Le projet du gouvernement grec en 2006 d’introduire une Cour constitutionnelle pour remplacer le contrôle diffus pose le problème du choix entre le modèle américain et le modèle européen. Il n’y a pas de supériorité inhérente d’un modèle sur le plan axiologique, logique, technique et empirique. Les défauts du système américain sont amplifiés en Grèce par le contexte européen de sorte que le système grec assure la dépolitisation du contrôle mais n’assure pas la sécurité juridique. De même, il est activiste en matière socioéconomique mais il ne l’est pas concernant les droits individuels de premier rang. Par ailleurs, les mécanismes correctifs (Cour suprême spéciale, Cour plénière, Tribunal des Salaires) aggravent le problème d’irrationalité en raison du grand nombre des juges. Ils engendrent aussi des décisions provocatrices dans les domaines électoraux et judiciaires. D’autre part, la Cour constitutionnelle se heurte à l’existence d’un système américain actif, d’un contexte culturel non continental, à l’interprétation historique des principes irrévisables et à un contexte social clientéliste. Plus particulièrement, la Cour constitutionnelle proposée favorise la loi en raison de la désignation des juges uniquement par le parti majoritaire et aussi de la saisine de la Cour dans le cas de deux invalidations successives de la loi. En conclusion, il est opportun d’établir un système mixte selon la nature des lois contrôlées comprenant une Assemblée Plénière restreinte et une Cour constitutionnelle constituée parmi une liste triple. / The project of the Greek government in 2006 to introduce a Constitutional Court in order to replace the diffused control poses the problem of the choice between the American model and the European model. There is non inherent superiority of one model from axiological, logic, technical and empirical point of view. The defaults of the American system are amplified in Greece by the European context, so that the Greek system assures the depoliticization of the control but it does not assure the legal security. In addition, it is activist in the socioeconomic domain but it is self-restrained concerning the fundamental liberties. The remedial mechanisms (Supreme Special Court, Plenary Court, “Tribunal of Wages”) aggravate the problem of irrationality, because of the existence of lot of judges and they engender also provocative decisions in the electoral and judicial domain. On the other hand, the introduction of a Constitutional Court comes up against the existence of an active American system, a non continental cultural context, the historical interpretation or irrevisable principles and a clientelist social context. More particularly, the proposed Constitutional Court favors the law owning to the fact that the judges are appointed only by the majority party and that the Court intervenes after two invalidations of the law. In conclusion, it is convenient to establish a mixed system according to the nature of controlled laws including a restricted Plenary Court and a Constitutional Court constituted among a triple list.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T17:38:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 30 / Nenhuma / A partir do exame de decisões do Tribunal Regional Federal da 4ª Região, com jurisdição nos Estados do Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina e Paraná, bem como do Superior Tribunal de Justiça, no que diz com o controle difuso de constitucionalidade das leis e atos normativos, tece o presente trabalho considerações sobre a utilização do Princípio da Reserva de Plenário, bem como da necessidade de manutenção do sistema difuso de controle de constitucionalidade, para concluir que esta jurisdição constitucional é necessária e imprescindível à manutenção da democracia. Vislumbra-se a horizontalidade do sistema de controle difuso como elemento indispensável à conservação de equilíbrio entre os Poderes da República, permitindo a provocação, por qualquer cidadão, da jurisdição constitucional, constatando-se que, a partir de uma interpretação crítica, o desvelamento do texto constitucional leva à necessidade da utilização do Princípio de Reserva de Plenário, mesmo no caso em que não se afasta o texto posto sob exame, isto / The present thesis aims to appreciate highly the principle disposed on the article 97 of the Brazilian Constitution by which the absolute majority number of plenary members (Full Bench) is requested in order to judge the questions related to the control of the constitutionality, as well as the necessity of the maintenance of the diffused control of the constitutionality, to conclude that the constitutional jurisdiction is necessary and indispensable for supporting the democracy. This study takes into consideration the decisions referring to the diffused control of the constitutionality over laws and normative acts given by the Federal Regional Court of the 4th Circuit with jurisdiction over the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná, and those pronounced by the Superior Court of Justice. It is possible to apprehend that the horizontality of the diffused control works as an indispensable element to maintain the balance among the Republic powers, permiting the provocation of the constitutional j

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-18T12:54:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTACAO_JOSE MURILO DUAILIBE SALEM NETO.pdf: 1318942 bytes, checksum: d4606d5b976747e139eb98856c88b4db (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-08 / FUNDAÇÃO DE AMPARO À PESQUISA E AO DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTIFICO E TECNOLÓGICO DO MARANHÃO / The present research studies the diffused constitutionality control, specifically through the Extraordinary Appeal, and its possibility to be a warrant of rights as integrity, against the changes that expanded its effects, as well as implemented institutes that also changed its admissibility requirement. In that order, is exposed how the constitutional supremacy ideal was accomplished, based on the constitutionalism of fundamental rights and the assignment of constitutional States of right. Highlighting the legitimacy arguments of the constitutionality control, especially for the warrant of fundamental rights, as well as analyzes the origination of this instrument and its history on the brazilian State. Highlighting the functions of the recent changes on the diffused constitutionality control, in a analyzis about the hard relation between the warrant of integrity and the rationalization of the judicial protection, with the creation of access requirements. / A presente pesquisa estuda o controle de constitucionalidade difuso, em especial o realizado através do Recurso Extraordinário, e sua possibilidade de garantia do direito como integridade, diante das modificações que ampliaram seus efeitos, bem como implantaram institutos que modificaram seus requisitos de admissibilidade. Neste intuito, expõe como se firmou o ideal de supremacia constitucional, baseado no constitucionalismo de direitos e no exercício de Estados constitucionais de direito. Destacando os argumentos de legitimidade do controle de constitucionalidade, mormente para garantia de direitos fundamentais, bem como analisa a criação deste instrumento e seu histórico no Estado brasileiro. Destacando as funções das alterações recentes no controle de constitucionalidade difuso, em uma análise sobre a difícil relação entre garantia da integridade e racionalização da tutela jurisdicional, com a criação de requisitos de acesso à prestação jurisdicional pelo STF.