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The study investigated the degree of compliance of selected Arizona public school districts with a set of state statutes which placed a limit on the amount bilingual education services a district could provide to students. The existing literature on implementation and compliance suggested that several conditions might influence districts to implement programs of instruction which would be at variance with the state laws. The study used questionnaires to gather program data from 40 school districts in southeastern Arizona. These questionnaires were screened to determine those districts offering programs of instructions which exceeded the restrictions of state law. Six such districts were found. Interviews were conducted with program administrators in each district to determine the explanations for noncompliance. An interview was also obtained with an Arizona Department of Education official to determine the role of the state regarding the bilingual statutes. Information obtained from the interviews revealed that several of the programs had been established under federal pressure to provide equal educational opportunity to limited-English-proficient children. These programs had existed long before these state statutes were put into effect in 1981. Data also indicated that the state statutes lacked enforcement mechanisms. The state agency responsible for those programs received no mandate to monitor districts or to enforce state restrictions. Also, this agency was federally-funded with a primary loyalty to federal priorities to keep programs in operation and with a service rather than an enforcement orientation toward local districts. No enforcement of the restrictions found in the 1981 bilingual statutes took place. Furthermore, administrative regulations for the 1981 statutes were formulated which permitted programs of instruction exceeding state limitations to continue. In 1984 new bilingual statutes were put into effect which removed the restrictions of the old statutes. The new statutes are discussed from the historical perspective of the earlier statutes.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--Lehigh University, 2006. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 217-223).

Thesis (PhD(Education Management and Policy Studies))--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Abstract in English. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1931. / Vita. Published also as Teachers college, Columbia university, Contributions to education, no. 474. Includes a check list of items, which will serve as an aid to school boards and as a guide to architects. Bibliography: p. 109-113.

Thèse--Université de Paris. / "Bibliographie": p. [285]-292.

During recent years, courts in the United States have in many instances attempted to force other agencies of government to take some sort of affirmative action. In doing so, they have sought repeatedly to force those other agencies to act where, left to their own accord, they would choose not to do so. A specific example of a situation of this sort is the United States Supreme Court's entry into the field of race relations with the issuance of the Brown decision in 1954. Quite obviously, in rendering that decision, the nation's highest court was seeking to force local school boards to act in a manner distinctly at odds with how they would otherwise have chosen to proceed. In the Brown situation and others like it, a crucial question which has arisen is this: to what degree is a court able to force other agencies to act where they otherwise would not? It is, moreover, with this question that this dissertation is concerned. Specifically, this volume seeks to explore the capability of the courts to force unwilling agencies to act in a manner opposed to their natural inclination by exploring the California school finance litigation and the legislative responses to it. What this exploration leads to is the conclusion that, although courts can and do force other agencies to act, their ability to do so is nonetheless limited. Specifically, it would appear that courts can act as agenda setters, thereby forcing other agencies of government to at least consider issues they otherwise would have ignored. Courts also, it would seem, can play some role in the molding of the substantive provisions of a given policy. There, though, their impact would appear not to be a particularly great one; rather, in that regard it would seem that all they are capable of doing is simply prodding other policy-makers in a given direction but little more. Indeed, it would appear that the capacity of courts to act as actual molders of substantive policy is seriously undercut by the fact that the decisions they issue are merely one component of the overall political environment with which nonjudicial officials must be concerned.

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