This dissertation centers on issues central to a scientific account of mental entities. In part I, I first consider the general question of whether, and when, it is legitimate to postulate theoretical entities in science. I argue that interpreting theories as if their theoretical terms do not refer to real items lowers their explanatory value by eliminating the opportunity to provide connections with other theories and provide a cohesive account of the world. I then question whether psychological theory needs to postulate mental entities in order to provide adequate explanations of observable behavior, concluding that, behaviorist claims not withstanding, talk about the mental cannot be reduced to talk about behavior. Finally, I argue that it is incumbent on such a theory to investigate the operation and constitution of its entities. In part II, I address attacks on the view that mental items might be made of physical stuff, but not analyzable in purely physical terms. I argue that while revised dualist arguments can show that mental entities cannot be defined in the vocabulary of physics, this is nevertheless consistent with their having a physical constitution. I conclude that in addressing the issue of mind-body identity, the solution lies as much in understanding "identity" as in understanding "mind." In part III, I apply the scientific account of mental items developed in the preceding parts to two traditional philosophical issues; the problem of personal identity. I sketch solutions to these problems and conclude that many remaining problems require scientific investigations rather than philosophical analysis.

No description available.

What is it that determines what our thoughts mean, and how do we know what they mean? Obviously a thought must mean something in order for us to know what it means, and frequently we do know the content of our thoughts. But the converse does not hold, for we can have thoughts to whose contents we are entirely obtuse. For example, people frequently do things for reasons contrary to those they might sincerely profess. But if meaning and thought are not epistemically given, how did we develop awareness of them at all? How do we think about thought—both our own and that of others? This essay is an exploration of these issues to the end of understanding how it is that we come to be able to represent our purposes, intentions, and meanings.

This study had two objectives. The first objective was to investigate whether or not local and international school students in Hong Kong have different thinking styles. The second objective was to examine the predictive power of socialization variables for thinking styles among students in secondary schools. Three hundred and two students from three schools in Hong Kong responded to the Thinking Styles Inventory – Revised II based on Sternberg’s theory of mental style government, and a survey on two groups of socialization variables: student characteristic and school environment. The student characteristic variables included personological and situational variables, while the school environmental variables included in-class experience and assessment-related variables. Results indicated that there were statistically significant differences in thinking styles between local and international school students in Hong Kong. Results also indicated that the subgroup of in-class experience was the most powerful in predicting thinking styles at the international school, the subgroup of assessment-related variables was the most powerful in predicting thinking styles at the traditional local school, and the subgroup of personological characteristics was the most powerful in predicting thinking styles at the direct subsidy scheme local school. Implications of the findings are discussed for parents, teachers, school administrators and policy makers. / published_or_final_version / Education / Master / Master of Education

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Published also as Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1922. / "Columbia university contributions to philosophy and psychology." "Bibliography of references": p. 100-101.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1960. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 24).

Thesis (M. Div.)--International School of Theology, 1984. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 31-32).