In 1985 Richard Preston identified three Royal Navy (RN) traditions (recruitment of officers at an early age, selection of officers from an elite social group, and insistence on sea service) which had shaped the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). These traditions, he argued, ensured a high level of professionalism amongst officers in the infant RCN, as well as complete interoperability between the two navies, but failed to recognise the distinct needs of Canadian society. Consequently, from the Second World War onwards the RCN chose to move away from the British model and to ???Canadianise??? its officer corps. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) also adopted these traditions, and they are examined here in the context of the social backgrounds, development and character of the permanent executive branch officers of the RAN between 1913 and 1950. This thesis argues that while the British model ensured a high level of professionalism within the RAN officer corps, in many other areas the system proved to be of doubtful utility for Australia. Although the Australian government tried to ensure that its naval officers maintained an Australian character and identity, the selection, training and operational policies of the RAN meant that its officers were, to all intents and purposes, virtually indistinguishable from their RN colleagues. While RAN officers were highly disciplined and professional men with excellent seamanship skills, unfortunately a wide social gulf developed between the Navy???s officers and its sailors. Further, the essentially scientific and practical education and indoctrination that naval officers received in their early years, combined with their narrow professional development, meant that they were, at best, only average higher level administrators and often performed poorly in dealings with their Australian political masters. The system produced a conservative type of officer, suspicious of political activity and intellectual effort, bound to the tradition of ???the Silent Service???, who felt that his country did not understand his work or sacrifices but who had not the capacity to change such community perceptions. Lacking highly educated and politically aware senior officers, the RAN found it difficult to cope with social changes after the Second World War. Consequently, the ???Australianisation??? of the naval officer corps was a slow and painful process and the profession of naval officer in Australia was to be even more marginal than numbers alone dictated.

In 1985 Richard Preston identified three Royal Navy (RN) traditions (recruitment of officers at an early age, selection of officers from an elite social group, and insistence on sea service) which had shaped the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). These traditions, he argued, ensured a high level of professionalism amongst officers in the infant RCN, as well as complete interoperability between the two navies, but failed to recognise the distinct needs of Canadian society. Consequently, from the Second World War onwards the RCN chose to move away from the British model and to ???Canadianise??? its officer corps. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) also adopted these traditions, and they are examined here in the context of the social backgrounds, development and character of the permanent executive branch officers of the RAN between 1913 and 1950. This thesis argues that while the British model ensured a high level of professionalism within the RAN officer corps, in many other areas the system proved to be of doubtful utility for Australia. Although the Australian government tried to ensure that its naval officers maintained an Australian character and identity, the selection, training and operational policies of the RAN meant that its officers were, to all intents and purposes, virtually indistinguishable from their RN colleagues. While RAN officers were highly disciplined and professional men with excellent seamanship skills, unfortunately a wide social gulf developed between the Navy???s officers and its sailors. Further, the essentially scientific and practical education and indoctrination that naval officers received in their early years, combined with their narrow professional development, meant that they were, at best, only average higher level administrators and often performed poorly in dealings with their Australian political masters. The system produced a conservative type of officer, suspicious of political activity and intellectual effort, bound to the tradition of ???the Silent Service???, who felt that his country did not understand his work or sacrifices but who had not the capacity to change such community perceptions. Lacking highly educated and politically aware senior officers, the RAN found it difficult to cope with social changes after the Second World War. Consequently, the ???Australianisation??? of the naval officer corps was a slow and painful process and the profession of naval officer in Australia was to be even more marginal than numbers alone dictated.