We model a two period game with duopoly market under either quantity or price competition. In the first period, the manufacturer decides on whether to accept the returned products. The optimal ratio of refurbishing is then determined in the second period once the manufacturer has decided to do refurbishing. We identify the optimality conditions that lead to different possible equilibrium outcomes for different scenarios in which two firms may play symmetrically or asymmetrically. Our extensive numerical analysis substantiates the analytical results and we focus on the effect on the subgame perfect equilibrium caused by various parameters. Among our results, we find that, as the return ratio increases, the profits generated from the refurbished market become harder to compensate the loss in the new product market. Besides, the increase of substitution effect in the quantity competition enhances the degree of satisfaction for the refurbished products and it hurts firm¡¦s performance in the more profitable new product market. However, the effect of substitution effect in the price competition is entirely opposite. For instance, when the substitution effect is high, only one firm enters the refurbished product market; and when the substitution effect is low, both firms enter the refurbished product market.

The internationalization of production requires each multinational firm to determine the local content rate for his product that is made and sold in a foreign country. In this thesis, we investigate the local content rate and pricing decisions for a multinational firm who competes with a local firm in a market without and with a local content requirement (LCR). We develop and solve a two-stage decision problem in which the multinational firm determines his optimal local content rate and the two firms then make their pricing decisions. Our analytical results show that the multinational firm sets a lower local content rate, when the competition between the product of the multinational firm and that of the local firm intensifies, consumers' valuation is more strongly affected by the quality of the product of the multinational firm, and the reduction in consumers' marginal utility is smaller. We also show that an LCR may induce the multinational firm to increase local content rate and transfer benefits from the multinational firm to the local firm. However, a very high LCR threshold will cause the multinational firm to adopt a low local content rate, resulting in a low demand and profit for both the multinational firm and the local firm.