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Outsourcing became an important corporate strategic issue and part of the business lexicon since the 1980s. Existing studies on outsourcing mostly focus on benefits of outsourcing such as cost saving and resource reallocation, and the results are generally ambiguous regarding outsourcing outcomes. We study three important aspects of outsourcing that were largely overlooked in the existing literature: the benefit of flexibility acquisition, the power play between the CEO and labor in outsourcing decisions, and the effects of flexibility and governance for global outsourcing. This dissertation consists of three essays and constitutes an empirical investigation that (a) what the effects of flexibility and governance are for US firms engaged in outsourcing, (b) how the power play between the CEO and labor affects the decision to outsource and its outcomes, and (c) how offshore outsourcing is decided and what the value of offshore outsourcing is. The first paper examines the influence of a firm's flexibility on its decision to outsource. It is commonly believed that flexibility is good, but there is little empirical evidence on whether flexibility affects corporate performance. The paper casts outsourcing in terms of real options and presents evidence regarding the value of flexibility for US firms engaged in outsourcing. From a real option perspective, a major source of gains from outsourcing is the flexibility it entails, compared to continued in-house production under high fixed cost and demand uncertainty. Empirical analyses include an examination of market reactions to outsourcing announcements and long-term post-outsourcing firm performance, as well as the relation between flexibility and outsourcing outcomes. The results show that market reactions are positive and significant, along with a potential synergy between outsourcing and insourcing firms. More importantly, after controlling for potential switching costs related to outsourcing, outsourcing gains are significantly associated with the presence of a firm's growth options. In addition, firm performance is related to corporate governance, underscoring the importance of effective corporate governance as a requisite to aid the realization of potential gains from outsourcing. The second paper asks the question of whether the power play between the CEO and labor affects a firm's outsourcing decisions and outcomes. Outsourcing can be viewed as a power play between the CEO and labor. Fundamentally, outsourcing may be potentially desirable because of cost saving and the value of flexibility. However, to make it happen, the CEO must negotiate with labor that may resist outsourcing because of its concern for jobs. Yet without outsourcing, the firm may lose out competitively and labor may lose even more. This paper empirically examines the extent to which outsourcing decisions and outcomes depend on CEO power and labor participation in major corporate decisions. Using the sample of US firms, we find that the likelihood of outsourcing is positively related to CEO power and negatively associated with labor power. More importantly, prior firm performance is likely to be a moderating factor in the resistance of labor against outsourcing. The long-term firm performance is found to be influenced by the power dynamics between the CEO and labor as well as the general efficacy of corporate governance. The third paper investigates the widely debated issue of offshore outsourcing. Given the diversity of cost structure, the gains from outsourcing can be potentially greater internationally than domestically. While uncertainties are greater internationally, these may be offset by the real option benefits of a multinational network. Empirical work for U.S. outsourcing firms indicates that the market valuation is greater and more significant for international outsourcing than domestic outsourcing. The gains are related to flexibility that can be obtained from multinational network. In addition, international differences in locational factors including differences in corporate governance influence the valuation gains from outsourcing as well as the division between outsourcers and insourcers. / Business Administration

The syndicated loan is become more and more important for firm's financing. We study three important aspects of loan syndication: the lead arranger's reputation effect on syndicated loan pricing, the switching behavior for repeat syndicate loans and the effect of country-specific bank-firm ownership structure on syndicated loan pricing and bank-firm relationship of repeat loans. The first chapter analyzes the reputation effect of the lead arranger on syndicated loan pricing, based on a sample of loan facilities to non-financial U.S. firms over the 1994-2006 period. Theory suggests that the reputation/spread relationship should generally be positive because more reputable lenders usually employ more costly loan screening and monitoring techniques and therefore must be compensated with a higher spread. After controlling for endogeneity in lender-borrower matching, the empirical results show that the reputable arrangers charge a "reputation premium" for monitoring and due diligence, and the commitment against extracting the information rent from borrowers. The results also show that the less-reputable arrangers offer a "reputation discount", since the market competition from both the loan market and bond market makes it more difficult for less reputable arrangers to sustain the reputation mechanism. In addition, the reputation effect on pricing becomes less significant when the borrower enters a repeat loan relationship with a prior or existing lender. Finally, the study finds that the arranger's reputation can reduce the lead share retained by the lead arranger in its loan portfolio, which serves as evidence that reputation also mitigates the information asymmetry between the lead arranger and participant banks. The second chapter analyzes the switching behavior for two types of repeat loans: migrating loans that remain within the same bank reputation class and loans migrating to a different reputation class. The theoretical literature argues that banks (lenders) and firms (borrowers) benefit from entering into a relationship-lending arrangement. In the syndicated loan market, however, it is very common for repeat loans to switch from one bank to another. We present a model that establishes conditions for implementing empirical investigations relating to relationship lending and the characteristics of the separating equilibrium in the loan market. Using explanatory variables describing firms, loans, and loan syndicates, we find that lending within the high quality bank sector reveals evidence that is consistent with relationship lending. That is, some firms forego longer maturity loans and less oversight to remain with their original lender. A similar finding does not hold for repeat lending in the lower quality bank sector. Regarding loans that migrate in either direction between the high and low quality banking sectors, firm risk is the most important determinant. Relatively riskier firms move down to lower quality lenders while relatively safer firms move up to higher quality lenders. The third chapter investigates the determinants of loan pricing and repeat loan relationship for a sample of 6,180 non-U.S.. firm-loan observations for the period 1998-2007. This paper focuses on the relation between a country-specific governance indicator and country-specific bank-firm ownership structures on loan pricing and the management of a lending relationship between the syndicate bank and firm. We evaluate the relationship between country-specific bank ownership structure and the main characteristics of loan, which are mainly measured by loan pricing and loan switching decision. The paper examines three interrelated questions: 1.How is loan pricing affected by country-specific bank-firm ownership structure? 2. Does country-specific bank-firm ownership structure influence the decision to switch lenders in the repeat loan market? 3. Is country-specific bank-firm ownership structure more important for a borrower to migrate to a higher reputation lender than to a lower reputation lender? We use loan-characteristic, bank-characteristic, and firm-characteristic variables as well as country-specific corruption and country-specific bank-firm ownership structure variables to explore the effect on loan pricing and loan-switching decisions. Using logistic regression analysis, we find that loan switching is less likely for firms when the bank controls the firm, especially in the case of a bank-controlled firm borrows from a low reputation syndicated loan lender. However, when the firm controls a local bank, there is no impact on the firm's switching decision in the syndicated loan market. The bank-controlling firm is as likely to switch as a firm that does not control a bank even though the firm is more opaque to the financial market. Our results suggest that in the international syndicated loan market, the bank-firm relationship is partly shaped by country-specific characteristics and information asymmetry of firms to the financial market. These chapters explores the bank and firm behavior in the syndicated loan market and make the contribution to the literature by offering further knowledge and deeper understanding about the bank-firm relationship and behavior in the loan syndication structure. / Business Administration

Scholars and investors have studied the value premium for several decades. However, the debate over whether risk factors or biased market participants cause the value premium has never been settled. The risk explanation argues that value firms are fundamentally riskier than growth firms. At the same time, the behavioral explanation argues that biased market participants systematically misprice value and growth stocks. In this paper, I use the implied cost of equity capital to capture all risks that investors demand a premium and sort stocks into risk quantiles. The implied cost of equity capital is estimated using models proposed by Gebhardt et al., Claus and Thomas, Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, and Easton. I find that value stocks have higher implied cost of equity capital and lower forecasted earnings growth while growth stocks have lower implied cost of equity capital and higher forecasted earnings growth. More importantly, even within the same risk quantile, the value premium still exists. The results suggest that risk and behavioral factors simultaneously cause the value premium. Furthermore, by decomposing the holding period return, I find that adjustments in valuation ratios caused by negative earnings surprises for growth firms and positive earnings surprises for value firms at least partially lead to the value premium.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Economics / Lance J. Bachmeier / Dong Li / For a unique sample of Israeli stocks that went public in the U.S. and then cross-listed in the home market, Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE), this dissertation consists of three essays examining the dynamics of return spillovers and volume-return interactions across markets and the valuation effect around the event of cross-listing and delisting from the home market. In Chapter II, I investigate the role of trading volume in the information flow and return spillovers between the U.S. and Israeli markets. Findings suggest that the dynamics of volume-return interactions across markets can provide us with valuable information regarding future price movements, which can be a useful tool to predict future returns. I also find the home market to dominate the host market in pricing these stocks, which is consistent with the Home Bias hypothesis. In Chapter III, I analyze the impact of the event of cross-listing on stock returns and risk exposure. The behavior of abnormal returns around the cross-listing date implies that cross-listing in TASE is an effective mechanism in reducing market segmentation between the U.S. and the Israeli capital markets. Risk assessment following the cross-listing suggests a decline firms’ overall risk exposure, indicating a higher degree of integration between the two markets due to cross-listing. In Chapter IV, I evaluate changes in the cost-of-capital for Israeli firms after delisting voluntary from TASE, the home market, while maintaining their listing in the U.S., the host market. The results show a significant positive shift in U.S. and negative shift in Israeli market risk exposure after the delisting. These results indicate that firms delisting form their home market (TASE), face greater risk exposure, higher required returns on their stocks and, hence, higher cost-of-capital after delisting.

Master of Arts / Department of Economics / William F. Blankenau / This paper examines several different issues which could make the various Social Security programs insolvent. I evaluate each cause and how it is related to the problems experienced by each program to determine potential policy changes. I draw the majority of my data and information from peer-reviewed scholarly articles, as well as government agencies such as the Social Security Administration, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Congressional Research Service. Section 1 of the paper explains the history of the Social Security program and the circumstances creating it. Section 2 goes into greater detail explaining different issues which could make the system insolvent. These areas are: earnings inequality, changes in healthcare, increased life expectancy, changes in the dependency ratio, general trust fund issues, disability trust fund issues, political climate, and recessions/reduced earnings. In Section 3, I evaluate two different proposed plans to fix Social Security. The first plan is an academic plan, the Diamond-Orszag Plan; the second is a plan created by a think-tank, The Heritage Plan. Section 4 gives a conclusion of the implications of the paper and explains the benefits and drawbacks of the two evaluated plans. After evaluating all the problems with Social Security and the two proposed plans, I come to the conclusion that neither plan would be ideal by itself. The Diamond-Orszag Plan is the most politically feasible plan, as it doesn’t change the framework of the current program. A combination of the two plans would be most beneficial, as The Heritage Plan has policy specifically targeting the problems with the Medicare system, where the Diamond-Orszag Plan does not. The three different plans for changing the disability system I evaluate in Section 2.5 are specific, targeted plans and could be a nice addition to a plan such as the Diamond-Orszag Plan. In any case, the sooner politicians finally start taking Social Security’s instability seriously, the better. The longer we wait, the more complex and difficult the problem will become.

Master of Science / Department of Agricultural Economics / Glynn Tonsor / This decade has seen movements in commodity futures markets never seen before. There are many factors that have intensified price movements and volatility behavior. Those factors likely altering supply and demand include governmental policy within and outside of the U.S, weather shocks, geopolitical conflicts, food safety concerns etc. Whatever the reasons are for price movements it is clear that the volatility behavior in commodity markets constantly change, and risk managers need to use current and efficient tools to mitigate price risk. This study identified market structural breaks of realized volatility in corn, wheat, soybeans, live cattle, feeder cattle and lean hogs futures markets. Furthermore, this study analyzes the forecasting performance of implied volatility, historical volatility, a composite approach and a naïve approach as forecasters of realized volatility. The forecasting performance of these methods was analyzed in the full period of time of our weekly data from January 1995 to April 2014 and in each identified market regime for each commodity. Previous research has analyzed forecasting performance of implied volatility, a time series alternative and a composite method. However, to the best of my knowledge, they have not worried about market structural breaks in the data that might influence the performance of the mentioned forecasting methods in different periods of time. Overall, results indicate that indeed there are multiple market structural breaks present in the volatility datasets across all six commodities. We found differences in the forecasting performance of the analyzed methods when individual market regimes were analyzed. There seems to be evidence that corroborates the idea in the literature about the superiority of implied volatility over a historical volatility, a composite approach and a naïve approach. Additionally, implied volatility encompassed all the information contained in the historical volatility and the naïve measure across each identified market regime in all six commodities. Our results show that when both implied volatility and historical volatility are available, the benefit of combining those measures into a composite forecasting approach is very limited. Our results hold true for a short term 1 week ahead realized volatility forecast. It would be of interest to see how results vary for longer forecasting time horizons.

Master of Agribusiness / Department of Agricultural Economics / David Barton / The main objective of this thesis is to aid Ag Valley Cooperative’s board of directors in the construction of a superior income distribution and equity redemption strategy. The key information provided is a detailed financial analysis and pro forma financial projections. Ultimately, this study focuses on increasing patron value by returning retained patronage refunds in an equitable and timely manner. This paper examines the benefits of eliminating Ag Valley Cooperative’s current equity redemption program, age of patron, and replacing it with a revolving fund. Chapter 1 introduces Ag Valley Cooperative and gives a brief description of the cooperative’s business model. The chapter concludes with the study’s methodology. Chapter 2 briefly examines cooperatives and people who use them. This chapter introduces Cooperative Performance Profile, the financial analysis used in the study. The chapter concludes with a look at cooperative finance theory and equity management. Chapter 3 describes key points of the Cooperative Performance Profile and separates it into five groupings: profitability, liquidity, solvency, efficiency, and size. Analyses are conducted in each category on Ag Valley Cooperative’s historic trends and comparisons to other Nebraska cooperatives. In Chapter 4 Ag Valley Cooperative’s current equity redemption strategy is defined along with four pro forma analyses. The first strategy, S0, assumes the cooperative continues business as normal with estate and age of patron redemption methods. Strategies S1 and S2 interject balance sheet management constraints and revolving fund redemption into the projection. In S1, revolving fund equity redemption is added to distribute any excess equity redemption budget, in S2 the revolving fund method is phased in. Strategy S3 builds upon S2 with a look at the effects and tax consequences of distributing non-qualified equity or retained patronage refunds instead of qualified retained patronage refunds.

Master of Science / Department of Industrial & Manufacturing Systems Engineering / Chih-Hang Wu / The recent economic crisis has been partially blamed on the decline in the housing market. This decline in the housing market resulted in an estimated 87% decline in value of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) between 2007 and 2008. This drastic decline in home values was sudden and unanticipated, thus it was incomprehensible for many investors how this would affect CDOs. This shows that while analytical techniques can be used to price CDOs, these techniques cannot be used to demonstrate the behavior of CDOs under radically different economic circumstances. To better understand the behavior of CDOs under different economic circumstances, numerical techniques such as Monte Carlo simulation can be used instead of analytical techniques to price CDOs. Andersen et al (2005) proposed a method for calculating the probability of defaults that could then be used in the Monte Carlo simulation to price the collateralized debt obligation. The research proposed by Andersen et al (2005) demonstrates the process of calculating correlated probability of defaults for a group of obligors. This calculation is based on the correlations between the obligors using copulas. Using this probability of default, the price of a collateralized debt obligation can be evaluated using Monte Carlo simulation. Monte Carlo simulation provides a more simple yet effective approach compared to analytical pricing techniques. Simulation also allows investors to have a better understanding of the behaviors of CDOs compared to analytical pricing techniques. By analyzing the various behaviors under uncertainty, it can be observed how a downturn in the economy could affect CDOs. This thesis extends on the use of copulas to simulate the correlation between obligors. Copulas allow for the creation of one joint distribution using a set of independent distributions thus allowing for an efficient way of modeling the correlation between obligors. The research contained within this thesis demonstrates how Monte Carlo simulation can be used to effectively price collateralized debt obligations. It also shows how the use of copulas can be used to accurately characterize the correlation between obligor defaults for pricing collateralized debt obligations. Numerical examples for both the obligor defaults and the price of collateralized debt obligations are presented to demonstrate the results using Monte Carlo simulation.