Wong, Ching Chuen. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 45-46). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Spatial Competition in Two-Dimensional Product Space --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- First model: Ordinal characteristics --- p.5 / Chapter 1.3 --- Second model: Categorical characteristics --- p.14 / Chapter 1.4 --- Conclusion --- p.18 / Spatial Competition with Demand Uncertainty --- p.21 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.21 / Chapter 2.2 --- Model --- p.26 / Chapter 2.3 --- Revelation of market density before transportation --- p.29 / Chapter 2.4 --- Revelation of market density after transportation --- p.36 / Chapter 2.5 --- Perfectly informed consumers --- p.38 / Chapter 2.6 --- Application: Negative externality --- p.40 / Chapter 2.7 --- Conclusion --- p.42 / References --- p.45

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This dissertation investigates consumer valuation of car characteristics with the special focus on two non-physical attributes of an automobile such as safety and comfort. Consumer valuation of automobile attributes is of interest to car manufacturers who supply the characteristics, consumers who purchase them, and policy makers who regulate the automobile. This study uses two approaches to accomplish this goal. The first one is the traditional hedonic method which calculates consumer willingness to pay for measurable components of safety and comfort, whereas the second one combines these components into comfort and safety indexes. It is argued in this study that these individual components, which can make a car safer or more comfortable, are evaluated by consumers in the broader context of safety and comfort before the final choice is made. It is also argued that this aggregation can be justified by a high degree of multicollinearity between various car attributes which has been observed in the previous hedonic studies of the automobile market. Included here is also a comprehensive discussion of econometric problems associated with the characteristics approach. The computational part is based on the new and the most extensive data set used in the hedonic literature of the automobile market. The study concludes by presenting the set of price and income elasticities of demand for the safety and comfort related variables. The results of both methods indicate that many car attributes are Giffen goods, which implies a positive relationship between the marginal willingness to pay and quantity purchased. The main reasons for these findings could be attributed to the impact of the government quality standards affecting automobiles and the shortcomings of the hedonic procedure (treatment of nonlinearities). / Ph. D.

We consider the applicability of the Revelation Principle under the possibility of collusive behavior among players in some Bayesian framework. In doing this, since the coalition formation itself suffers information asymmetry problems, we assume that the coalition is formed if the colluding parties can successfully find some coalitional mechanism whose outcome is a set of messages in the original mechanism. Recently Cremer [1986] proposes a coalitional mechanism in the framework of the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism. We assume that the agents successfully collude if they can find coalitional a mechanism such that (i) coalitional mechanism is incentive-compatible and (ii) the payoff of this mechanism is strictly Pareto-improving in terms of the agent’s expected utility. Our analysis is undertaken in a one principal/two agent framework. We first ünd that the Revelation Principle is still applicable in the pure adverse selection model. We then extend this result to a model with both adverse selection and moral hazard aspects. Finally, we consider a three-tier principal/supervisor/agent hierarchical organization, as in Tirole (1986). We explicitly present the coalitional mechanism as a side-contract between the supervisor and the agent. We apply the previous result of applicability of the Revelation Principle and characterize the coalition-proof mechanism. We find that the principal can design an optimal collusion free contract with some additional cost by specifying proper individual and coalitional incentive-compatibility conditions and individual rationality conditions. Moreover, we find that the results of Tirole (1986)’s paper hinge on the fact that he considers only “hard,” verifiable, information. / Ph. D.

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-137)

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Historically, the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Method (C-CAPM) has performed poorly in that estimated parameters are implausible, model restrictions are often rejected and inferences appear to be very sensitive to the choice of economic agents' preferences. In this study, we estimate and test the C-CAPM with Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) using time series data from Germany, South Africa, Britain and America during relatively short time periods with the latest available data sets. Hansen's GMM approach is applied to estimate the parameters arising from this model. In general, estimated parameters fall outside the bounds specified by Lund & Engsted (1996) and Cuthbertson & Nitzsche (2004), even though the models are not rejected by the J-test and are associated with relatively small minimum distances.