Reconsidérant tardivement l’ontologie fondamentale élaborée dans et à partir d’Être et temps, Heidegger la soumet à une critique immanente radicale et totale : 1° l’ontologie fondamentale n’est pas fondamentale ; 2° par ce qu’elle vise sans l’avoir clairement compris à ses débuts, l’ontologie fondamentale ne mérite même pas, à proprement parler, le titre d’ontologie. Comment, ayant élaboré l’ontologie fondamentale pour répéter la question de l’être comme la question fondamentale après qu’elle fut tombée en oubli depuis Platon et Aristote, Heidegger a-t-il pu en venir lui-même à nier que cette ontologie fût fondamentale et même qu’elle méritât le titre d’ontologie ? Afin de le comprendre, nous tenterons de suivre le chemin de pensée de Heidegger, depuis l’ontologie fondamentale comme son terminus ab quo jusqu’à la pensée de l’Ereignis comme son terminus ad quem. De là les trois parties principales de la présente recherche : 1°, la saisie et le déploiement de l’ontologie fondamentale en son essence comme phénoménologie herméneutique de l’être du Dasein et de l’être en général ; 2°, le virage de la pensée, que nous distinguerons avec Heidegger du tournant dans l’Ereignis ; 3°, l’explicitation de la pensée de l’Ereignis, en vue de dégager l’horizon ultime de l’interprétation de l’ontologie fondamentale. / Reconsidering late the fundamental ontology elaborated in and from Being und Time, Heidegger subjects her to an immanent, radical and total criticism : 1° the fundamental ontology is not fundamental ; 2° by what she focuses without clearly understanding it in her beginnings, the fundamental ontology doesn't deserve, strictly speaking, the title of ontology. How, having elaboreted the fundamental ontology to repeat the question about the Being as the fundamental question, after she was forgotten since Plato and Aristoteles, Heidegger could ever come himself to deny that this ontology was fundamental and even that she deserved the title of ontology ? In order to understand it, we'll try to follow the way of Heidegger’s thought, from the fundamental ontology as his terminus ab quo to the thought of the Ereignis as his terminus ad quem. Based on this, the three main parts in the research are : 1° getting and developping the fundamental ontology in her essence as hermeneutical phenomenology of the Being of the Dasein and of the Being in general ; 2° the bend of the thought, that we'll differ with Heidegger from the turning in the Ereignis ; 3° the explicitation of the thought of the Ereignis, in order to bring out the last horizon for an interpretation of the fundamental ontology.

In his “Letter on Humanism,” Martin Heidegger conveys the importance he attributes to poetry when he states: “Language is the house of being” (“Letter” 239). In response to his early Jesuit education, he developed a secular alternative to theology with his existential phenomenology. Theology, poetry, and phenomenology share the basic concern of explaining the foundations of being. For Heidegger, ownership characterizes being in a fundamental way; in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), he establishes the “Ereignis” (“event of appropriation”) as the foundation of being. Ownership lies at the core of being in his thinking following Being and Time. Yet his philosophy ignores the material circumstances of ownership. By way of a materialist critique of Heidegger’s Idealist phenomenology, I expose how property-relations are encoded in the modern poetry and philosophy of dwelling with the question: who owns the house of being? The answer lies in “self-possession,” which represents historical subjectivity as the struggle for the means of production. Paul Celan, T. S. Eliot, Rainer Maria Rilke, and Paul Valéry are all poets who address the relationship between being and ownership in expressing what Marx and Engels call the “language of real life” in The German Ideology (26). In 1927, Eliot converted to Anglicanism and found solace in the realm of faith; by opting for the theology of dispossession, he surrendered his historical subjectivity. Rilke thought that he could find refuge from the marketplace in aesthetic beauty and pure philosophy but eventually disabused himself of his illusion. Similarly, Valéry sought refuge in the space of thought; basing reality in the mind, he forsook the social realm as the site of contestation for gaining ownership over being. As a poet who distinguished himself from the Idealism of his predecessors, Celan developed a structure of dialogue based upon shared exchange on common ground. A materialist approach to the poetry and philosophy of dwelling exposes property-relations as the foundation of the house of being.

In his “Letter on Humanism,” Martin Heidegger conveys the importance he attributes to poetry when he states: “Language is the house of being” (“Letter” 239). In response to his early Jesuit education, he developed a secular alternative to theology with his existential phenomenology. Theology, poetry, and phenomenology share the basic concern of explaining the foundations of being. For Heidegger, ownership characterizes being in a fundamental way; in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), he establishes the “Ereignis” (“event of appropriation”) as the foundation of being. Ownership lies at the core of being in his thinking following Being and Time. Yet his philosophy ignores the material circumstances of ownership. By way of a materialist critique of Heidegger’s Idealist phenomenology, I expose how property-relations are encoded in the modern poetry and philosophy of dwelling with the question: who owns the house of being? The answer lies in “self-possession,” which represents historical subjectivity as the struggle for the means of production. Paul Celan, T. S. Eliot, Rainer Maria Rilke, and Paul Valéry are all poets who address the relationship between being and ownership in expressing what Marx and Engels call the “language of real life” in The German Ideology (26). In 1927, Eliot converted to Anglicanism and found solace in the realm of faith; by opting for the theology of dispossession, he surrendered his historical subjectivity. Rilke thought that he could find refuge from the marketplace in aesthetic beauty and pure philosophy but eventually disabused himself of his illusion. Similarly, Valéry sought refuge in the space of thought; basing reality in the mind, he forsook the social realm as the site of contestation for gaining ownership over being. As a poet who distinguished himself from the Idealism of his predecessors, Celan developed a structure of dialogue based upon shared exchange on common ground. A materialist approach to the poetry and philosophy of dwelling exposes property-relations as the foundation of the house of being.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-29T15:06:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Daniel Rodrigues.pdf: 929080 bytes, checksum: da4db89bfdec7ec99ff5836ad5b5327e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-07-02 / The together-belongingness (Zusammengehörigkeit) of Be-ing and man is discussed in this dissertation in the style of a Phenomenological reflection the together-belongingness (Zusammengehörigkeit) of Be-ing and man. It treats of a concept which appears explicitily in the phenomenological thought of Martin Heidegger, especially, beginning in the 30s, when he questioned the meaning of Truth according to the history of Be-ing, that is, as enowning (Ereignis). The reflection, however, begins with the presupposition together-belongingness is a notion present in the thought of Heidegger from the outset of the fundamental-ontological development of the question of Be-ing, represented principally by the primary work of 1927, Sein und Zeit. For this reason, the reflection begins discussing the unity of the thought itinerary of Heidegger, showing that the reversal of the thinking (Kehre) of the 30s is responsible for the transformation which establishes the same question of Be-ing in a more originating extent than that of Sein und Zeit. Admitting from the beginning that together-belongingness translates the mutual reference between Be-ing and man, coming from the primordial unity, in dependence upon which both bring about historically their essence, and not a secondary and posterior relation between two self-subsisting poles, the discussion proceeds determining the structures of human existence, by which together-belongingness is considered in the different levels of elaboration of the question of Be-ing. Consequently, the central thrust of the dissertation is summarized in limiting the spatial-temporal ambience of the common reference. In the first place, attention is given to the analyses of the comprehension-interpretation project of human existence and language, according to Sein und Zeit. Then, according to Beiträge zur Philosophie, the same ambience is limited taking into consideration the grounding of Da-sein as the intermediary dimension between man and Be-ing, it being the instance of supportability of happening of Truth. Finally, the projection of human existence is revealed as the leap of Be-ing, in such a manner that movement of realization of the essence of Be-ing is shown as being the same as the consummation of the historical existence of men. Thus, the coming about of the Truth, by which Be-ing is experienced as abysmal grounding, is coordinated with the historical coming about of human existence, granting it, in virtue of the depth of its grounding, a unitary movement of revealing and of hiding the mystery of Be-ing. Being that this coordination is the manifestation of the originating space and time, human existence appears as the establishment of the space-time dimension of the abyss of Being, always in agreement with an historical possibility. In this way, the together-belongingness appears as an historical sending-forth, in the form of a questioning which Be-ing directs to man, but which is consumed in the measure which man responds, or as it may be, assumes the responsibility for the destiny of his existence according to the appeals of Be-ing. Thus, thought, understood as a human faculty during all of the history of metaphysics, is reduced to its essence: that by which man corresponds to the historical appeals of Be-ing. To think consumes the intimate reference of man to Be-ing and, therefore, is the privileged manner of placing in operation human existence in union with Be-ing. By means of thought, therefore, man has understood himself separated from and in front of Be-ing. For that reason, the reflection of this dissertation is a path in search of the forgotten unity between man and Be-ing. / Discute-se nessa dissertação, ao modo de uma reflexão fenomenológica, a co-pertinência (Zusammengehörigkeit) entre Ser e homem. Trata-se de um conceito que aparece explicitamente no pensamento fenomenológico de Martin Heidegger, sobretudo a partir dos anos 30, quando o pensamento heideggeriano interroga o sentido da Verdade segundo a história do Ser, isto é, como Ereignis. A reflexão, entretanto, parte do pressuposto de que a co-pertinência é uma noção presente no pensamento de Heidegger desde o desenvolvimento fundamental-ontológico da questão do Ser, representado principalmente pela obra capital de 1927, Sein und Zeit. Por essa razão, a reflexão principia discutindo a unidade do itinerário de pensamento de Heidegger, mostrando que a viragem (Kehre) dos anos 30 é responsável por uma transformação que instaura a mesma questão do Ser em um âmbito mais originário que aquele de Sein und Zeit. Admitindo desde o início que a co-pertinência traduz a mútua referência entre Ser e o homem, advinda da unidade primordial, em dependência da qual ambos realizam historicamente sua essência, e não uma relação secundária e posterior entre dois pólos subsistentes em si, a discussão prossegue explicitando as estruturas da existência humana, pelas quais a co-pertinência é abordada nos diferentes níveis de elaboração da questão do Ser. Nesse sentido, o esforço central da dissertação se resume em circunscrever a ambiência espaço-temporal da mútua referência. Primeiramente, privilegiam-se as análises do projeto compreensivo-interpretativo da existência humana e da linguagem, conforme Sein und Zeit. Depois, conforme os Beiträge zur Philosophie, a mesma ambiência é circunscrita tendo em vista a fundação do Da-sein como a dimensão intermediária entre homem e Ser, por ser a instância de suportabilidade do acontecimento da Verdade. Ao final, o projetar-se da existência humana se desvela como um lance do Ser, de tal maneira que o movimento de realização da Essência do Ser se mostra como sendo o mesmo da consumação da existência histórica dos homens. Assim, o acontecer da Verdade, pelo qual o Ser se dá como fundamento abissal, conjuga-se com o acontecer histórico da existência humana, conferindo a ela, em virtude da abissalidade de seu fundamento, um movimento unitário de abrir e de velar o mistério do Ser. Sendo essa conjunção a manifestação do espaço e tempo originários, o existir humano aparece como a instauração do espaço-temporal do abismo do Ser, sempre em consonância com uma possibilidade histórica. Desse modo, a co-pertinência aparece como um envio histórico, na forma de uma interpelação que o Ser dirige ao homem, mas que se consuma à medida que o homem responde, ou seja, responsabiliza-se pela destinação de sua existência segundo os apelos do Ser. Assim, o pensamento, compreendido como uma faculdade humana durante toda a história da metafísica, é reconduzido a sua essência: aquilo pelo qual o homem corresponde aos apelos históricos do Ser. Pensar consuma a íntima referência do homem ao Ser e, portanto, é o modo privilegiado de pôr em obra a existência humana em unidade com o Ser. Pelo pensamento, porém, o homem tem se compreendido separado e diante do Ser. Por isso, a reflexão dessa dissertação é um caminho em busca da unidade esquecida entre homem e Ser.