of the Labour Court. They therefore specifically provided for review of CCMA arbitrations awards in section 145, but they also gave general powers of review in section 158(1)(g) respectively of the LRA. As if the jurisdictional puzzle created by the LRA was not complex enough, the legislature added the Promotion of Justice Act 3 of 2000. It is an attempt to give expression to the constitutional right of fair labour practices and the constitutional standard of lawfulness and rationality. If section 145 limits the grounds on which commissioners’ actions can be reviewed, or if that section cannot be interpreted to reconcile it with the PAJA, it may well be that section 145 cannot pass constitutional muster - unless that section constitutes a limitation compliant with section 36 of the Constitution. That would be for the Constitutional court to decide.

No abstract available. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of Natal, Durban,1987.

The purpose of this study is to access the viability of traditional African courts in a future legal dispensation in South Africa. The research method used is a study of literature, court decisions and relevant statutes. The development of indigenous courts in South Africa is broadly outlined. As an analogy to the South African court system, the courts of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana are used to illustrate the dual systems of courts. Rapid urbanisation is discussed to illustrate that despite the increasing urbanisation, traditional values remain inherent to South African Blacks. The salient features of indigenous courts are analysed to facilitate the development of reform measures that have to be implemented so that the courts can meet the challenge of the future. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.M.

Text in Afrikaans / In enige arbeidsverhouding bly dit wenslik dat partye hulle onderlinge verpligtinge vrywilliglik sal nakom. Soms is dit nie moontlik vanwee die onderlinge wantroue tussen partye nie en daarom is di t belangrik om te let op wyses van afdwinging van nywerheidsraadooreenkomste, versoeningsraadooreenkomste en vasstellings en bevele van die Nywerheidshof. Nywerheidsrade en versoeningsrade is die instrumente wat daar gestel is sodat partye onderling kan beding om geskille te voorkom en ooreenkomste van onderlinge belang te beding. Daar is sekere regsgevolge verbonde aan die publikasie van sodanige ooreenkomste en as sodanig word dit as h vorm van ondergeskikte wetgewing beskou. Wat die afdwinging van sodanige ooreenkomste betref speel die strafsanksie h belangrike rol. Ooreenkomste word egter nie noodwendig gepubliseer nie en soms is die strafsanksie ook nie altyd die aangewese een nie. In sodanige gevalle sal daar na siviele sanksies gekyk moet word vir die afdwinging van sodanige ooreenkomste. Daarbenewens maak die Wet ook voorsiening dat sodanige ooreenkomste as h onbillike arbeidspraktyk ~n die Nywerheidshof afgedwing kan word. Die strafsanksie en die siviele sanksie het egter hulle tekortkominge en dus moet dear gekyk word na alternatiewe wyses vir die afdwinging van ooreenkomste. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.M

Imagine a "new South Africa" in which, to borrow an idea from a former bureaucrat of the US State Department, history has come to an end.3 A new society in which class, race and gender are no longer necessary categories to define the social phenomenon. South Africa will be, then, the "terrestrial paradise". However, I am afraid to remind the reader that in this particular African country, history has not come to an end. This country experiences the most open and rude expression of struggle (class, race and gender), and it is difficult to foresee that in this period of transition, history or the struggle, will come to an end. Popular justice vis ei vis state justice is, perhaps, one of the best examples in which the struggle between the oppressed and the oppressors is manifested. But the popular justice that I am thinking of, is that particular experience of "people’s legality" that has emerged in South Africa since the popular revolts of the mid-1980s. It could have its origins in African (customary) traditions (Bapela, 1987), but the cultural experience that emerged during the last decade went beyond its traditionalist roots (Suttner, 1986). Thus, the distinctive element of popular justice is that it has been ingrained in a democratic movement for empowering the people. What people?4 Whose justice? In the specific context of South Africa, by people I understand the working class and working classes, unemployed and marginal sectors, and different social sectors that are struggling for equality (ie the youth, women, gays and lesbians, and others). By justice, I mean the development of a new legality that will take into consideration the many gains that have been achieved within the Western legal system of "rights and obligations" (Pashukanis, 1978:100), and that goes beyond that model in the construction of a democratic society with wider social participation. So far, it has been in South Africa’s black townships that an incipient expression of popular justice has emerged.6 The 1980s people’s courts represented a synthesis of a popular project defining its own structures of legality. State repression over these popular structures did not represent the end of the project. In contrast to other points of view that have viewed this experience as a prefigurative enterprise that did not accomplish its aims (see in general Allison, 1990), I argue that the experience of popular justice of the 1980s laid the foundation for a (long term) project leading towards a radical conception of democracy (Laclau, 1990:chapter 6). / Occasional papers (University of the Witwatersrand. Centre for Applied Legal Studies) ; v. 15

This dissertation seeks to explore the judiciary as an independent and separate arm of government. In doing so, this dissertation attempts to provide a holistic analysis of the constitutional and legislative framework that has been established to protect both individual and institutional independence of the judiciary in South Africa. The question that will be asked is whether such mechanisms are consistent with the section 165 of the Constitution. Central to this analysis is whether the system of court administration that was inherited from apartheid is appropriate for the purposes that courts now have to perform under South Africa‟s constitutional democracy. Chapter one lays the foundation by providing an introduction to the topic under discussion. In doing so, this chapter also provides the research question, literature review, and an explanation of the research methodology. Lastly, this chapter attempts to trace the historical foundation of the principle of judicial independence. It is concluded that judicial independence is linked with the development of the rule of law and seeks to counter unfettered power. In an attempt to provide a conceptual definition for judicial independence, chapter two draws from international law instruments. This definition focuses on the distinction between independence and impartiality; individual and institutional independence. It is then concluded that judicial independence is vital for good governance, administration, accountability and the protection of the public from the arbitrary and abusive exercise of power by the state. Chapter three focuses on the independence of judges in South Africa, in other words, individual independence. This chapter contains an analysis of legislative mechanisms adopted in South Africa to protect the judges from improper influence in their adjudicatory tasks. Further, this chapter also analyses jurisprudence relating to impartiality and bias. It is concluded that the constitutional and legislative framework adopted in South Africa sufficiently insulates judges from improper influence. As far as impartiality is concerned, it is concluded that in terms of South African jurisprudence, the presumption is that judges are impartial. The burden of proof falls on the party alleging bias. Chapter four focuses on court administration. This chapter gives an overview of the structure of courts and the current system of court administration in South Africa. Further, this section discusses how the doctrine of separation of powers relates to court administration. This section also discusses reforms to the current system of court administration that have been proposed by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. It is concluded that the current system of court administration is inconsistent with the Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers as it permits the executive to encroach upon the independent functioning of the courts. Chapter five seeks to discuss some of the challenges that threaten judicial independence in South Africa. This chapter begins by providing a cursory overview of some of the main incidents which have threatened the independence of South Africa‟s judiciary. The main focus of this chapter is the alleged attempt by the Cape Judge President Hlophe to improperly influence judges of the Constitutional court in their adjudicatory tasks. Moreover, this chapter discusses the manner in which the complaint against Judge Hlophe was dealt with by the Judicial Service Commission. It is concluded that in dismissing the complaint against Judge Hlophe without a thorough examination, the Judicial Service Commission abdicated its constitutional duty. It is also concluded that the unresolved complaint against Judge Hlophe casts a shadow of doubt over the impartiality and independent functioning of the judiciary in South Africa. The main conclusion in chapter six is that the protection of independence in South Africa suffers from contradictory elements which leave the judiciary under executive control, which constitutes an insidious erosion of the doctrine of separation of powers. Therefore the status of the judiciary as an equal arm of government in South Africa is weak. Thus, while South Africa's judiciary is impartial and contains strong elements of individual independence, it is not independent. The essence of the recommendations relate to the functioning of the Judicial Service Commission, the application of section 175 (2) of the Constitution, the tenure of judges, the administration of courts, the complaint against Judge Hlophe and the Superior Courts Bill. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2012.

The purpose of this study is to access the viability of traditional African courts in a future legal dispensation in South Africa. The research method used is a study of literature, court decisions and relevant statutes. The development of indigenous courts in South Africa is broadly outlined. As an analogy to the South African court system, the courts of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana are used to illustrate the dual systems of courts. Rapid urbanisation is discussed to illustrate that despite the increasing urbanisation, traditional values remain inherent to South African Blacks. The salient features of indigenous courts are analysed to facilitate the development of reform measures that have to be implemented so that the courts can meet the challenge of the future. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.