Project stakeholder management (SM) as one of the building blocks for project management theory has been studied by many scholars, and a lot of theoretical frameworks are developed to analyse relevant stakeholders based on different groups of attributes to formulate appropriate expectation managing strategies. Nevertheless, contemporary research rarely describes the dynamic change of stakeholder relationship during the course of a project and mainly focuses on public-private partnership projects where the relationships are complex and some external stakeholders can be threatening to project goals. As a result, private engineering procurement projects are less addressed by such studies, in which stakeholders are usually aligned on organisation-wise objectives but they lack alignment on whose expectation to prioritize by project operation team.  This thesis studied one engineering equipment procurement project took place at start-up company who specialised on green energy and tailored one existing stakeholder model to analyse key stakeholder's salience development during two major project stages and to understand their behaviours, as well as the resulted impacts on project operation brought by individual stakeholder action. The study found out that stakeholders’ behaviours are well in line with their expectations from not only the project but also the organization, and stakeholder salience level can function as good guidance to steer project trajectory. Nevertheless, a proper cross-functional coordination is needed to not overshadow project genuine objective with organization-level objectives. The study also addressed other challenges pertinent to stakeholder management in private engineering project sector, in terms of stakeholder inclusion and information dissimilation, stakeholder coalition and intervention of top management. Further research is called out to be performed on this sector especially for start-up organisations that operate under rapid changing environment.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti-submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia???s maritime operations and retarded its development.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti-submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia???s maritime operations and retarded its development.