We model a two period game with duopoly market under either quantity or price competition. In the first period, the manufacturer decides on whether to accept the returned products. The optimal ratio of refurbishing is then determined in the second period once the manufacturer has decided to do refurbishing. We identify the optimality conditions that lead to different possible equilibrium outcomes for different scenarios in which two firms may play symmetrically or asymmetrically. Our extensive numerical analysis substantiates the analytical results and we focus on the effect on the subgame perfect equilibrium caused by various parameters. Among our results, we find that, as the return ratio increases, the profits generated from the refurbished market become harder to compensate the loss in the new product market. Besides, the increase of substitution effect in the quantity competition enhances the degree of satisfaction for the refurbished products and it hurts firm¡¦s performance in the more profitable new product market. However, the effect of substitution effect in the price competition is entirely opposite. For instance, when the substitution effect is high, only one firm enters the refurbished product market; and when the substitution effect is low, both firms enter the refurbished product market.