M.Comm. (International Accounting) / The study investigates the potential effect of applying a fair value model after the grant date to employee share options. The research assesses the appropriateness of the requirements of IFRS2 Share-Based Payment transactions with a specific focus on equity-settled Employee Share Options. The researcher has calculated the percentage movements or changes of fair value between each financial year including the overall percentage change. The study was mainly triggered by the IFRS2 Share-Based Payment rules and various arguments from different authors challenging the appropriateness of IFRS2 Share-Based Payment on employee share options (ESOs) transactions in capturing the full economic value transferred to the option holder at exercise date when applying a grant date accounting model. The study provides insights into whether a grant date accounting model is appropriate in measuring ESOs and capturing the full economic value transferred to the option holder. The application of a static fair value model in measuring the value of ESOs has the potential for both positive and negative effects on the compensation cost recognised in the financial statements over the vesting period. After analysing the descriptive financial data on fair value per option over the six year period included in the sample selection, a conclusion was reached that, IASB should consider to true-up or make a restatement of the opening balance of the fair value reserves account in order to minimise the potential permanent error in equity accounts and to minimise the potential effect of understating or overstating the compensation cost. The IASB should further consider the proper classification of equity instruments issued to employee ESOs which comply with other financial instrument accounting standards such as the IAS32 – Financial Instruments: Presentation, and IFRS9 Financial Instruments. This will ensure that transactions viewed as economic equivalents of each other are treated in the same way from an accounting perspective, and the correct measurement basis of ESOs may be achieved.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2001. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-92). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users. Address: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3024508.

M.A. (Industrial Relations) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

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2005年10月，中國政府發布“國務院批轉證監會關於提高上市公司品質意見的通知“。它允許和建議上市公司探索利用股權補償，以激勵員工。由於中國股市和股權補償的歷史很短，以及對企業的激勵機制的重要性。我們研究和發現公司治理和採納該計劃的可能性之間的關係是混合的。而具有較高的營業利潤/資產比率和淨利潤/總資產比率的公司更可能採用股權補償。我們還發現，通過在企業層面測量累積異常收益率（CAR），股權補償的公佈有積極的市場反應。此外，如果最大的部分限制性股份或購股權授予僱員工會委員或在公司的核心員工，市場反應更是積極。 / In October 2005, the Chinese government released "Notice about the State Council of China approving China Securities Regulatory Commission to improve qualities of listed firms". It allows and suggests listed firms to explore the use of equity-based compensation in order to motivate employees. In this thesis, we find that the relationship between corporate governance and the likelihood of adopting the scheme is mixed. Firms with higher ratios of operating profits to assets and net profit to total assets are more likely to adopt equity-based compensation. We also discover positive market responses by measuring the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to the announcement of equity-based compensation at the firm level. Moreover, if a larger portion of the restricted shares or options is granted to the groups of employees which are union committee members or core employees in the firm, the market response is much more positive and the CAR is larger in magnitude. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Ko, Ka Yin. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 32-33). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Cover Page --- p.1 / Abstract --- p.2 / Chinese Version --- p.3 / Contents --- p.4 / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.6 / Chapter 2 --- Basic idea of equity-based compensation --- p.7 / Chapter 3 --- Literature Review --- p.9 / Chapter 4 --- History and Development --- p.11 / Chapter 4.1. --- Equity-based compensation around the world --- p.11 / Chapter 4.2. --- Regulations of equity-based compensation in China --- p.12 / Chapter 5 --- Hypothesis --- p.13 / Chapter 6 --- Methodology --- p.16 / Chapter 6.1. --- Equity-based compensation in the company --- p.16 / Chapter 6.2. --- Ownership concentration and characteristics --- p.16 / Chapter 6.3. --- Legal framework --- p.17 / Chapter 6.4. --- Ownership Nature --- p.17 / Chapter 6.5. --- Board of directors’ characteristics --- p.17 / Chapter 6.6. --- Operating performance --- p.18 / Chapter 6.7. --- Industry sectors --- p.18 / Chapter 6.8. --- Equity-based compensation scheme characteristics --- p.19 / Chapter 6.9. --- Logistic model --- p.19 / Chapter 6.10. --- Event study approach --- p.21 / Chapter 7 --- Data --- p.24 / Chapter 7.1. --- Sources of Data --- p.24 / Chapter 7.2. --- Equity-based compensation and firm characteristics --- p.24 / Chapter 8 --- Empirical Results --- p.25 / Chapter 8.1. --- Factors that drive companies to implement equity-based compensation . --- p.26 / Chapter 8.1.1. --- Univariate test --- p.26 / Chapter 8.1.2. --- Logistic model --- p.26 / Chapter 8.2. --- Short-term market response --- p.27 / Chapter 8.2.1. --- Event study --- p.27 / Chapter 8.2.2. --- Univariate test --- p.28 / Chapter 8.2.3. --- Multivate OLS regressions --- p.29 / Chapter 9 --- Conclusions --- p.30 / References --- p.31 / Chapter Table 1 --- Number of equity-based compensation schemes announced by each firm in the sample period --- p.33 / Chapter Table 2 --- By year, number of firms with equity-based compensation schemes announcement in restricted share and option --- p.33 / Chapter Table 3 --- Sector distribution for equity-based compensation announced firms --- p.33 / Chapter Table 4 --- Share of restricted share or option in the equity-based compensation scheme by each group --- p.34 / Chapter Table 5 --- Descriptive statistics for firm characteristics --- p.35 / Chapter Table 6 --- Univariate test --- p.37 / Chapter Table 7 --- Logistic Model --- p.38 / Chapter Table 8 --- Cumulative abnormal returns for an event study of implementation of equity-based compensation announcements --- p.40 / Chapter Table 9 --- Abnormal returns for an event study of implementation of equity-based compensation announcements --- p.40 / Chapter Table 10 --- Descriptive statistics for firm characteristics and mean comparison of CAR between below median/ "0" group and above median/ " 1" group using t-test --- p.41 / Chapter Table 11 --- OLS regression --- p.43

I investigate the effect of shareholder rights and information asymmetry on option-related repurchase activity. Prior research shows that the dilution effect of the exercise of the employee stock options on earnings per share (EPS) decreases the value of stock options. Thus, managers tend to use stock repurchases rather than dividends to return cash to shareholders (the dividend substitution effect). I document that the executive stock option incentives to repurchase stock as a substitute for dividends are stronger when firms have weak shareholder rights and the level of information asymmetry positively influences managerial stock option incentives to repurchase stock. Furthermore, prior research indicates that information asymmetry is positively associated with stock repurchases. I also provide evidence indicating that the relationship between information asymmetry and stock repurchases is stronger when firms have weaker shareholder rights. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

<p>I examine whether financial statement preparers (managers and auditors) treat recognized versus disclosed fair value of option compensation differently. Recognition refers to items that appear on the face of financial statements and that are included in subtotal figures that appear in the summary accounts; disclosure refers to items that appear in words and amounts in only the financial statement footnotes. I find that fair value recognition of option compensation is likely to have a significant impact on net income. Firms in my sample granted options amounting to a median fair value of 7% of profits in 1996 and 11% of profits in 2004. I compare the terms of option grants and the properties of fair value estimation under a disclosure reporting regime to terms and properties under a recognition regime. Under a fair value recognition regime, I find firms reduce/eliminate option grants across all levels of employees, reduce the statutory length of options, and substitute restricted stock and bonuses for option compensation. The fair value reduction in option grants is on average 9% (0.4%) of absolute net income. In contrast, under a fair value disclosure regime, option compensation was not reduced. I also find that firms increase the bias in three inputs to fair value option estimation: volatility, dividend, and interest. This increase amounts to 4%, 2%, and 0.3% of fair value cost. Mandatory recognition firms also display increased dividend and interest input accuracy. Combined, these results suggest that financial statements reflect differences in behavior between recognition and disclosure reporting regimes, such that both real actions and fair value estimation are used to reduce recognized values.</p> / Dissertation

The papers of stock-based employee compensation have increased dramatically in recent years, focusing attention on whether stock-based employee compensation can enhance employees¡¦ motivation or impact firm value. A number of recent papers have addressed conflicting evidence as to whether stock-based employee compensation enhance the performance of the firm. Some relatively new studies used use the Ohlson (1995,1999) and Feltham ¡® Ohlson (1999) models to investigate the market¡¦s perception of the economic effect of employee stock options on firm value(Aboody et al.2001; Bell et al., 2002). However, critics have questioned the validity of such studies (For a review of related studies, see Beaver 2002). In fact, stock-based employee compensation can influence firm value through improving performance of firm, and at the same time by diluting the shares of outstanding stocks, thus harms shareholder equity. This study was primarily designed to examine how stock-based employee compensation affects shareholder equity through Incentive and dilute effects. Stock-based employee compensation in this study comprises employee stock bonuses and employee stock options. First, the Incentive and dilute effects are combined in Ohlson model. The hypothesized relationships of constructs, observed variables and operational definitions are defined. The empirical work will be conducted by LISREL method to estimate the coefficients in the model. The estimated results will be dressed the following points. 1.Whether the stock-based employee compensation affects equity valuation. 2.Whether the stock-based employee compensation affects that the intrinsic value through improving abnormal earning? 3.Whether the stock-based employee compensation harms shareholder equity by diluting the shares of outstanding stocks? 4.Discuss employee stock bonuses and employee stock options respectively. In this study, we find the stock-based employee compensation is relevant to the equity value. Employee stock bonuses are relevant to shareholder equity and abnormal earning. In other words, employee stock bonuses have directly incentive effects. Otherwise, employee stock bonuses also have dilute effects. However, the dilute effects are smaller than the incentive effects. On the other hand, employee stock options aren¡¦t relevant to shareholder equity and abnormal earning. Otherwise, employee stock options don¡¦t have direct dilute effects in grant year.

This thesis investigates how chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives affect the remediation of material weaknesses (MWs) in internal control. First, we predict that the sensitivity of CEO stock and stock option portfolios to stock price (CEO price sensitivity or delta) has a positive impact on firm promptness in remedying MWs, because CEOs whose personal wealth is tied to stock price suffer losses from negative market reactions to the public disclosure of MWs. Second, we predict that the sensitivity of CEO stock option portfolio to stock-return volatility (CEO volatility sensitivity or vega) has a negative impact on firm promptness in remedying MWs, as firms with internal control weaknesses are associated with higher information and operating risks that manifest in stock return volatility. Our empirical results, based on a sample of firms disclosing MWs in internal control under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) during November 15, 2003 and August 27, 2006, are consistent with the above predictions. We further provide evidence that an effective board of directors could mitigate the undesirable, negative impact of CEO volatility sensitivity on MWs remediation. We measure firms’ promptness in remedying MWs based on their subsequent internal control audit opinions (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Goh 2009); and CEO price (volatility) sensitivity as the dollar change in CEO stock and option portfolios (option portfolio) from a 1 percent change in stock price (Core and Guay 2002). This thesis is innovative with respect to the prediction and evidence of the opposing effects from CEO price and volatility sensitivities on internal control quality. This new evidence contributes to the literature that examines managerial incentives embedded in stock-based and option-based compensation plans in various economic contexts (e.g., Knopf et al. 2002; Coles et al. 2006; Low 2009; Armstrong et al. 2013). Our findings suggest that when stock constitutes a major part of CEO compensation, the mandatory disclosure requirement of SOX provides a channel for the stock market to discipline CEO. However, when options dominate CEO compensation, volatility sensitivity and the associated risk-taking incentive can cause CEOs to delay rectifying internal control deficiencies. These results have interesting policy implications for regulators and firms concerning mandatory disclosure and compensation design. Moreover, this thesis contributes to the broad literature on corporate governance by documenting an interaction between corporate governance and CEO incentives, namely that strong corporate governance mitigates the undesirable risking-taking incentive caused by CEO option holdings. Overall, this thesis deepens our understanding on mechanisms through which regulators, firm executives, and boards of directors strengthen internal control over financial reporting in the post-SOX era. / published_or_final_version / Business / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

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