This thesis comprises three empirical studies. These studies can be read as though they are independent. However, all three of them revolve around investigating whether and how characteristics of directors can affect firm-level outcomes. The first study – “Does gender diversity affect firm equity risk?” – systematically investigates whether gender diversity in the boardroom influences firm equity risk. To identify the causal effect of gender on risk, I employ a dynamic model which allows for the possibilities that risk can influence the gender of appointed directors and that both director gender and risk can be influenced by other unobserved firm-level factors. The overall results in this study do not support the view that female boardroom representation influences equity risk. I also show that findings of a negative relationship between the two variables are spurious and driven by unobserved between-firm heterogeneous factors. The second study – “Spillover effects of women on boards” – introduces an alternative way of looking at boardroom gender diversity. The definition of boardroom gender diversity is broadened to include female directors who do not sit on the board but are connected to the board through male directors or “external” female influence. This is in addition to the “internal” influence of female directors inside the board. I find that when both external and internal influences of female directors are considered, there is evidence supporting a link between gender diversity and firm risk and that a plausible channel by which gender affects risk is through more effective monitoring. Male directors are less likely to exhibit absenteeism when they are exposed to both external and internal female influence. CEO turnover sensitivity increases with the proportion of male directors who are externally connected to women, when there is at least one female director inside the board. Risk also increases with the proportion of these connected men when they work on a board with at least one woman. The findings suggests that female directors can exert influence on firm-level outcomes despite their minority status in the boardroom. The third study – “Independent director reputation incentives and stock price informativeness” – examines whether the reputation incentives of independent directors increase the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices. I find that the proportion of directors who deem their directorships to be more important based on firm market capitalization is associated with higher firm-specific information content in stock prices. This is consistent with the argument that boards that are incentivized to protect their reputation can deter managers from withholding information. I find this relation to be stronger when other external monitoring mechanisms are weak and when there is uncertainty regarding the future prospects of the firm. I also find evidence that a channel by which directors can influence stock price informativeness is through voluntary disclosure. Additionally, the presence of directors with high reputation incentives is negatively associated with stock price crash.

By the 20th Century, tax codes made a distinction between for-profit and not-for-profit organisations. The distinction was that not-for- profits were to supply a service to society like hospitals, churches and museums. The distinctions are no longer clear. There is a demand for 'new breed' or hybrid directors in an environment favoring economic capital and searching for people who can be champions for social capital. This international cross-disciplinary research explores the leadership challenge through personal interviews and survey feedback with 72 museum directors or associate directors across Australia, the United States, England and Canada. Organisation psychology and management theory is brought to the field of art history. Art history is the traditional breeding ground for museum directors. In concluding, the thesis argues for a range of propositions to address the current leadership crisis in art museums based on a new understanding of leadership and leadership development / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Thesis (D.Min.)--Liberty Theological Seminary and Graduate School, 2007.

As evident from recent changes in NYSE and Nasdaq listing requirements, board independence is considered an important constituent of firms?? corporate governance structures. However, the empirical evidence regarding the impact of board structure on firm performance is mixed. Since firms employ a variety of governance mechanism to control agency problems, the significance of board independence may depend upon the strengths of other governance mechanisms. I study the importance of board independence from the viewpoint of an investor by examining the market reaction to board member resignation announcements. I then examine this market reaction in the context of each firm??s existing governance structure and business environment. I find that investors react more negatively when an outside director resigns from the board than when an inside or gray director resigns. More importantly, I find that investor reaction to outside director resignation is less negative when insider or non-affiliated blockholder stock ownership is high. This evidence suggests that board independence and insider ownership and non-affiliated blockholder ownership may serve as substitutes. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that firms may require higher board oversight when a large part of managerial compensation is based on stock incentives. This finding suggests that overly high levels of stock-based managerial compensation may exacerbate agency problems. Taken together, these results have important implications for choosing an effective set of governance mechanisms that may work independently or in combination with each other to mitigate the agency cost of equity.

Thesis (M.R.E.)--Conservative Baptist Theological Seminary, 1969. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [55]-57).

The primary focus of this study is with the interactions and power relations between UK companies and other persons and organisations (who directly or indirectly are involved with their concerns) and the Accounting Standards Committee(RSC). Such a concern is explored at both the general level (i.e interactions and power relations about the process of setting accounting standards more generally) and on the specific level (i.e the depreciation and leasing standards). Th. contents of this study can be seen to be divided into three major parts. The first, presents a case for, and describes the nature of, a methodological approach based on Foucault's philosophy. The second, building on the first, takes a critical look at literature related to the concern of this study, paying particular attention to Its epistemological and methodological underpinnings. The third part, building again on the first, traces the micro —powers (techniques of power ) exercised between UK companies (directly or indirectly) and the ASC. In so doing, the study demonstrates and lends support to the following points. Firstly, to fully understand, the interactions and power relations between UK companies and the ASC concerning particular standards requires an uncovering of the wider context of interactions between the other interested parties and the RSC. In addition, these interactions should be placed in the wider context of interactions concerning the process of setting accounting standards more generally. Secondly, any change in the standards and the process of setting them, as visible events, are preceded and surrounded with Invisible interactions and power relations between UK companies and other interested parties and the ASC. Thirdly, these interactions have been expressed through both visible and invisible procedures and processes. These different forms of interaction are presented at every stage in the formulation of any standard. Fourthly, and finally, power exercised In the process of setting accounting standard on both a general and specific level has disciplinary, relational, and positive aspects.

No description available.

The traditional model of corporate governance is comprised of three main players: the board of directors, the management, and the shareholders who own of the corporation. This model has received a wave of criticism. The two most important complaints were that the directors had little to do with the day-to-day business of the corporation, and in their decision making the interests of the shareholders were not being taken into account. This situation has led to the creation of what has been called the "expectation gap" which is defined as the gap which exists between the shareholder's expectation, and the performance and actions of the board of directors. / To reduce this gap, the corporate governance actors have called for an increase in the independence of the board. / The purpose of this study is to give advisors to the French government a comparative understanding of the way that corporate governance in general, and in particular, the way the issue of the independence of the board has been dealt within the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

The purpose of this study was to develop a comprehensive data base of the status, role, and functions of athletic directors in South Dakota. Because the position had never been formally studied in this state, school administrators and school board members had no reliable data base to use when making policy and personnel decisions.The population surveyed consisted of all 191 athletic directors in South Dakota. One hundred and seventy eight athletic directors responded for a return rate of 93.2%. Differences among Class AA (16 largest schools), Class A (next 64 largest schools), and Class B (111 smallest schools) athletic directors were calculated using a chi-square test of independence with significance at p-value <.05.The surveys and subsequential statistical tests revealed that the larger the school in South Dakota, the more likely athletic directors were assigned full-time status, administrative status, secretarial assistance, a greater weekly time commitment to their jobs, more sports to supervise, more staff members to supervise and evaluate, an administrator to supervise and evaluate them, and a higher part-time stipend. The larger the school, the less likely athletic directors were assigned coaching duties. Larger schools were also more likely to employ athletic directors with more years of experience in teaching and coaching than were smaller schools. Physical education was the primary undergraduate major of athletic directors.These findings suggest that school enrollment is an important variable determining the role, status, and job scope of South Dakota athletic directors. In addition, many athletic directors in the smallest schools were principals or superintendents who performed the duties of athletic director as a part of their overall administrative duties.Recommendations are made for improving role definition and further research. / Department of Educational Leadership

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Murdoch University, 2007. / Thesis submitted to the Division of Arts. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 401-428).