Essay 1 Abstract Prior research indicates that equity markets assign a higher valuation to firms that sustain a string of earnings increases (earnings string) and a string of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings expectations (MBE string). However, to date, there is little evidence on the response of debt investors when firms sustain a long string of meeting/beating earnings benchmarks. This study fills the gap in the literature by analyzing the impact of sustaining an earnings string/MBE string on the cost of debt. I find evidence of a positive (negative) association between the length of the earnings string/MBE string and the bond yield spreads (credit ratings). These results suggest that debt holders assess a higher risk to firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks and require a higher risk premium, contrary to equity holders, who reward firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks. Additional analyses indicate that this discrepancy is attributable to the different investor compositions between debt and equity markets. Essay 2 Abstract This study extends the existing literature by investigating the impact of sustaining a string of earnings increases (earnings string) on stock returns using the time-series asset pricing approach. Using both Fama-French (1993) three-factor and Carhart (1997) four-factor models, I find that the average abnormal return of a zero investment arbitrage portfolio that longs the highest earnings string portfolio and shorts the lowest earnings string portfolio is approximately negative 65 (75) basis points per month. These results provide further insight into the existing literature by demonstrating that earnings string firms initially experience higher stock returns. However, as earnings strings become longer, the market reaction becomes weaker.

Audit reporting lag continues to remain an issue of significant interest to regulators, financial statement users, public companies, and auditors. The SEC has recently acted to reduce the deadline for filing annual and quarterly financial statements. Such focus on audit reporting lag arises because, as noted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, relevance and reliability are the two primary qualities of accounting information; and, to be relevant, information has to be timely. In my dissertation, I examine three issues related to the audit report lag. The first essay focuses on the association between audit report lag and the meeting or beating of earnings benchmarks. I do not find any association between audit report lag and just meeting or beating earnings benchmarks. However, I find that longer audit report lag is negatively associated with the probability of using discretionary accruals to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. We can infer from these results that audit effort, for which audit report lag is a proxy, reduces earnings management. The second part of my dissertation examines the association between types of auditor changes and audit report lag. I find that the resignation of an auditor is associated longer audit report lag compared to the dismissal of an auditor. I also find a significant positive association between the disclosure of a reportable event and audit report lag. The third part of my dissertation investigates the association between senior executive changes and audit report lag. I find that audit report lag is longer when client firms have a new CEO or CFO. Further, I find that audit report lag is longer when the new executive is someone from outside the firm. These results provide empirical evidence about the importance of senior management in the financial reporting process.

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We propose and empirically test a new hypothesis that managers rationally choose between specific channels of earnings management to meet earnings benchmarks. Prior research documents that managers are ready to interfere with the neutrality of financial reporting process to report earnings above zero, earnings above last year's earnings, and earnings above analysts' forecast. However, there is a controversy over whether this earnings management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks is intended to distort investors' view by delaying the disclosure of bad news or whether it is intended to communicate managers' private information about the firm's strong future performance. We argue that the credibility of the earnings management signal crucially depends on the cost of its imitation. As revenue management is more costly to imitate than cost management, we argue that managers who intend to send a credible signal about their firm's future performance likely boost revenues rather than depress costs. To test this prediction, we use a recently developed model of discretionary revenues that is arguably more powerful in detecting earnings management than traditional techniques. The empirical results are consistent with our predictions for the most important earnings benchmark - the consensus of analysts'...

An increase in the prevalence of earnings restatements and cases of financial statement fraud in the early 21st century led to a significant loss of market capitalization and investor confidence in the attestation process. In an effort to restore such confidence, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in July of 2002. The Act significantly increased the penalties for engaging in accrual activities aimed at either misleading users of the financial statements concerning the underlying economic condition of the firm or influencing contractual outcomes. Recent literature separates earnings management into accrual and real activities. Accrual activities include the management of accounts that have not yet been realized in cash, such as receivables and payables. Real activities include the management of actions that deviate from normal business practices, such as price discounts aimed at temporarily increasing sales, excessive inventory production aimed at lowering the cost of goods sold, and aggressively reducing discretionary expenditures such as R&D to improve profit margins. As a result of the increased penalties for engaging in accrual activities, one would expect a relative shift from accrual activities to real activities to facilitate earnings management in the post-SOX period. As with most academic social disciplines, the test employed in my dissertation is a joint test of the sensitivity of the tools available to detect management activities, the research design, and the presence and strength of the effect for which I am searching. This dissertation is the first to test for changes in both accrual quality and real activity-based earnings management in the post-SOX period. In order to test for a change in accrual quality in the post-SOX period, I utilize a model developed by Dechow and Dichev in 2002. The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model of accrual quality is an appropriate measure of accrual information risk, and may therefore be superior to the use of discretionary accrual models to test for an economic effect (Francis et al. 2004). I also utilize three empirical measures of real activity-based earnings management developed by Roychowdhury (2006) to document a change in real earnings management in the post-SOX period. The findings of the study empirically support a change in earnings management techniques in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX period. Specifically, the quality of accruals incorporated into the accounting earnings figure have significantly increased in the post-SOX period. However, instances of earnings management using real activities have also significantly increased in the post-Sox period. These findings inform academics about the power of the tools used in academic accounting research and the overall quality of the argument. They inform users of financial statements about where to direct their attention in reading and evaluating the financials. Finally, they inform regulators, practitioners and policy makers of the effectiveness of the law at improving the quality of accruals, and bring to their attention a potential substitution in the techniques used to manage earnings.

This study investigates the earnings management practices of firms around product recalls. In recent years, the management of earnings around firm-specific events has received considerable attention in the finance and accounting literature. New equity issues, mergers and acquisitions, share repurchases, and management buyouts are some events around which at least some firms have been shown to manage their earnings to achieve managements? objectives. Product recalls offer yet another interesting occasion when managers have incentives to cover up the true financial performance of their firms and mislead investors. In order to determine whether firms announcing product recalls manage earnings more aggressively than non-announcing firms, this study employs the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones (1991) model, as adapted by Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998 a and b). In order to address the misspecification concern of the model, especially in the context of a performance-related event like product recall, we suggest a modification in the model. We show that the proposed change in the model not only better controls for event-specific working capital changes around recalls, it also increases the explanatory power of the model. Overall, our results suggest that managers tend to manage earnings upwards in quarters immediately preceding and following the recall announcement quarter. We also find weak evidence of downward earnings management in the quarter of recall. These results are in line with the predictions of theoretical models and the findings of past empirical studies in earnings management. The results of our research have important implications for investors and regulators.

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This dissertation examines the cost behavior model implicit in analysts' and investors' decisions. Even though a cost behavior model that recognizes fixed and variable costs and cost stickiness can provide more accurate earnings forecasts, analysts and investors cannot fully capture sticky cost information. Since analysts are not fully aware of the correct cost behavior model, earnings surprises can be largely explained by a cost model that recognizes sticky stickiness. Similarly, investors' under-reaction to sticky cost information relates to post-earnings announcement drifts. As a result, positive abnormal returns can be earned by a trading strategy that takes advantage of investors' lower awareness of sticky cost information. / Business Administration/Accounting

Bakgrund och Problematisering: I och med att internationella redovisningsregler blev tvingande för europeiska börsbolag 2005 förändrades svensk redovisning. Vad gäller redovisningen av forskning och utvecklingskostnader öppnades för en större andel subjektiva bedömningar. Denna subjektivitet kan leda till att företagsledningar tar redovisningsbeslut för att genom de i näringslivet vanliga bonussystemen gynna sig själva, bedriver earnings management. Om detta är fallet innebär det att det kan ifrågasättas om bonussystemen fungerar som det är tänkt. Det är därför relevant att studera om företagsledningar verkligen använder forsknings och utvecklingskostnaderna för att bedriva earnings management. Syfte och frågeställning: Syftet är att undersöka om de möjligheter till subjektiva bedömningar som ges av IAS 38 leder till earnings management. Ur detta syfte kommer frågeställningen om hur det eventuella sambandet mellan incitament att bedriva earnings management och kostnaderna för forskning och utveckling. Metod: Studien har en kvantitativ metod med hypotetiskt deduktiv ansats. Ur agentteorin har hypoteser deducerats som prövas i en undersökning av redovisningsdata. Prövningen använder regressionsanalys för att godta hypoteserna. Slutsats: Studien visar på positivt samband mellan incitament att bedriva earnings management i form av big bath och income smoothing och kostnaderna för forskning och utveckling vilket innebär att företagsledningar synes utnyttja forsknings och utvecklingskostnaderna för att reglera resultatet.