Introduction Entrepreneurship and SME development play a crucial role in speeding up the economic development of transition economies. Although entrepreneurship exists in all environments it flourishes in the conditions where it is supported. Transition economies, as well as Georgia, are characterized by inefficient framework conditions that present barriers to productive entrepreneurship and SMEs to develop and benefit the economies in their full potential.   Purpose The Thesis aimed at answering the following research questions:   1)      To what extent the framework conditions necessary for promoting productive entrepreneurship and SME development exist in Georgia? 2)      What are the perceived barriers to entrepreneurship and SME development in Georgia? 3)      In what ways is entrepreneurship and SME development encouraged and supported in Georgia? Method The thesis consists of theoretical data such as literature review, secondary data presented by previous studies, and primary data collected by conducting interviews with Georgian entrepreneurs and representatives of governmental bodies and NGOs engaged in improving a business climate in the country.   Conclusions The study revealed that basic framework conditions for developing entrepreneurship are present in Georgia. Although inefficiencies and institutional gaps give rise to a number of barriers to entrepreneurship and SME development. They are mostly presented by inefficient tax system and financial framework. Despite their efforts towards fostering favourable business environment, GoG, as well as NOGs could do a better job in improving an indirect support in terms of abolishing imperfections in the taxation system, as well as directly providing finance, training and effectual information flow to existing and potential businesses.

For more than a decade, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have been attempting to transform their centrally planned economies into market economies. In some of these countries a considerably large unofficial economy has become a serious obstacle to economic growth and public finances. Studies by Johnson et al. (1997), Johnson et al. (1998), and Johnson et al. (2000) show that transition countries with large unofficial economies tend to have excessive regulations, high levels of taxation and high incidence of corruption. As well, bureaucratic corruption in tax and customs administration appears to be an important element in defining the underground economy in some transition countries. </p> <p>Given the potential impact of the unofficial economy on public finances and the provision of public goods, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine how corruption affects the unofficial economy in transition countries, with a particular focus on the unofficial economy that results from tax non-compliance. More specifically the study examines tax cheating as it relates to corruption in tax administration, to the business culture in the economy and to the tax-regulation policy-making process. The thesis looks at the feedback effects of decisions of different agents in the economy, and the implications of these decisions for the provision of public goods. </p> <p>The research is conducted along two lines. First, the thesis examines the nature and the extent of corruption in Albania, focusing particularly on the informal sector and corruption in customs and tax administrations. The thesis also examines the implications of the informal economy on the tax revenues available for the provision of public goods. Then the thesis examines the pattern of government spending in public education and transport infrastructure in Albania to reveal the priorities that these sectors are being given during the transition period. Second, the thesis develops a number of theoretical models to examine some of the issues raised in the analysis of Albania. The theoretical models provide a framework to examine the incentives for different agents in the economy to engage in tax cheating and corruption. More specifically, this section of the thesis examines: the feedback effects between the decision of tax inspectors to engage in corruption and firms' cheating activities; the firms' tax compliance as tax cheating and corruption are more accepted practices when they become increasingly widespread; how government affects the degree of cheating and corruption through auditing; and how corruption affects policy-makers' decisions to allocate the revenue obtained from tax collection between public education and infrastructure. </p> <p>Results from the theoretical models show that widespread bureaucratic corruption among tax inspectors can perpetuate an unofficial economy that in turn sustains these and other corrupt practices. In such situations, intense auditing and penalties serve as cheating deterrents only if cheating and engaging in corruption is very costly for both firms and tax inspectors. When cheating becomes cheaper as the size of the unofficial economy grows, a multiplier effect in the economy gives rise to Pareto-ranked multiple equilibria. In an economy with a widespread tolerance for corrupt tax enforcers, tax non-compliance and a low enforcement of penalties, the Pareto inferior (large unofficial economy and an under-provision of public goods) stable equilibrium can prevail. Changes that will move an economy from an inferior equilibrium to a superior equilibrium have a strong political dimension and are complex.</p> <p>Modeling the ways in which policy-makers affect the unofficial economy indicates that, due to the high cost of auditing, the government must allow for some cheating and corruption in order to maximize the revenues available for the provision of public goods. Only if a government views illicit activities as a "public bad", and is willing to eliminate these activities at any cost, will it choose to perform very intense auditing. The government's decision to allocate revenues between education and infrastructure depends on the returns generated by these public goods in the economy and on the private benefits from corruption. A government will allocate funds to education only if education generates relatively higher returns, and if the government favours at the margin the provision of public goods relative to private benefits from corruption. If at the margin the government favours the private benefits from corruption and cheating, then all revenues are allocated to infrastructure even though education generates higher relative returns in the economy. When infrastructure generates higher social returns in the economy, the government commits revenues to infrastructure either to provide the most beneficial public good, or to facilitate opportunities for corruption benefits. Overall the thesis shows that illicit activities (cheating, and political and bureaucratic corruption) can sustain each other regardless which actors in the economy (firms, enforcers, and politicians) undertake them.

For more than a decade, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have been attempting to transform their centrally planned economies into market economies. In some of these countries a considerably large unofficial economy has become a serious obstacle to economic growth and public finances. Studies by Johnson et al. (1997), Johnson et al. (1998), and Johnson et al. (2000) show that transition countries with large unofficial economies tend to have excessive regulations, high levels of taxation and high incidence of corruption. As well, bureaucratic corruption in tax and customs administration appears to be an important element in defining the underground economy in some transition countries. </p> <p>Given the potential impact of the unofficial economy on public finances and the provision of public goods, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine how corruption affects the unofficial economy in transition countries, with a particular focus on the unofficial economy that results from tax non-compliance. More specifically the study examines tax cheating as it relates to corruption in tax administration, to the business culture in the economy and to the tax-regulation policy-making process. The thesis looks at the feedback effects of decisions of different agents in the economy, and the implications of these decisions for the provision of public goods. </p> <p>The research is conducted along two lines. First, the thesis examines the nature and the extent of corruption in Albania, focusing particularly on the informal sector and corruption in customs and tax administrations. The thesis also examines the implications of the informal economy on the tax revenues available for the provision of public goods. Then the thesis examines the pattern of government spending in public education and transport infrastructure in Albania to reveal the priorities that these sectors are being given during the transition period. Second, the thesis develops a number of theoretical models to examine some of the issues raised in the analysis of Albania. The theoretical models provide a framework to examine the incentives for different agents in the economy to engage in tax cheating and corruption. More specifically, this section of the thesis examines: the feedback effects between the decision of tax inspectors to engage in corruption and firms' cheating activities; the firms' tax compliance as tax cheating and corruption are more accepted practices when they become increasingly widespread; how government affects the degree of cheating and corruption through auditing; and how corruption affects policy-makers' decisions to allocate the revenue obtained from tax collection between public education and infrastructure. </p> <p>Results from the theoretical models show that widespread bureaucratic corruption among tax inspectors can perpetuate an unofficial economy that in turn sustains these and other corrupt practices. In such situations, intense auditing and penalties serve as cheating deterrents only if cheating and engaging in corruption is very costly for both firms and tax inspectors. When cheating becomes cheaper as the size of the unofficial economy grows, a multiplier effect in the economy gives rise to Pareto-ranked multiple equilibria. In an economy with a widespread tolerance for corrupt tax enforcers, tax non-compliance and a low enforcement of penalties, the Pareto inferior (large unofficial economy and an under-provision of public goods) stable equilibrium can prevail. Changes that will move an economy from an inferior equilibrium to a superior equilibrium have a strong political dimension and are complex.</p> <p>Modeling the ways in which policy-makers affect the unofficial economy indicates that, due to the high cost of auditing, the government must allow for some cheating and corruption in order to maximize the revenues available for the provision of public goods. Only if a government views illicit activities as a "public bad", and is willing to eliminate these activities at any cost, will it choose to perform very intense auditing. The government's decision to allocate revenues between education and infrastructure depends on the returns generated by these public goods in the economy and on the private benefits from corruption. A government will allocate funds to education only if education generates relatively higher returns, and if the government favours at the margin the provision of public goods relative to private benefits from corruption. If at the margin the government favours the private benefits from corruption and cheating, then all revenues are allocated to infrastructure even though education generates higher relative returns in the economy. When infrastructure generates higher social returns in the economy, the government commits revenues to infrastructure either to provide the most beneficial public good, or to facilitate opportunities for corruption benefits. Overall the thesis shows that illicit activities (cheating, and political and bureaucratic corruption) can sustain each other regardless which actors in the economy (firms, enforcers, and politicians) undertake them.

As the U.S. population continues to increase, planning for future water quantity and quality needs is important. Historically, many municipalities have relied heavily on surface water as their major source of drinking water, but recently, technological advancements have improved the economic viability of reverse-osmosis (RO) desalination of brackish-groundwater as a potable water source. Brackish-groundwater may be an alternative water source that provides municipalities an opportunity to hedge against droughts, political shortfalls, and protection from potential surface-water contamination. This research specifically focuses on investigating economies of size for conventional surface-water treatment and brackish-groundwater desalination by using results from four water treatment facilities in the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley (LRGV). The methodology and results can have direct implications on future water planning. Economic and financial life-cycle costs were estimated for a "small"- conventional-surface water facility (2.0 million gallons per day (mgd) Olmito facility) and a "small"-brackish-groundwater desalination facility (1.13 mgd La Sara facility). Prior analyses were modified to determine similar costs for a "medium"-sized conventional surface-water facility (8.25 mgd McAllen Northwest facility) and a "medium"-sized brackish-groundwater desalination facility (7.5 mgd Southmost facility). The life-cycle costs of the "small" Olmito facility are compared to the life-cycle costs of the "medium" Northwest facility and the life-cycle costs of the "small" La Sara facility are compared against the life-cycle costs of the "medium" Southmost facility to determine the existence of economies of size. This research was facilitated by the use of the CITY H20 ECONOMICS© and the DESAL ECONOMICS© Excel® spreadsheet models previously developed by Texas AgriLife Research and Texas AgriLife Extension Service agricultural economists. Although the results are applicable to the Texas LRGV, economies of size are apparent in conventional surface-water treatment and constant economies of size are evident in brackish-groundwater desalination. This research also concludes that RO desalination of brackish-groundwater is economically competitive with conventional surface-water treatment in this region.

Introduction The innovation systems literature has provided a useful framework to analyse the linkages of firms and other organisations with both domestic and foreign actors. Although the concept of innovation systems was originally developed at the national level (Freeman, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Lundvall, 1985; Nelson, 1988, etc), the literature has expanded rapidly over the years. Since its origins innovation systems have been defined at different levels. National, regional, local, sectoral and technological systems of innovation now constituted alternative units of analysis to better understand the processes of creation, diffusion and use of knowledge. These different views, rather than conflicting, tend to complement each other and depend on the attributed boundaries to the system subject of analysis. This paper proposes that the reciprocal interaction between regional economic poles within the developing regions can be studied by employing systems of innovation perspective. The application of the systems of innovation perspective serves as a window to explore the quality of interactions in economic, education, productive activities and institutions. The importance of the regional dimension in stimulating the innovation capability and competitiveness of firms and regions has been examined by many authors (Asheim et al., 2003: Cooke, 2003, Wolfe, 2003, Isaksen, 2002, Malmberg and Maskell, 2002). The regional dimension is acquiring more relevance as the interactions between actors within the region become more intense. In the context of Africa, for example, the emergence of South Africa as an economic outlier in the region has created new challenges both opportunities and dangers for the rest of Africa. This paper suggests that a systems‟ of innovation perspective might be useful to examine how South Africa, as a regional pole in Africa, interacts with the region by sharing knowledge, learning and capacity building.

The Louisiana shrimp fishery has experienced a collapse in the price of shrimp since 2001. The principal reason for this collapse is increasing shrimp imports. Examining the political economy of agro-food systems and the interrelated household economies of Louisiana shrimp fisherpeople, this thesis asks how household commodity production, where fishers own their means of production and supply most labor themselves, is being restructured by the liberalization of seafood trade. Shrimpers have drawn increasingly on household resources (such as unwaged labor of family members) that are normally devoted to social reproduction to maintain their participation in household commodity production. In other words, households shift resources out of the family and into the economy in order to make good on losses of cash income they suffer from low prices. Households continue producing at de facto wage levels below that necessary to support the household on shrimping income alone.

No description available.

This thesis examines the development of goat and sheep herding in the Levant during the Neolithic period, and focuses particularly on the emergence of caprines as major early domesticates and the development of specialised pastoral economies. It is divided into two sections. The first consists of a critical review of published palaeoclimatic, archaeological, archaeobotanical and zooarchaeological data, which are integrated to provide baseline interpretations of caprine domestication and the development of specialised pastoral economies. The second section presents the results of a zooarchaeological analysis of the faunal assemblage from the Neolithic site of 'Ain Ghazal, located in the Jordanian Highlands, which are evaluated in the context of the two baseline interpretations presented in the first section. The relative merits of the different methods by which archaeological caprine remains can be identified to species are also discussed. It is argued that goats were probably first domesticated in or immediately adjacent to the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains during the 10th millennium b.p., and that mouflon were probably first domesticated in the piedmont zones of the Taurus and Zagros Mountains during the first half of the 9th millennium b.p. The independent domestication of goats in the Zagros Mountains during the first half of the 9th millennium b.p. is regarded as a strong possibility. It is concluded that the concepts of there have been a temporal gap between the appearance of the earliest permanent agricultural villages and the earliest domestic caprines, and that significant periods of loose-herding preceded the full domestication of these species, may need to be reconsidered. Pastoral economies during the Levantine Neolithic seem to have been based on sedentary animal husbandry aimed at subsistence-orientated meat production. There is however some evidence that simple forms of distant pastures husbandry, still focused on subsistenceorientated meat production, may have developed during the Neolithic period.

Augsburg, Univ., Diss., 2006.

No description available.