Det finns stora skillnader i nivån av BNP per capita mellan länder som inte går att förklara med nuvarande teorier om konvergens, det vill säga att fattiga länder kommer att komma ifatt rika länder på lång sikt. I stället verkar skillnaderna i länders inkomstnivå bestå. Denna studie syftar till att undersöka om, och i så fall i vilken utsträckning, en del av skillnaden mellan BNP per capita i olika länder kan förklaras genom demokrati. Studien utgår huvudsakligen från två teorier, endogen tillväxtteori och moderniseringsteori. Som metod kommer multipel regressionsanalys av paneldata att användas med samtliga världens länder mellan 2010 och 2019. Sambandet söks för hela populationen men också uppdelat på världsdel, inkomstnivå och typ av regim. Studien visar att det finns ett positivt samband mellan demokrati och BNP per capita sett till hela populationen men i olika hög grad i urval baserat på världsdel, inkomstnivå och demokratiindex. Endast för gruppen höginkomstländer var sambandet negativt, men när auktoritära höginkomstländer uteslöts fanns ett positivt samband även för den gruppen. / There are big differences in the level of GDP per capita between countries, that cannot be explained by differences in the current capital stock levels or workforce according to theories on convergence. This study aims to examine if, and to what extent, a part of the difference in GDP can be explained by democracy. The study takes its theoretical frame of reference from endogenous growth theory and modernization theory. The method used is multiple regression analysis of panel data with all countries between 2010 and 2019. The regressions analysis is performed on the whole population as well as divided based on continents, income groups and type of regime. The study shows that there is a positive correlation between democracy and GDP per capita, but to different extents in the different samples. Only for high income countries where there a negative correlation, but that turned positive when authoritarian high-income countries were excluded from the sample.

Taking off from a security related interest in de-democratization processes throughout Europe and the limited theoretical field thereof, this paper examines the political development in Poland 2008-2018. Through a comparison of the development in Poland and Hungary, the ambition is to identify what differs the de-democratization process of the two East European countries in regards to their communist past and in a broader sense to their current membership in the European Union. To guide the comparison is the theoretical framework of Merkel (2004), through both qualitative and quantitative analysis as it has been applied on Hungary by Bogaards (2018). The combined framework provides five categories of defect democracies: exclusive, illiberal, delegative, tutelary and diffusely defect. While Bogaards (2018) categorizes Hungary as a diffusely defect democracy, the study finds that Poland does not adhere to any single one of the categories. The question of what differs the development in Poland and Hungary is best answered in terms of legality. Whereas the systematic Hungarian process has been carried out within legal frames of the majority rule in parliament, the hasty Polish process resembles a palace revolution, as the leading party is interfering with and partly controlling the rule of law. The study provides support to the observations of the EU being an externally limiting, enabling and legitimizing factor of autocratic developments in member states, made by Bozóki and Hegedüs (2018). Additionally, a reverse snowball effect is being put to action by Poland and Hungary vetoing on EU sanctions against one another. The findings of the paper also support observation made of a limited research field; theoretical understanding and international measurement indexes of democratization being insufficient in explaining and describing the emerging de-democratization. The study opens up for further research regarding democratic peace in Europe.