The subject of this thesis is the growing problem of computer crime and especially the possibility of its reduction and elimination of consequences associated with it. In the introductory chapter is broken down as the development of computer crime in the world as in the Czech Republic. The second chapter compares the possibility of insurance against computer attacks, while the insurance is offered only in foreign countries. The third chapter deals with cyberinsurance economic model and the final chapter outlines possible future development in this area.

Companies around the world invest an increasing amount of money trying to protect themselves from cybercrime and unauthorized access of valuable data. The nature of these covert threats makes it seemingly impossible to quantify the risk of getting attacked. While it is possible to estimate the tangible costs of a security breach it is much harder to asses what a company stands to lose in terms of intangible costs. This thesis uses the Event Study methodology to determine the intangible losses of listed American companies who suffered data breaches. On average, the companies in the dataset loses 0.21% of their market cap after a security breach which, although not being statistically significant, translates to $267 million. Despite looking at several parameters to find significant predictors, only one turned out to be statistically significant, namely the number of records breached. These weak correlation is a result in itself; because of the low impact of a breach perhaps the companies lack proper incentives to protect their users' data. / Det ständigt växande cyberhotet gör att allt fler företag väljer att göra stora investeringar i datasäkerhet. Den dolda hotbilden gör det i stort sett omöjligt att kvantifiera sannolikheten för att råka ut för en attack. Även om det går att avgöra och förutspå de direkta kostnaderna kring ett dataintrång så är det nästintill omöjligt att avgöra de indirekta kostnaderna kring ett dataintrång. Detta arbete använder eventstudie-metodologin för att uppskatta de indirekta kostnaderna hos börsnoterade amerikanska företag efter att de haft ett dataintrång. Företagen i den undersökta datamängden förlorar i genomsnitt 0.21% av sitt marknadsvärde vilket, även om det saknar statistisk signifikans, motsvarar $267 miljoner. Arbetet undersöker ett antal parametrar för att hitta signifikanta prediktorer men endast en av de prediktorer vi undersökte var statistiskt signifikant, nämligen antalet läckta uppgifter. Dessa svaga samband är i sig intressanta; den till synes svaga inverkan av dataintrång på företagens börsvärde antyder att de kanske inte har så stora finansiella incitament att skydda sina kunders data.

Today's environment is filled with the proliferation of cyber-attacks that result in losses for organizations and individuals. Hackers often use compromised websites to distribute malware, making it difficult for individuals to detect. The impact of clicking through a link on the Internet that is malware infected can result in consequences such as private information theft and identity theft. Hackers are also known to perpetrate cyber-attacks that result in organizational security breaches that adversely affect organizations' finances, reputation, and market value. Risk management approaches for minimizing and recovering from cyber-attack losses and preventing further cyber-attacks are gaining more importance. Many studies exist that have increased our understanding of how individuals and organizations are motivated to reduce or avoid the risks of security breaches and cyber-attacks using safeguard mechanisms. The safeguards are sometimes technical in nature, such as intrusion detection software and anti-virus software. Other times, the safeguards are procedural in nature such as security policy adherence and security awareness and training. Many of these safeguards fall under the risk mitigation and risk avoidance aspects of risk management, and do not address other aspects of risk management, such as risk transfer. Researchers have argued that technological approaches to security risks are rarely sufficient for providing an overall protection of information system assets. Moreover, others argue that an overall protection must include a risk transfer strategy. Hence, there is a need to understand the risk transfer approach for managing information security risks. Further, in order to effectively address the information security puzzle, there also needs to be an understanding of the nature of the perpetrators of the problem – the hackers. Though hacker incidents proliferate the news, there are few theory based hacker studies. Even though the very nature of their actions presents a difficulty in their accessibility to research, a glimpse of how hackers perpetrate attacks can be obtained through the examination of their knowledge sharing behavior. Gaining some understanding about hackers through their knowledge sharing behavior may help researchers fine-tune future information security research. The insights could also help practitioners design more effective defensive security strategies and risk management efforts aimed at protecting information systems. Hence, this dissertation is interested in understanding the hackers that perpetrate cyber-attacks on individuals and organizations through their knowledge sharing behavior. Then, of interest also is how individuals form their URL click-through intention in the face of proliferated cyber risks. Finally, we explore how and why organizations that are faced with the risk of security breaches, commit to cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy. Thus, the fundamental research question of this dissertation is: how do individuals and organizations manage information security risks?