Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1956. / Typescript. Vita. Title from title screen (viewed May 9, 2006). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-100). Online version of the print original.

Thesis (M.S.)--Eastern Illinois University, 1959. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 123-124).

Thesis (M.A.)--Eastern Illinois University, 1967. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-80).

Thesis (M. Div.)--St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, 2005. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-67).

Thesis (M.S.)--Eastern Illinois University, 1956. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf [14]).

Thesis (M.S.)--Eastern Illinois University, 1962. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 172-174).

Thesis (S.T.M.)--St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, 1971. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references.

<p> The dissertation examines Saudi oil policy, focusing mainly on the first half of the 1980s. In this period, Saudi Arabia played a "swing producer" role to control oil prices in the world oil market. This behavior of Saudi decision-makers can be understood within the economic framework of the "dominant producer" model. After interdisciplinary research on previous political and economic studies of Saudi oil policy, the dissertation concludes that the basic notion of Saudi oil policy as a "swing producer" was intended to meet Saudi Arabia's long-term political and economic interests. It was therefore logical for Saudi officials to implement the oil policy of "swing producer" to maximize the long-term economic value of Saudi oil, since this would also contribute to the political consolidation of the Saudi regime. However, there are several questions still remaining in the details of this oil policy. In contrast to the argument of the "dominant producer" model, why did Saudi Arabia try to achieve relatively high oil prices at the expense of its already reduced market share during this period? If Saudi oil policy as a "swing producer" was derived primarily from the state's long-term economic interests, why did it suddenly give up this role in the summer of 1985? To answer these questions, it was necessary to examine Saudi oil policy since December 1976, because it was at this point that the state began to implement an oil policy based on its national interests. After a comprehensive study on Saudi oil policy during boom and slump periods, I have identified the main priorities of Saudi oil policy in these two different periods, and have tried to draw a conclusion that provides the readers with plausible answers to the main questions in my dissertation.</p>

Persia's importance in the latter part of the nineteenth century stemmed from her position between the rapidly expanding Russian empire on one side and Great Britain's Indian empire on the other. Three departments in London the Foreign Office, the India Office, and the War Office were concerned with the affairs of that country. This study is, in part, an analysis of their interests. British statesmen approached the Persian problem from two points of view. Some favoured building the country into a strong and truly independent buffer state. Then Persia, like Afghanistan, would constitute a substantial outwork in Indian defence and a barrier to the Russian movement south. Others, however, believed that the obstacles in the way of reform and regeneration were too great to be surmounted. Their alternative was agreement with Russia and the eventual division of the country into spheres of influence. In the years of this study, from 1885 to 1892, Lord Salisbury was the dominating personality in foreign affairs. As a result of his previous service as Secretary of State for India he was keenly aware of the problems of Central Asia. Persia figured more prominently in his plans than in those of many of his colleagues. He upheld the principle of the buffer state, and he sent Sir Henry Drummond Wolff to Tehran for the purpose of giving life to that policy. Wolff's years in Persia, 1888 to 1891, were successful ones. He sponsored measures, such as the opening of the Karun river to navigation and the establishment of the Imperial Bank, which would promote the welfare of Persia as well as strengthen the position of England there. Simultaneously, however, he carried on the negotiations for an understanding with Russia.

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