Considering the recent corporate scandals over the past couple years – VBS Mutual Bank, McKinsey & Trillian, Steinhoff, EOH and possibly Tongaat Hulett to name but a few – many shareholders may seek to hold the directors and management of such entities personally liable for their involvement or negligence. Especially where their actions were tantamount to fraud, they benefited in some way and or as a result the company, and possibly the shareholders, suffered damages. This is especially true when a company as consequence is liquidated and cannot institute action on its behalf. It is submitted that directors are rarely held personally liable for failing to fulfill their duties, let alone liable to the shareholders. The risk of failing to monitor internal controls or business risks, and to hold those acting on behalf of the company responsible and accountable for their actions, is dangerous due to the significant effect that such failure could have on the economy, for example the economic collapse with respect to the recent Steinhoff debacle. Whereas the earlier Companies Act 61 of 1973 did not necessarily ‘spell out’ directors’ duties in detail, the Companies 71 of 2008 comprehensibly records their statutory and common law duties. To this extent the board is held accountable and can ensure proper governance in the company’s internal affairs. Shareholders expect management to maximise the value of a company for the benefit of the shareholders and to act in their best interest. In achieving this, directors are required to act in the best interests of the company. However, directors may use their elevated position for their own personal gain and self-interests. Thus, in which circumstances will courts pierce the corporate veil, stepping aside from a company’s unique legal personality, to impute liability to the wrongdoers lurking behind? The relationship between directors, a company and its shareholders is a fiduciary one which imposes certain duties upon directors. However, it is well established in law that directors’ duties are owed to the company itself. Thus, considering common and statutory law, on what legal basis would shareholders be able to bring a claim against directors for the loss or damage they suffered due to an act of the directors? Considering the above, this paper seeks to explore directors’ liability to shareholders within South Africa’s common and statutory law, bearing in mind entrenched legal principles, such as the argument that fiduciary duties are duties owed to the company and not to individual shareholders; and that as a result only the company can impose liability on its directors. / Mini Dissertation (LLM (Corporate Law))--University of Pretoria, 2019. / Mercantile Law / LLM (Corporate Law) / Unrestricted

Czech regulation of limited companies from the point of view of the 'law and economics' school Abstract Law and economics has a potential to provide us with an uncommon and to the Czech jurisdiction often neglected point of view on laws. The aim of this paper is to apply economic theories on directors' liability for breach of fiduciary duties and to consider its consequences on the economic efficiency of companies. The critical question is whether not having such liability could provoke an increase of wealth of all stakeholders. The paper also aims to come up with instruments capable of minimizing the lost caused to companies by mandatory rules regarding director's liability. At the end of the thesis, the Czech laws regarding the director's liability for breach of fiduciary duties are analyzed in the point of view of economic analysis. The analysis is followed by proposition of instruments that could make companies operating in Czech legal environment more effective. Directors' liability, which can result in an aversion to make risky decisions, can cause significant losses to companies (so called agency costs). For that reason, the possibility to determine the scope of director's liability given to shareholders can have, in some cases, positive effect on the company's efficiency. The paper concludes that...

La tesi affronta il tema della responsabilità dei membri del consiglio di amministrazione di s.p.a verso la società per gli inadempimenti dei doveri gestori insiti negli atti o nelle omissioni collegiali. L'accertamento dei presupposti della responsabilità degli amministratori deve avvenire su base individuale con conseguente possibilità di imputazione del danno da risarcire ad alcuni consiglieri e non ad altri, che pure abbiano compartecipato al medesimo inadempimento: il singolo amministratore può infatti essere esonerato da responsabilità mediante la prova della personale immunità da colpa (dimostrando di essere stato diligente alla luce della natura del suo incarico e delle sue specifiche competenze) anche a prescindere dalla manifestazione formale del dissenso ex art. 2392 cc., ult. comma. La solidarietà rappresenta la regola di attuazione dell'obbligazione risarcitoria tra gli amministratori ritenuti corresponsabili in relazione al medesimo fatto dannoso. È possibile tuttavia pervenire ad una graduazione della condanna risarcitoria in virtù dell'eventuale connotazione dolosa dell'inadempimento di un singolo consigliere e dell'applicazione del regime risarcitorio differenziato di cui all'art. 1307 c.c.. La società può inoltre rinunziare alla solidarietà anche ex ante con adozione in via statutaria di un regime di responsabilità parziaria per tutti o alcuni degli amministratori, purchè nei soli rapporti tra società e amministratori e nei limiti di cui all'art. 1229 cc. / This thesis provides an analysis of the pertinent aspects of the liability of corporate directors for breach of their fiduciary duties in case of collegial functioning of an Italian s.p.a.'s board of directors. The liability of the directors must be determined on an individual basis and whether they are exculpated from liability for a breach of their duties can vary for each director based on his specialized skills and on the role he plays in the board (independent director, president, member of a committee), regardless of the entering of the dissent from the board's action into the corporate records. The liability is joint and several where two or more directors jointly participate in the same breach of a fiduciary duty with a right of contribution inter se. The corporation ( S.P.A. ) may waive to the protection secured by the joint and several liability rule either (i) by opting for a proportional liability regime with respect to the directors' liability vis-a-vis the corporation and except for the cases of directors' fraud or gross negligence or (ii) by entering into partial settlements with one director (or more directors) for the portion of the damage attributable to his (or their) personal fault.

Submitted by Edileide Reis (leyde-landy@hotmail.com) on 2013-04-15T14:00:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Irena Carneiro Martins.pdf: 492924 bytes, checksum: adb1e49b063679e6e3940d77a1771caa (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Meirelles(rodrigomei@ufba.br) on 2013-05-09T17:39:33Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Irena Carneiro Martins.pdf: 492924 bytes, checksum: adb1e49b063679e6e3940d77a1771caa (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-09T17:39:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Irena Carneiro Martins.pdf: 492924 bytes, checksum: adb1e49b063679e6e3940d77a1771caa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Este trabalho tratou de investigar as origens do instituto da limitação da responsabilidade dos sócios e estabelecer a importância de tal limitação – a partir da harmonização entre os princípios constitucionais de proteção aos direitos sociais e os princípios – igualmente constitucionais – da livre iniciativa do qual decorre também o princípio da preservação da empresa. De modo semelhante buscou se estabelecer a importância da delimitação da responsabilização dos administradores que não possuem vínculo societário com as empresas por eles administradas tanto no âmbito legislativo quanto judicial. Nesse contexto buscou-se demonstrar – para além dos prejuízos – a ociosidade da aplicação da teoria da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica em face dos remédios jurídicos já existentes no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro para as ocasiões em que se verifique a ocorrência de fraude simulação e prática dos atos ultra vires. Advoga-se neste trabalho a possibilidade de se buscar a preservação da empresa atendendo ao chamado do devido processo legal e – simultaneamente– ao chamado da busca pela satisfação do crédito ou reparação de prejuízos ensejados mediante o abuso. da pessoa jurídica seja por administrador seja por sócio fortalecendo assim os caros institutos da segurança jurídica e previsibilidade das decisões judiciais. Concorrem também para a consagração do tudo quanto aqui exposto uma redução do ativismo judicial que se verifica em preterimento de direitos processuais que gozam de status constitucional como os da ampla defesa e do contraditório. Além disso buscou-se evidenciar a necessidade de diálogo entre Direito – através dos magistrados – e Economia a partir da compreensão por parte daqueles dos reflexos de sua atuação para o desenvolvimento econômico e consequentemente para o desenvolvimento social. Nesse tocante acredita-se útil a colaboração que pode ser fornecida pela Psicanálise a partir de uma das três instâncias do aparelho psíquico: o superego no entendimento do Judiciário como superego da sociedade. / Salvador