Domestic Violence is a pervasive social evil which must be combated with every means possible. To this end, the legislator enacted the Domestic Violence Act, 116 of 1998 (hereafter referred to as the DVA) to provide for a fast and accessible process by which the victims of domestic abuse can obtain an interdict to protect themselves against further acts of violence. Section 7(1)(c) of the DVA allows for a court, when considering an application made for a protection order in terms of the Act, to make an order prohibiting the Respondent from entering the shared residence of the Applicant and Respondent. Section 7(1)(d) allows for a court, when considering an application as mentioned, to make an order prohibiting the Respondent from entering any specific part of the shared residence. It is argued that the orders provided for in sections 7(1)(c) and (d) amounts, de facto, to an order that evicts the Respondent from the shared residence. Evictions are a traumatic procedure for the person(s) concerned, and endangers a large variety of human rights. It should therefore be approached with extreme caution to ensure that no person’s fundamental rights are infringed. Section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution) determines that no person(s) may be evicted from their home without a valid order of court, which order should be granted only after taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances. Specific pieces of legislation have been enacted to regulate the eviction process, prescribing specific procedures and setting requirements for a legal eviction. When an order is given in terms of section 7(1)(c) of the DVA, these procedures are not followed and the requirements are not met, resulting in illegal evictions. These orders may further infringe upon certain fundamental rights of the Respondent, such as the constitutional property rights set out in section 25, and the right of access to the courts. The concerned sections of the DVA can be justified under section 36 of the Constitution. However, it is argued that the DVA is in practice frequently misused by applicants, to such an extent that it becomes a tool of abuse, defying the whole purpose of the Act and extreme caution should be used by presiding officers when considering applications for orders in terms of sections 7(1)(c) and (d) of the DVA. / LLM, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

Domestic Violence is a pervasive social evil which must be combated with every means possible. To this end, the legislator enacted the Domestic Violence Act, 116 of 1998 (hereafter referred to as the DVA) to provide for a fast and accessible process by which the victims of domestic abuse can obtain an interdict to protect themselves against further acts of violence. Section 7(1)(c) of the DVA allows for a court, when considering an application made for a protection order in terms of the Act, to make an order prohibiting the Respondent from entering the shared residence of the Applicant and Respondent. Section 7(1)(d) allows for a court, when considering an application as mentioned, to make an order prohibiting the Respondent from entering any specific part of the shared residence. It is argued that the orders provided for in sections 7(1)(c) and (d) amounts, de facto, to an order that evicts the Respondent from the shared residence. Evictions are a traumatic procedure for the person(s) concerned, and endangers a large variety of human rights. It should therefore be approached with extreme caution to ensure that no person’s fundamental rights are infringed. Section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution) determines that no person(s) may be evicted from their home without a valid order of court, which order should be granted only after taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances. Specific pieces of legislation have been enacted to regulate the eviction process, prescribing specific procedures and setting requirements for a legal eviction. When an order is given in terms of section 7(1)(c) of the DVA, these procedures are not followed and the requirements are not met, resulting in illegal evictions. These orders may further infringe upon certain fundamental rights of the Respondent, such as the constitutional property rights set out in section 25, and the right of access to the courts. The concerned sections of the DVA can be justified under section 36 of the Constitution. However, it is argued that the DVA is in practice frequently misused by applicants, to such an extent that it becomes a tool of abuse, defying the whole purpose of the Act and extreme caution should be used by presiding officers when considering applications for orders in terms of sections 7(1)(c) and (d) of the DVA. / LLM, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

The Water Resources Management Act 24 of 2004 will change the water regime in Namibia dramatically. Section 4 of the Water Resources Management Act provides for this change by excluding private ownership of water from the new water law dispensation. This study focused on section 4 of the Water Resources Management Act and the implication that this section will have on property rights in the Namibia. The dissertation firstly outlines the historical development of ownership of water in Namibia. It is indicated that private ownership of water was an established principle under Roman-Dutch law. A further examination of Roman-Dutch law reveals that surface water could be divided into private and public water. Public water belonged to the whole nation, while ownership of private rivers was vested in the land owner. Under South West Africa’s water legislation, the Irrigation and Water Conservation Act 8 of 1912 and the Water Act 54 of 1956 maintained the distinction between public and private water. However, the Water Act of 1956 expanded the definitions of both public and private water, and acknowledged that the land owner where the water found its source or flowed over, could exercise the exclusive use rights of such water. The Water Resources Management Act has been approved and published in the Government Gazette. However, it has not yet come into force as a date for commencement of the Act, as prescribed by section 138(1)(b), has not yet been determined by the Minister. Once the Act is in force, the Water Act will be repealed as a whole. Section 4 of the Water Resources Management Act will abolish the private ownership of water in Namibia. This is clearly in violation of article 16 of the Namibian Constitution of 1990, which provides for private ownership of water when read with article 100. Therefore, the research concludes that the Water Resources Management Act will dramatically affect property rights in Namibia. Under the Water Resources Management Act there will be no private ownership of water, and the affected person will have no recourse under the Act to claim compensation. / LLM (Environmental Law and Governance), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The Water Resources Management Act 24 of 2004 will change the water regime in Namibia dramatically. Section 4 of the Water Resources Management Act provides for this change by excluding private ownership of water from the new water law dispensation. This study focused on section 4 of the Water Resources Management Act and the implication that this section will have on property rights in the Namibia. The dissertation firstly outlines the historical development of ownership of water in Namibia. It is indicated that private ownership of water was an established principle under Roman-Dutch law. A further examination of Roman-Dutch law reveals that surface water could be divided into private and public water. Public water belonged to the whole nation, while ownership of private rivers was vested in the land owner. Under South West Africa’s water legislation, the Irrigation and Water Conservation Act 8 of 1912 and the Water Act 54 of 1956 maintained the distinction between public and private water. However, the Water Act of 1956 expanded the definitions of both public and private water, and acknowledged that the land owner where the water found its source or flowed over, could exercise the exclusive use rights of such water. The Water Resources Management Act has been approved and published in the Government Gazette. However, it has not yet come into force as a date for commencement of the Act, as prescribed by section 138(1)(b), has not yet been determined by the Minister. Once the Act is in force, the Water Act will be repealed as a whole. Section 4 of the Water Resources Management Act will abolish the private ownership of water in Namibia. This is clearly in violation of article 16 of the Namibian Constitution of 1990, which provides for private ownership of water when read with article 100. Therefore, the research concludes that the Water Resources Management Act will dramatically affect property rights in Namibia. Under the Water Resources Management Act there will be no private ownership of water, and the affected person will have no recourse under the Act to claim compensation. / LLM (Environmental Law and Governance), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014