Civility has many critics. Some challenge its distinctness as a virtue, others its moral significance. In this essay, I attempt to meet both challenges by offering an account of civility that stands distinct from other concepts and holds great value, both intrinsically and instrumentally. I claim that we show civility toward others when we dispute their ideas in ways that respect those persons' intrinsic worth. My account pays particular attention to the connections between civility, clarity and reconciliation--connections that make civility vital for modern pluralistic societies. I then consider a recent alternative to this conception of civility advanced by Calhoun (2000), arguing that it secures distinctness at the cost of moral significance. / Master of Arts / In the midst of our contemporary polarization and hostile exchanges, one often hears calls for greater civility. Yet what is civility? Does it name a distinct concept, or is it merely synonymous with other virtues? And why, if at all, should we value it? In this essay, I attempt to answer these questions. Cheshire Calhoun notes that the latter two question pose serious challenges for would-be defenders of civility, challenges of distinctness and significance. I aim to offer an account of civility that meets both of these challenges. I argue that we show civility toward others when we dispute their ideas in ways that respect those persons’ intrinsic worth. My account pays particular attention to the connections between civility, clarity and reconciliation— connections that make civility particularly important for modern pluralistic societies. I then consider Calhoun’s own conception of civility, arguing that it secures distinctness at the cost of moral significance.