The purpose of this study was to use evaluation research methods to test the effectiveness of a model for planning programs in the defense industry.One of the major reasons for deficiencies in both training and education of Program Managers is the lack of a generic Program Management Planning Process which contains essential elements of program planning and which can be modified or tailored to accommodate the specifics of a given program.This study addressed the following evaluation research questions with regard to a selected Program Management Planning Process:1. How adequate is the functional Performance Measurement Baseline, as a result of following the Program Management Planning Process of this study?2. What is the quality of the resulting Performance Measurement Baseline?3. To what extent are the efforts in creating a performance measurement baseline as defined by the Program Management Planning Process of this study perceived as justified?4. Is the methodology employed in this evaluation research study generalizable to other studies of planning processes?5. Relative to integrated linear and integrated nonlinear models of planning processes, what does this study reveal?The results indicated:1. All of the activities of the Program Management Planning Process of this study were performed and their culminating products produced.2. The Performance Measurement Baseline for the program of this study was satisfactory, but subject to short-term obsolescence and may have been created without sufficient attention being paid to potentially significant cost, schedule or technical program drivers.3. The program planning team participants did believe the Program Management Planning Process of this study added sufficient value, over alternative methodologies, to merit its continued use.4. On the whole, the methodology employed in this research study proved to be generalizable for use on other programs.5. The findings of this study support the proposition that integrated nonlinear planning models are really macro-models and integrated linear models are really micro-models, as applicable to program planning. They are not separate models, but, in fact, the integrated linear model is a subset of the higher level integrated nonlinear model. / Department of Educational Leadership

<p>The paper focuses specifically on the South African Military Aerospace Industry as most of the weapons procured under the arms deal were military aircraft. Taking into account the numerous social needs of South Africa, the purpose of this paper is to inter alia try to establish the rationale behind the South African government's decision to to purchase an array of military weapons from foreign suppliers at an initial cost of almost thirty billion rand. In order to gain a better undrstanding of the topic, the author gives a brief overview and history of the South African Aerospace industry.Furthermore, an examination of the politics of the transition from apartheid to democracy and how this affected the aeropace industry is given.</p>

Thesis (M.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, System Design and Management Program, 2006. / Title from title screen (viewed Aug. 29, 2008). "February 2006." Includes bibliographical references (p. 143-150). Also issued in paper format.

Magister Legum - LLM / The paper focuses specifically on the South African Military Aerospace Industry as most of the weapons procured under the arms deal were military aircraft. Taking into account the numerous social needs of South Africa, the purpose of this paper is to inter alia try to establish the rationale behind the South African government's decision to to purchase an array of military weapons from foreign suppliers at an initial cost of almost thirty billion rand. In order to gain a better undrstanding of the topic, the author gives a brief overview and history of the South African Aerospace industry.Furthermore, an examination of the politics of the transition from apartheid to democracy and how this affected the aeropace industry is given. / South Africa

This thesis investigates the accuracy of a model that the Department of the Navy uses to predict the financial health of major defense hardware contractors. The inputs to this model are six financial ratios derived from a firm’s income sheet and balance statement. The output of this model is a single Z-score that indicates the health of a firm. Depending on the score, a firm’s financial standing is classified as healthy, distressed, or uncertain. The model is tested using a database compiled for this thesis that includes financial information for a total of 72 defense and non-defense firms. The test database is unique relative to the underlying model database; it reflects a more recent timeframe and a greater number of firms, none of which were used to develop the model. Model accuracy was computed by measuring how often the model correctly classified a bankrupt firm as distressed and a nonbankrupt firm as healthy. Then, model accuracy was evaluated by comparing these test results (i.e., percent correctly classified) to results published by the model’s developers. This comparison produced mixed results. In light of this fact, the thesis concludes that the model should be improved and recommends a course of action. / Master of Arts

The overall purpose of this thesis is to question the value of the use of models regarding decision-making as it effectively operates within the environment of US armaments procurements. For example, conceptual framework models such as bureaucratic politics, organisational outputs, incrementalism, and others are far too simplistic in their application to this subject - they only tend to distort reality. The thesis argues that the process is far too complex with decisional centres shifting throughout the life of any one given system, thus necessitating a more realistic conceptual approach. Evidence of this is provided throughout the discussion of the organisational processes and the roles of those involved in the procurement process. Moreover, it becomes apparent that those in the highest positions of decision-making (for example, Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, etc.) are at times least likely to be involved in decisions, dependent on the stage of development of the weapon system. Further, other groups (for example, Congress, Joint Chiefs, etc.) commonly perceived as the decisional centres have little, if any involvement during the earlier stages in the life of a weapon system. The possibility of their involvement increases as the system enters what the author refers to as the hardware phase, when monies must be appropriated. In other words, the system becomes politicised and the expertise of those in higher positions becomes salient, because they are chosen for their political and managerial skills - not their expertise in detailed defence matters. Even the weight of their decisions during the hardware phase is questionable due to the fact that lower level "experts", referred to as DoD Components, with longer periods of tenure, are consistently directing upwards their appraisals of new systems requirements, threats, etc., thus setting the parameters for the higher positioned decision maker. Following the description of the organisational processes and the roles of those involved, the discussion turns to the case study of the F-16 to validate these points. The purpose is not to research a case study and then attempt to extrapolate from it axioms of weapons procurement. The exercise is intended to yield credence to the points referred to above.

Despite nearly 50 years of attempts at reform, the US defense acquisition system continues to deliver weapon systems over budget, behind schedule, and with performance shortfalls. Why has acquisition reform failed? Three potential contributors were identified in the literature: the misalignment of incentives, a lack of a systems view, and a lack of objective evaluation criteria. This thesis considers these problems in the context of the most recent effort to transform the defense acquisition enterprise, evolutionary acquisition. First, game theory was employed to analyze the incentives of participants in the defense acquisition enterprise regarding the use of immature technology. It was found that there is a tragedy of the commons at work where acquisition programs serve as a common resource for stakeholders to meet their goals. The result is that participants are incentivized to use immature technology in contradiction of evolutionary acquisition policies. Second, the cost and performance of evolutionary acquisition in the context of the defense acquisition system was analyzed using a discrete event simulation. What was found was that evolutionary acquisition may lead to better performance from fielded systems and lower cost programs but also that the cost of operating the acquisition system as whole may actually rise. Finally, a method using price indices was developed to translate the gain in buying power resulting from improvements to the defense acquisition system into a monetary valuation. This allows for the application of options analysis to determine whether or not it is cost effective to pursue a potential improvement. A comparison with a more traditional approach revealed that simply using the NPV of cost savings may significantly understate value.

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. / Mode of access: Internet via the World Wide Web. Title from title screen (viewed May 10, 2005). "December 2004." Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-73). Also issued in paper format.

Thesis (Master of Research and Development Management)-Air Force Institute of Technology, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 28, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. / Title from title screen (viewed Apr. 16, 2008). Cites June 2003 GAO report GAO-03-695, "Contractors provide vital services to deployed forces but are not adequately addressed in DoD plans." "June 2005." The original document contains color images. "ADA435597"--URL. Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-96). Also issued in paper format.