No description available.

This doctoral research explores the ways in which UK law engages with embryonic processes, namely under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended). The research offers a fuller understanding of these elusive and evolving biological processes, and in particular, how they can, in turn, allow us to understand legal process and legal regulation more deeply. To do so, the thesis employs an anthropological concept - liminality - coined by Arnold van Gennep, which is itself concerned with revealing the dynamics of process. Liminality may be described as being concerned with the spaces in between distinct stages of human experience or with the process of transition between such stages. With this framing of liminality in mind - which is often characterised as a three-stage process of human experience - the research is divided into three parts, broadly reflecting the three parts of van Gennep's liminal schema: into, through, and out of liminality. It is argued herein that in regulating the embryo - that is, a processual liminal entity in itself - the law is regulating for uncertainty. Tracing the legal governance of the early stages of human life, from its inception to today's regulatory frameworks, the research diagnoses a 'legal gap' between the conceptual basis for regulation, and practical 'realities' of the 1990 Act (as amended). In particular, this 'gap' is typified by uncertainty surrounding embryos in vitro, and what this thesis diagnoses as 'legal stasis'. In order to situate this novel liminal analysis within existing paradigms, however, the thesis first frames embryos in vitro as 'gothic', building upon emergent analytical responses to postmodern forms of categorisation. This framing helps to articulate the nature of, and the reasons for, the above-mentioned 'legal gap'. This framing is nonetheless incomplete without a liminal lens, as it draws our attention to the dynamics of the processes occurring within this 'gap'. It is argued that considering the 'problem' in this manner enables us to move beyond conceptualisation, towards realisation. The gothic, and the liminal are thus used to critically assess legal representations of the embryo, and suggests that there are ways in which the law might better embrace the multiplicity of environments through which the embryo in vitro can travel, that is, either towards reproductive or research ends. It is argued that full recognition of these variable, relational liminal states of the embryo is important for the future of artificial reproduction and embryo research, and that this does not currently happen. In order for the law to reflect better the uncertain nature of embryonic processes, and the technologies that create them, the thesis posits a nuanced, contextual reframing of the embryo that captures the multiplicity of embryonic 'pathways' available within the 1990 Act (as amended). The overarching objective of this work is to consider a more coherent and robust intellectual defence of the ways in which we justify different treatments of in vitro embryos. It thus proposes a 'context-based approach' that embraces the variable, relational pathways already facilitated by the 1990 Act (as amended) in order to lead the embryo (and itself) into, through and out of liminality.

Over the past few years, embryo research has been a widely discussed topic. New techniques such as embryo stem cell research or therapeutic cloning are considered by scientists to be very promising. Nevertheless, opponents of these experimentations warn against the commodification of human life forms and argue that the moral status of embryos should protect them from being destroyed purely for research. / Legislations on this topic have been enacted in most Western countries, though they are still much criticised. Is there an adequate way of regulating embryo research? Our argument suggests that consensus can only be procedurally obtained. That is, we believe that only legislative assemblies should have authority to take a position on this controversial topic, which is subject to moral disagreement, and as such, judges should only have a minor role.

No description available.

With the new capabilities of genetic engineering and such biotechnologies, come added considerations for policy makers. If gene therapy (or even embryo selection) becomes common practice, we must look not only to creating policies that protect the interests of individuals in the legal and social realms, but consideration must also be given to the equality of opportunity in the genetic sense. This additional level brings with it much significance; one can argue that financial disparity is at least theoretically surmountable but it is difficult to account for intentional genetic alterations that would forever give certain individuals a physical advantage over non-enhanced persons. It is with these new boundaries that genetic policy must find itself creating legislation; it is also with these new boundaries that policy will find its greatest hurdles. Given the ever-expanding field of biotechnology and gene therapy, one can hardly expect policy written today to be up-to-date ten, or even two years from now. Instead of focusing, therefore, on specific recommendations, I will center my discussion on a broad framework that outlines the arguments that should be considered when dealing with genetic engineering and public policy. After creating a theoretical structure centered on historical experiences and the philosophical writings of John Rawls, we will delve deeper into the actual possibilities created by genetic engineering and embryo selection. I will further analyze the differences between positive and negative genetic interventions and discuss the consequences of these differences as they should (or should not) affect policy. This particular distinction and the implications of these differences on policy will serve as the bulk of my discussion. / Master of Arts