The main objective of this dissertation is to provide insight into commercial bank decisionmaking in the United States. To this end, commercial bank behavior is explored in three separate essays. Chapter 1 examines the liquidity adjustment behavior of U.S. commercial banks from 1993-2006. A panel vector autoregressive framework is employed to estimate the dynamic responses of bank loans and liquid assets to a variety of bank funding shocks. Orthogonalized impulse responses reveal that banks respond to disruptions in funding by extending less credit and hoarding liquid assets. This paper also highlights functional differences between small and large banks. Large banks generally have access to capital markets and other external funding sources; small banks do not. As a result, small banks are more sensitive to funding disruptions. Balance sheet liquidity is also vitally important for small banks. Small, liquid banks are able to continue lending in response to disruptions in core deposits while illiquid banks are forced to cut lending. Chapter 2 investigates the effects of bank mergers on deposit growth over the period 1994- 2005. The present study differentiates between mergers initiated by small and large banks. We find empirical evidence of deposit runoff to go along with the anecdotal evidence known to the banking community. Contrary to expectation, mergers initiated by large commercial banks are able maintain their deposit levels while mergers between small banks generally lose deposit funding. Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on key segments of the mortgage market. Error correction models of the residential real estate loan share and the non-jumbo loan share indicate that the Dodd-Frank Act coincided with a dramatic decline in both loan share measures. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act had a negative, long-run effect on the non-jumbo loan share for large commercial banks; reducing the non-jumbo loan share by 15.13%. Moreover, the residential real estate share declined by 8.79%. These findings are consistent with commercial banks re-allocating their loan portfolios in favor of high dollar C&I loans, commercial real estate loans, and jumbo mortgages in response to the increased fixed compliance costs of originating loans under the Dodd-Frank Act.

This master thesis deals with causes and some of the main instituonal answers to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The thesis also ppresents a brief historical overview of US financial crisis. The main aim of the first chapter is to decide whether the US historical crisis have something in common. The answer is that the past crisis really share something and the difference is rather in historical circumstances. The second chapter is dedicated to some of the financial crisis causes such as Community Reinvestment Act,Gramm Leach Bliley Act, Commodity Futures Modernization Act and also to the role of moral hazard. This thesis is of a firm belief that the only aspect that can be blamed is the phenomenon of moral hazard. The last chapter is focused on the main instituonal answers to the crisis. Dodd-Frank Act, Volcker rule, reorganization of derivative market, some of the changes in rating agencies regulation and also BASEL III consequences for capital requirements are all under the radar.

The financial markets have undergone a very dramatic evolution in the last 100 years. Multiple attempts to regulate the evolution were part of the development. They reacted mostly on economic crises, whether on the capital market or in the banking sector. This thesis describes the developments in the US and European financial markets. Most important part of the thesis contains an analysis of the causes, course of action and impacts of the financial crisis, it evaluates current crisis in the terms of functionality of the financial crisis regulation system as well as suggestions and discussions how tho improve regulation in the USA and the European Union.

This dissertation investigates agents’ behavior in a world with financial frictions such as financial regulations and information asymmetries. The three chapters of the dissertation are devoted to answering the following questions: Does financial regulation slow credit supply growth by imposing higher lending standards on banks? How does business volatility contribute to the declining firm entry rate in recent decades through credit channel? How does a financially distressed firm respond to risks when it is deemed "too big to fail"? Although widely acknowledged for enhancing financial stability, the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) has continued to attract criticisms arguing that it contracts credit supply, and, as a consequence, reduces GDP and creates pressure on unemployment. In chapter I, I provide empirical and theoretical evidence on DFA’s negative impacts on credit supply. Based on a structural banking model, I find that DFA has reduced credit supply by at least 3.1% of the current volume of bank credit. This sizable loss partially validates the concern that the Wall Street reform put a strain on the economy and prevented it from fully recovering through credit channels. In chapter II, I present empirical and theoretical evidence suggesting that unexpected surging economic uncertainty hurts startups through credit channel: rising default rates accompanying heightened economic turbulence drive up credit spreads. With startups facing increasing funding costs, entry barriers go up and entry rates decline. Through simulations of an industry model incorporating dynamic entry and exit, I show that unexpected uncertainty shocks can generate larger and more persistent impact on economic outputs in a world with financial frictions than that without the frictions. In Chapter III, I argue that the risk-taking behavior of a financially distressed firm is exacerbated if the equity holders have larger bargaining power over debt holders. Using a firm’s valuation model which permits the endogenous default on the debt, I show that the threshold value triggering risk-taking behavior is positively related to the equity holders’ bargaining power in debt renegotiations. Therefore, firms anticipating a final bailout intentionally undertake more risky investments.

This paper examines shareholder disapproval of CEO compensation as expressed through their advisory vote on executive compensation (say-on-pay) as required by Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Using a sample of 884 votes by S&P 500 firms in 2011 and 2012, I find that higher CEO salary, a weak link between pay and performance, and higher dilution from stock option grants are associated with lower say-on-pay approval. In addition, I find evidence that shareholders are sophisticated in their examination of CEO compensation by voting against excess compensation over what is deserved due to performance and other determining factors.

The 2008 subprime mortgage crisis is characterized by an increase in subprime lending and default on such mortgages. A combination of factors, such as risk excessive risk taken on by financial institutions, poorly implemented government housing policies and biased regulation are perceived to have caused the crisis. In response to the crisis, Congress approved the largest bailout of the United States financial system in taxpayer history. Signed into law by President George W. Bush, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) authorized the federal government to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to purchase distressed assets, including mortgage-backed securities, and provide liquidity to banks. Comprehensive financial reform followed the bailout package in the form of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This paper examines how both pieces of legislation threaten the constitutional protection of economic liberties.

Révélées au grand jour à partir de l’année 2007, par leur implication dans la crise des subprime puis parleur rôle procyclique dans celle des dettes souveraines, les agences de notation ont été l’objet d’uneattention toute particulière du législateur qui se devait d’assurer l’intégrité des marchés et de restaurer laconfiance des investisseurs au lendemain d’un véritable cataclysme financier. Conflits d’intérêts, opacité,méthodologies défaillantes, crédibilité équivoque, comportements anti-concurrentiels, les critiquesadressées à l’encontre de l’oligopole, dominant l’industrie de notation, étaient nombreuses. L’adoptionsuccessive de dispositifs règlementaires n’a pu permettre un affranchissement de l’influence de cepouvoir privé économique, dont l’enracinement règlementaire date du lendemain de la GrandeDépression de 1929 et le développement est étroitement lié à celui de la titrisation. Bien au contraire, lesnouvelles règlementations qui auraient dû encadrer «l’activité» plutôt que les «structures» n’ont eu, aucoté de certaines initiatives louables, eu pour effet principal que la consécration d’un régime spécial.Même les affronts à l’ordre public économique n’ont été que rarement lavés par une justice qui setrouvait, sauf rares exceptions, en manque d’armes adéquats et par un régulateur encore trop balbutiant.Rattrapés par des enjeux en constante mutation, les quelques acquis liés à la transparence et au contrôledes agences de notation tendent déjà à être remis en cause. Le législateur, quant à lui, semble déjà êtrepassé à autre chose, et ce, alors que point à l’horizon des nouveaux marchés de nouvelles bulles oùagissent encore les agences de notation. / As a result of their involvement in the subprime crisis and pro-cyclical role in the sovereign debt crisis,the credit rating agencies have been, since 2007, subject to the specific attention of the lawmaker whichhad to ensure integrity of the financial market and restore investors’ confidence in the aftermath of a realfinancial cataclysm. The criticisms against the oligopoly that dominates the rating industry were manyand include, inter alia, conflict of interest, opacity, deficient methodologies, lack of credibility and anticompetitivebehaviours. The successive adoption of regulatory and legislative measures was not enoughto achieve emancipation from the influence of this economic private power which maintains rootswithin the market regulatory framework since the aftermath of the Great Depression of 1929 and whosedevelopment is closely linked to securitization. Instead, the new regulations that should have governedan “activity” rather than “structures” have, alongside some commendable initiatives, resulted in theconsecration of a specific regime. Even the violations of the economic public order were rarely punishedby a justice which, except for anecdotic cases, was missing adequate legal weapons to address thosesituations or by a regulator still too immature. However, due to an environment constantly changing, thefew benefits obtained in terms of the rating agencies’ transparency and control, are already in the processof being jeopardised. The lawmaker seems to have moved on to other topics, while on the horizonappear new bubbles in new markets where rating agencies are very active.

The aim of this thesis is to do an in-depth research into the development of regulation and supervision over the financial and bank markets in the European Union and the USA at the time of the ongoing financial crisis. The first part deals with general theoretical attitudes and targets of regulation and supervision over financial markets. Furthermore, it focuses on the effects of the financial crisis and the problems faced by European as well as American banking institutions and on the rescue measures taken by national governments. The second part presents a comprehensive view on the individual steps and regulating propositions taken by the EU and USA. In the main, it describes the regulation reform and the new architecture of the supervising system over the financial sector. The conclusion of this work is a summary of the acquired knowledge about the regulation reform and the supervision over the financial sector and its objective is to evaluate the impact on the world economy produced by this reform.

This purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of increased accounting regulations on financial reporting practices. Specifically, this paper provides an in-depth look into two specific regulations, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. SOX was enacted as a result of the many accounting scandals that occurred in the late 1990s, and its main intention was to reduce the likelihood that fraud would occur by establishing additional oversight and increasing the number of regulations for public accounting firms. This paper examines the costs associated with specific provisions within SOX and the effects that they have on public companies. Ultimately, this paper finds that SOX imposes an unfair burden to smaller public companies. Secondly, this paper examines the effect that regulations in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act had on the financial services industry. The 2008 financial crisis was caused by poor regulations of large financial institutions, which failed to prevent these institutions from engaging in behavior that would later have a negative impact on many Americans. In order to prevent this type of behavior from affecting the stability of the entire U.S. economy, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act. Due to the recent enactment of this act, and because most of its provisions are still being implemented, this paper focuses on identifying and presenting valid arguments for and against some of the act’s most important provisions.

As harmful as the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was, some organizations professed some benefits as a result; “we know our risks better,” “we can better manage risks.” Many of the organizations that hailed such positives undoubtedly had what would generally be considered sound risk management systems/practices (RMS). So, what happened? What prevented organizations RMS from perhaps better mitigating risk during the recent financial crisis than was the case? Said another way, “what are barriers to effective risk management?” This study proposes a risk governance framework (RGF) that helps distinguish phases of RMS, and is grounded in Risk principles versus a controls based foundation that many view as part of the current problem with RMS. Based on our survey of 41 Risk Managers (RM) and 96 Regulators (REG), we obtained perspectives on barriers to effective risk management including barriers to effective risk management leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the importance of Risk principles, and suggestions to improve the effectiveness of RMS. We also obtained RM and REG perspectives of the impacts to RMS from our banking environment providing a type of “insurance,” impacts to RMS due to perceptions of the state of the financial/economic environment, how complete must phases of RMS be, compensation practices and its impacts to RMS, and the notion of quantitative/qualitative methods in current RMS. Leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, identified barriers to effective risk management include a lack of risk culture and under estimating risks. Some suggestions to improve RMS include improving the risk function and developing more dynamic, forwarding looking and preemptive risk management tools and techniques that blend quantitative and qualitative methods. The proposed RGF and the rich context on barriers to effective risk management obtained from our study may help practitioners and academia alike in considering ways to analyze and improve RMS.