This thesis presents two essays on real earnings management and future performance. The first essay draws on empirical studies that examine the three types of real earnings management activities in the United Kingdom (UK) for firms that are more likely to manipulate their earnings to avoid missing earnings targets. These targets include the zero earnings, and last year’s earnings. Also drawing from empirical studies, the second essay investigates the impact of real earnings management on firms’ future operating performance in the UK. In the first essay, I examine earnings management through real activities manipulation by using a sample of UK firms over the period 2009-2013. According to the transaction cost theory and opportunistic perspective of earnings management, the results of the first essay reveal that managers in UK suspect firm-years that manage earnings upward utilise more real earnings management activities to achieve earnings benchmarks opportunistically. Specifically, I find that (1) firms which manage upward earnings have unusually low cash flows from operations by offering price discounts or/and more lenient credit terms to increase sales; (2) firms that manage upward earnings have unusually low discretionary expenditures by cutting/reducing expenditures spending to improve reported margin and (3) firms which manage upward earnings, incur unusually high production costs by producing more products to report lower costs of goods sold in order to achieve their targets. Further, I find evidence that UK firms’ meeting/beating earnings benchmarks around zero earnings and last year’s earnings engage in sales-based manipulation and reducing/cutting discretionary expenses simultaneously; they also engage in overproducing products and reducing discretionary expenses at the same time. Furthermore, I do not find, however, evidence that managers in UK firms are associated with high real earnings management through sales-based manipulation to meet/beat last year’s earnings. On the other hand, I find evidence that manager in UK firms engage in income-increasing earnings management through accounting choice (e.g., accrual-based earnings management) to meet an earnings target. Motivated by agency conflicts of real earnings management (e.g., opportunistic and signalling perspectives), the second essay investigates whether there is an association between UK firms that manipulate their business operations to meet earnings benchmarks (e.g., zero earnings, last year’s earnings) and subsequent operating performance. I implement Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) regression analysis to examine the effects of the magnitude of real earnings management on firms’ future performance. Empirical test results show that manipulation of operating activities such as sales, discretionary expenditures, and production costs to meet earnings benchmarks has a significant positive consequence for firms’ subsequent operating performance and signals firms’ good future performance. Further, I find evidence that firms that manipulate their operating activities in the absence of meeting/beating earnings benchmarks experience a decline in their subsequent operating performance. The findings of this research lend support to our understanding of the process that management follows to evaluate costs and benefits of real earnings management.

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The high level of political risk might enhance the information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders, therefore leading to increased opportunity for earnings management activities, which depress the usefulness of financial information. On the other hand, times of high political uncertainty possibly increase the demand for information among stakeholders, consequently leading to enhanced scrutiny and fewer earnings management activities. By examine 625 firms listed in the United States between 20022016, I make use of a firm-level measurement of political risk to identify the possible impact on earnings quality. I identify that political risk exposure measured on a firm-level is negatively associated with earnings management. Therefore I can conclude that firm-level political risk increases earnings quality. I further show how firm-level political risk better predicts earnings management activities than an aggregated measurement of political risk. Finally, I provide evidence that suggests that accrual-based earnings management is affected by the past level of political risk exposure. Real earnings management activities show no such indications.

This study adds to the earnings guidance debate by investigating whether quarterly guidance is related to two forms of earnings management: (1) benchmark beating and (2) accounting irregularities. Using a post-Regulation Fair Disclosure sample, I find that firms regularly issuing earnings guidance display a discontinuity around zero in their distribution of management forecast errors and a larger discontinuity in their distribution of analyst forecast errors compared to non-guiding firms. Multivariate tests reveal that guiding firms recognize large abnormal accruals to beat their own guidance, but not to beat analyst forecasts, whereas non-guiding firms do recognize large abnormal accruals to beat analyst forecasts. Overall, guiding firms and non-guiding firms use similar levels of abnormal accruals to beat benchmarks. I also find no statistical relation between quarterly guidance and the likelihood of accounting irregularities. In sum, the evidence shows that while guiding firms and non-guiding firms manage earnings to different benchmarks, they are similar in terms of their aggregate earnings management.

I conduct an examination of the deferred revenue account. I provide descriptive evidence of deferred revenue both at an industry-level and a macro-level, and I examine whether managers use discretion in deferred revenue around earnings benchmarks. I develop a model to measure the normal change in short-term deferred revenue, and examine how the abnormal change varies across the pre-managed distribution of three common earnings benchmarks. My results show that managers delay recognition of revenue using deferred revenue when pre-managed earnings exceed benchmarks by a large margin, and accelerate the recognition of revenue using deferred revenue when premanaged earnings just miss or miss benchmarks by a large amount. I document the prevalence of accelerated revenue recognition, and show that meeting or just beating the annual consensus analyst forecast is where the most cases of suspected accelerated revenue recognition occur. The results are next strongest for the avoidance of earnings decrease benchmark and weakest for the avoidance of loss benchmark. I examine whether conventional abnormal accrual models reflect discretion in deferred revenue, and whether discretion in deferred revenue is associated with lower earnings quality. I show that deferred revenue changes are a leading indicator of future earnings. My results indicate that discretion in revenue can lower the predictability of sales regardless of whether it is of an aggressive or conservative nature.

Given the importance of historical dividend policy to firms, I investigate whether dividend payers manipulate earnings through real activities to smooth dividend levels and dividend payout ratios. Using Compustat’s Execucomp database, I find evidence that dividend policy impacts both upward and downward real earnings management. I find that payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to mitigate the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to prior year dividends when pre-managed earnings are lower than dividends paid in the prior year, suggesting that dividend levels are an important earnings benchmark. I document a stronger relationship between changes in pre-managed earnings and real earnings management for payers than for non-payers, suggesting that dividend policies impact real earnings management. Consistent with the importance of dividend policy in real earnings management, I show that dividend payers that follow conservative dividend policies manipulate earnings to a greater extent than dividend payers that do not follow conservative dividend policies.

This paper investigates the impact of accounting earnings on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation by examining how the valuation role and the contracting role of accounting earnings jointly determine the value of CEO total compensation. Current earnings are informative about the firms future cash flows and hence affect stock price, and the resulting price movement affects the value of CEO equity-based compensation. Thus, accounting earnings not only have a direct impact on CEO cash compensation, but also an indirect impact on CEO equity-based compensation due to earnings valuation role. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to provide empirical evidence that because of earnings valuation role, accounting earnings are an economically significant determinant of CEO total compensation. Prior accounting research testing predictions of agent theory has focused on CEO cash compensation even though total compensation is a more relevant measure. Thus, the significant result of earnings in CEO total compensation enables re-examination of agency predictions. I provide evidence that earnings (but not stock returns) are used in CEO total compensation consistent with the sensitivity vs. precision hypothesis. That is, accounting earnings receive less weight when earnings are relatively more volatile and when firms have significant growth opportunities.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2001. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 70-71). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2001. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 70-71). Also available on the Internet.

Empirical studies have found that managers choose debt rather than equity to avoid EPS dilution and buy back outstanding shares to boost EPS, I thus explore the resulting effect of EPS on leverage. A firm’s leverage is negatively influenced by the level of its EPS. I also find that fluctuations in EPS have large effects on leverage and these effects persist for at least a decade. Besides, the negative impact of EPS on leverage becomes much stronger after the passage of SOX, in which period managers engage in more actions of debt-equity choices or stock repurchases with the sole purpose of manipulating EPS. Furthermore, managers’ equity incentives and corporate governance are two economic mechanisms through which EPS negatively influences leverage.