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In 1985 Richard Preston identified three Royal Navy (RN) traditions (recruitment of officers at an early age, selection of officers from an elite social group, and insistence on sea service) which had shaped the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). These traditions, he argued, ensured a high level of professionalism amongst officers in the infant RCN, as well as complete interoperability between the two navies, but failed to recognise the distinct needs of Canadian society. Consequently, from the Second World War onwards the RCN chose to move away from the British model and to ???Canadianise??? its officer corps. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) also adopted these traditions, and they are examined here in the context of the social backgrounds, development and character of the permanent executive branch officers of the RAN between 1913 and 1950. This thesis argues that while the British model ensured a high level of professionalism within the RAN officer corps, in many other areas the system proved to be of doubtful utility for Australia. Although the Australian government tried to ensure that its naval officers maintained an Australian character and identity, the selection, training and operational policies of the RAN meant that its officers were, to all intents and purposes, virtually indistinguishable from their RN colleagues. While RAN officers were highly disciplined and professional men with excellent seamanship skills, unfortunately a wide social gulf developed between the Navy???s officers and its sailors. Further, the essentially scientific and practical education and indoctrination that naval officers received in their early years, combined with their narrow professional development, meant that they were, at best, only average higher level administrators and often performed poorly in dealings with their Australian political masters. The system produced a conservative type of officer, suspicious of political activity and intellectual effort, bound to the tradition of ???the Silent Service???, who felt that his country did not understand his work or sacrifices but who had not the capacity to change such community perceptions. Lacking highly educated and politically aware senior officers, the RAN found it difficult to cope with social changes after the Second World War. Consequently, the ???Australianisation??? of the naval officer corps was a slow and painful process and the profession of naval officer in Australia was to be even more marginal than numbers alone dictated.

This thesis studies the development of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), during the period 1911 to 1952 from the perspective of the men of the lower deck, the RAN ratings. The early RAN was modelled very closely on the Royal Navy (RN), but the expectations of its managers and administrators, imbued as they were with the culture and tradition of the RN, were not easily compatible with the character of the Australians who became the RAN???s ratings. The class distinction which functioned in the RN, when applied to the more egalitarian Australians caused ill-feeling and led to the breakdown of discipline. The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board strongly resisted attempts by the Australian Government and the Australian people to regulate its affairs, a situation which seriously disadvantaged the RAN ratings and their families. In the wider context a continuing refusal by both the British Admiralty and the senior officers of the RAN to allow the development of a truly national navy led to significant manpower problems. This both inhibited the establishment of a navy for Australia and denied that navy full use of the unique attributes of the Australian rating.

This thesis examines the origins and development of signals intelligence in the Royal Australian Navy, during the period 1914 to 1945, within the context of an Australian contribution to Imperial defence. In doing so it demonstrates how the development of this capability was shaped by national, Imperial and international forces and events. The thesis thus fills a gap in the historiography of imperial defence and of early twentieth century signals intelligence. It also constitutes a case study of the development of a niche military capability by a small to medium power in the context of great power alliances and major historical events. The thesis is based principally upon the investigation of documents in the Australian, US and UK national archives, some of which have been newly declassified for this purpose. During the First World War the RAN undertook a minor cryptographic effort focused on intercepting and breaking coded messages from the German Pacific Squadron. After the War, and at the request of the RN, the RAN began to develop a signals intelligence capability aimed at the Imperial Japanese Navy. This capability was seen as part of the RAN contribution to Imperial defence. The commitment, made without Australian political approval, would see the RAN conduct two covert intelligence collection operations against the Japanese Mandated Territories. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent defeat of the Western Powers in Asia, the RAN signals intelligence organisation became, as a consequence of agreements between Britain and the USN, part of the USN organisation in the Pacific. At no stage however, was the RAN involved in the discussions which accompanied these arrangements nor did it have any subsequent say in the strategic direction of this capability. As a consequence, when the Pacific War was drawing to a close the future of the RAN's cryptographic organisation came in to question. By the time the Japanese surrendered this issue had still not been resolved. Beyond the history of the origins and development of signals intelligence in the RAN, and of its involvement in the signals intelligence war against Japan, the thesis highlights the importance of committed individuals in small military organisations and how they can greatly influence the success or otherwise of these organisations. The ability of personnel from different nations to work together in signals intelligence is reflective of the functioning of the alliance as a whole. The development of such a niche capability by a small to medium power can have an effect on that nation's standing, in the context of alliance relationships, as it did in this case. As the RAN found however, such capabilities do not provide for automatic access to strategic decision making within an alliance.

In 1985 Richard Preston identified three Royal Navy (RN) traditions (recruitment of officers at an early age, selection of officers from an elite social group, and insistence on sea service) which had shaped the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). These traditions, he argued, ensured a high level of professionalism amongst officers in the infant RCN, as well as complete interoperability between the two navies, but failed to recognise the distinct needs of Canadian society. Consequently, from the Second World War onwards the RCN chose to move away from the British model and to ???Canadianise??? its officer corps. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) also adopted these traditions, and they are examined here in the context of the social backgrounds, development and character of the permanent executive branch officers of the RAN between 1913 and 1950. This thesis argues that while the British model ensured a high level of professionalism within the RAN officer corps, in many other areas the system proved to be of doubtful utility for Australia. Although the Australian government tried to ensure that its naval officers maintained an Australian character and identity, the selection, training and operational policies of the RAN meant that its officers were, to all intents and purposes, virtually indistinguishable from their RN colleagues. While RAN officers were highly disciplined and professional men with excellent seamanship skills, unfortunately a wide social gulf developed between the Navy???s officers and its sailors. Further, the essentially scientific and practical education and indoctrination that naval officers received in their early years, combined with their narrow professional development, meant that they were, at best, only average higher level administrators and often performed poorly in dealings with their Australian political masters. The system produced a conservative type of officer, suspicious of political activity and intellectual effort, bound to the tradition of ???the Silent Service???, who felt that his country did not understand his work or sacrifices but who had not the capacity to change such community perceptions. Lacking highly educated and politically aware senior officers, the RAN found it difficult to cope with social changes after the Second World War. Consequently, the ???Australianisation??? of the naval officer corps was a slow and painful process and the profession of naval officer in Australia was to be even more marginal than numbers alone dictated.

This thesis studies the development of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), during the period 1911 to 1952 from the perspective of the men of the lower deck, the RAN ratings. The early RAN was modelled very closely on the Royal Navy (RN), but the expectations of its managers and administrators, imbued as they were with the culture and tradition of the RN, were not easily compatible with the character of the Australians who became the RAN???s ratings. The class distinction which functioned in the RN, when applied to the more egalitarian Australians caused ill-feeling and led to the breakdown of discipline. The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board strongly resisted attempts by the Australian Government and the Australian people to regulate its affairs, a situation which seriously disadvantaged the RAN ratings and their families. In the wider context a continuing refusal by both the British Admiralty and the senior officers of the RAN to allow the development of a truly national navy led to significant manpower problems. This both inhibited the establishment of a navy for Australia and denied that navy full use of the unique attributes of the Australian rating.

On 10 February 1964 during naval night exercises off the south coast of Australia, the destroyer HMAS Voyager was lost after colliding with the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne. 82 men were killed. Following the collision, there were two Royal Commissions that sustained a political controversy that lasted for over four years. This thesis examines the loss of Voyager as a watershed in the operational and administrative history of the RAN and as a major event in Australian national history. This study has four broad objectives: to describe the loss of Voyager and the long running controversy that accompanied the disaster; to offer a convincing explanation of the causes of the collision and why two royal commissions concluded that the causes for the disaster were inexplicable; to assess the effect on the RAN, in terms of specific reforms and its influence on Service culture and professional ethos, of the disaster and the inquiries that followed; and finally, to analyse the loss of Voyager as a media and political cause celebre in Australian history. As so little has been written about Voyager using primary sources, this thesis was committed to detailed description of events as well as analysis of themes. This thesis draws upon an extensive body of primary source material in the form of official naval and Royal Commission records to which complete access was given; several large collections of private papers; over one hundred interviews with principal participants; and comprehensive files of press cuttings. The discussion seeks to demonstrate that a series of naval accidents preceding the loss of Voyager contributed in a substantial way to shaping the public reaction to, and political handling of, the disaster; that the method of inquiry played a major role in generating public and political disquiet; that the collision was both a catalyst and stimulus to change in naval operations and reform in naval administration; that the inability of two Royal Commissions to ascertain the causes of the collision and then to public suspicion of a cover-up; and, that the collision was most probably caused by the incorrect relaying of a tactical signal on the bridge of Voyager. The loss of HMAS Voyager appears to be a key event in the development of the RAN, not as a direct result of the collision or its causes, but as a consequence of its long and controversial aftermath.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti-submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia???s maritime operations and retarded its development.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti-submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia???s maritime operations and retarded its development.