Thesis (Ph. D.)--Cornell University, 1966. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 179).

Thesis, Rostock

Thesis (M. Div.)--Grace Theological Seminary, 1985. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-68).

No description available.

Humans have long sought to use technology to augment human abilities and intellect. However, technology is traditionally employed only to create speedier solutions or more-rapid comprehension. A more challenging endeavor is to enable humans with technology to gain additional or enhanced comprehension that may not be possible to acquire otherwise. One such application is the use of technology to augment human abilities in detecting deception using nonverbal cues. Detecting deception is often critical, whether an individual is communicating with a close friend, negotiating a business deal, or screening individuals at a security checkpoint.The detection of deception is a challenging endeavor. A variety of studies have shown that humans have a hard time accurately discriminating deception from truth, and only do so slightly better than chance. Several deception detection methods exist; however, most of these are invasive and require a controlled environment.This dissertation presents a technological approach to detecting deception based on kinesic (i.e., movement-based) and vocalic (i.e., sounds associated with the voice) cues that is firmly grounded in deception theory and past empirical studies. This noninvasive approach overcomes some of the weaknesses of other deception detection methods as it can be used in a natural environment without cooperation from the individual of interest.The automatable approach demonstrates potential for increasing humans' ability to correctly identify those who display behaviors indicative of deception. The approach was evaluated using experimental and field data. The results of repeated measures analysis of variance, linear regression and discriminant function analysis suggest that the use of such a system could augment human abilities in detecting deception by as much as 15-25%. While there are a number of technical challenges that need to be addressed before such a system could be deployed in the field, there are numerous environments where it would be potentially useful.

In some cases of chronic pain, the complaints seem out of proportion to pathophysiological findings. Several models of pain have been forwarded to account for such cases, but no one explanation can account for the underlying processes involved in the genesis of chronic pain in all cases. The present analysis offers the additional factor of self—deception, defined as a contradiction between one’s words or attitude and behavior. By attempting to demonstrate subjective pain to observers, a pain patient convinces him- or herself of the displayed painfulness through a process of self—deception. Several psychological phenomena are included in the model of self—deception, including coping strategies, cognitive dissonance, self-perception, impression management, and attentional and memory biases. To explore the self—deception model of chronic pain, a laboratory analogue study was devised using female student volunteers who rated the painfulness of shock—induced stimuli under conditions designed to foster self—deception. Painfulness was measured 1) verbally by means of two visual analogue scales which reflected the pain intensity and affective unpleasantness and 2) nonverbally by means of quantified facial muscle movements. For each subject, individual pain threshold and tolerance levels were established. She then underwent a pretest comprising five random shocks from her threshold to tolerance range. Next, in the manipulation phase the subject was asked to display more, less or the same degree of pain while undergoing another random series of shocks. A final posttest was identical to the pretest and provided a measure of the durability of the altered pain display effect. In the first of two studies, the altered pain display was nonverbal: subjects exaggerated, diminished or did not change their facial expressiveness while undergoing the pain stimuli. In the second study, the altered pain display was verbal: subjects were told that at the end of the series they would be required to tell a fellow student (via videotape) that the shocks hurt more, less or about the same as what they had expected. Half of all subjects were further told that their deceptive communication would have negative consequences for viewers. Misleading fellow students about the pain experienced was expected to make the subjects feel badly, motivating them to change their attitude or beliefs about the pain experienced. They were expected to change their pain reports in keeping with the deceptive communication. That is, other deception was expected to foster self-deception. This effect was expected to endure and it was expected to be greatest for those in the negative consequences condition. The first study showed that exaggerated facial expressions of pain appear to be an amplification of normal pain expression. However, changes in facial expression did not bring about changes in verbal report of pain perceived, calling into question the facial feedback hypothesis. The results of the second study suggested that pain was altered only for subjects who prepared to state that their pain felt less painful than expected. This effect reached significance on the pain intensity visual analogue scale for low intensity shocks. This effect did not carry over into the posttest phase, nor were negative consequences effective in amplifying the manipulation, leaving the theoretical mechanism underlying the change in pain unclear. Moreover, the effect did not vary amongst subjects who scored differently on questionnaires measuring self—deception as a trait, present anxiety, or adaptive coping strategies. The self—report measure of self—deception was related to factors found to predict adaptive coping or good functioning in chronic pain patients, namely a sense of control over pain and the absence of catastrophizing thoughts. One particular facial movement (brow lowerer) was consistently related to the verbal pain reports, attesting to the validity of facial expression as a measure of pain. The results are discussed with implications and suggestions for future research. One major problem with research involving subject deception is that subjects may appear to comply with experimental instructions to deceive others while avoiding personal responsibility through a variety of mechanisms yet to be determined.

In some cases of chronic pain, the complaints seem out of proportion to pathophysiological findings. Several models of pain have been forwarded to account for such cases, but no one explanation can account for the underlying processes involved in the genesis of chronic pain in all cases. The present analysis offers the additional factor of self—deception, defined as a contradiction between one’s words or attitude and behavior. By attempting to demonstrate subjective pain to observers, a pain patient convinces him- or herself of the displayed painfulness through a process of self—deception. Several psychological phenomena are included in the model of self—deception, including coping strategies, cognitive dissonance, self-perception, impression management, and attentional and memory biases. To explore the self—deception model of chronic pain, a laboratory analogue study was devised using female student volunteers who rated the painfulness of shock—induced stimuli under conditions designed to foster self—deception. Painfulness was measured 1) verbally by means of two visual analogue scales which reflected the pain intensity and affective unpleasantness and 2) nonverbally by means of quantified facial muscle movements. For each subject, individual pain threshold and tolerance levels were established. She then underwent a pretest comprising five random shocks from her threshold to tolerance range. Next, in the manipulation phase the subject was asked to display more, less or the same degree of pain while undergoing another random series of shocks. A final posttest was identical to the pretest and provided a measure of the durability of the altered pain display effect. In the first of two studies, the altered pain display was nonverbal: subjects exaggerated, diminished or did not change their facial expressiveness while undergoing the pain stimuli. In the second study, the altered pain display was verbal: subjects were told that at the end of the series they would be required to tell a fellow student (via videotape) that the shocks hurt more, less or about the same as what they had expected. Half of all subjects were further told that their deceptive communication would have negative consequences for viewers. Misleading fellow students about the pain experienced was expected to make the subjects feel badly, motivating them to change their attitude or beliefs about the pain experienced. They were expected to change their pain reports in keeping with the deceptive communication. That is, other deception was expected to foster self-deception. This effect was expected to endure and it was expected to be greatest for those in the negative consequences condition. The first study showed that exaggerated facial expressions of pain appear to be an amplification of normal pain expression. However, changes in facial expression did not bring about changes in verbal report of pain perceived, calling into question the facial feedback hypothesis. The results of the second study suggested that pain was altered only for subjects who prepared to state that their pain felt less painful than expected. This effect reached significance on the pain intensity visual analogue scale for low intensity shocks. This effect did not carry over into the posttest phase, nor were negative consequences effective in amplifying the manipulation, leaving the theoretical mechanism underlying the change in pain unclear. Moreover, the effect did not vary amongst subjects who scored differently on questionnaires measuring self—deception as a trait, present anxiety, or adaptive coping strategies. The self—report measure of self—deception was related to factors found to predict adaptive coping or good functioning in chronic pain patients, namely a sense of control over pain and the absence of catastrophizing thoughts. One particular facial movement (brow lowerer) was consistently related to the verbal pain reports, attesting to the validity of facial expression as a measure of pain. The results are discussed with implications and suggestions for future research. One major problem with research involving subject deception is that subjects may appear to comply with experimental instructions to deceive others while avoiding personal responsibility through a variety of mechanisms yet to be determined. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

This thesis examines two examples of strategic deception campaigns - interwar Germany and modern Iraq - to determine the necessity for a clear framework, to decide how deception campaigns might meet overall national strategic goals. With the mindset of a pending overhaul in the way that the Department of Defense conducts business, understanding the importance of deception will become increasingly vital as the military becomes lighter and leaner. With such a change in the makeup of the force, old conventions of warfare, requiring a numerical advantage, may have to be forsaken in favor of techniques traditionally considered unconventional. By developing such a doctrine now, the challenge can be met before it actually arises. The key to doing so is examining past successes and failures and learning from history's mistakes. Using the DoD framework as a basis, it is possible to use the analysis of these case studies to develop a planning method to mitigate many of the hurdles experienced in these campaigns, from planning and execution to termination. / US Air Force (USAF) author.

Since security is based on trust in authenticity as well as trust in protection, the weakest link in the security chain is often between the keyboard and chair. We have a natural human willingness to accept someone at his or her word. Attacking computer systems via information gained from social interactions is a form of social engineering. Attackers know how much easier it is to trick insiders instead of targeting the complex technological protections of systems. In an effort to formalize social engineering, we are building two models: Trust and Attack. Because social-engineering attacks are complex and typically require multiple visits and targets, these two models can be applied, individually or together, at various times to each individual attack goal. / US Air Force (USAF) author.

The problem to be examined in this study is whether or not deception concerning general morale and attitude toward management is prevalent among hourly female employees at a large discount store in a city of approximately 30,000 population.