In this essay I investigate whether political deliberation in an assembly of 300 people that is randomly selected from the entire population (democratic deliberation) is epistemically superior to political deliberation in an assembly of the same size where individuals have been selected based on certain criteria (non-democratic deliberation). I present Helene Landemore’s argument in favor of the epistemic superiority of democratic deliberation and consider Aaron Ancell’s critique of this argument. I argue the point that Ancell’s critique fails but that a conclusive result on whether democratic deliberation is epistemically superior to non-democratic deliberation has to await further investigations, some of which I take to be empirical in nature. / I denna essä undersöker jag huruvida politiskt problemlösande i en grupp av 300 slumpmässig utvalda personer från hela befolkningen befolkningen (demokratiskt problemlösande) är epistemiskt överlägsen politisk problemlösande i en grupp av samma storlek där individer har blivit utvalda baserat på vissa kriterier (icke-demokratiskt problemlösande). Jag presenterar Helene Landemores argument som visar på den epistemiska överlägsenheten av demokratiskt problemlösande och undersöker sedan Aaron Ancells kritik av detta argument. Jag argumenterar för att Ancells kritik misslyckas men att ett slutgiltigt resultat om huruvida demokratisk problemlösning är epistemiskt överlägsen icke-demokratisk problemlösning behöver invänta vidare undersökningar, däribland empiriska sådana.

The concept of autonomy underlies many other issues in moral and political philosophy. This dissertation states that contemporary debates within Shi’i thought view autonomy as individualistic, and that this individualism brings it into conflict with tradition. It then argues that autonomy is not equivalent to individualism, and argues for an understanding of autonomy that is socially and historically embed- ded and discursive. This makes it possible to rethink the relationship between autonomy and tradition. This rethinking is done through a method of reflective equilibrium, where various ideas from various fields are brought into a coherent whole. There are two phases to this rethinking. The first is in clarifying the concept of autonomy and the second is bringing this concept of autonomy and Shi’i tradition into equilibrium. The dissertation begins by stating that Shi’i thought has already made room for autonomy, but that the concept of autonomy that is dominant is individualistic. An understanding of autonomy as socially and historically embedded is defended. The second phase is to reconcile this embedded notion of autonomy with Shi’i tradition. It is argued that autonomy is important for both the internalisation of tradition and the formation of tradition. Empirical evidence is provided through positive psychology that shows that the most effective means of internalising a belief is through contexts that support autonomy. This understanding of internal- isation is brought into equilibrium with the Shi’i concept of forbidding wrong. It is argued that one of the conditions of forbidding wrong is the condition of efficacy. Approaches to forbidding wrong that support autonomy meet this condition, while those that deny autonomy generally do not. Finally, it is argued that autonomy should be considered within the process of ijtihād because it has an epistemic gain. Autonomous individuals gain a certain level of expertise through their life experiences that are necessary to be incorporated in the ijtiḥād.

Ordinary citizens are rarely charged with making consequential decisions in representative democracies. Almost all consequential decisions are delegated to elected representatives or political appointees. On what basis should we judge whether decisions should be placed in the hands of ordinary citizens or delegated to political elites? I argue that decision-making authority should be allocated in whatever way an assembly of randomly selected citizens would choose, given reasonable beliefs about the consequences of their possible choices. The standard I defend is a variation of the principal-agent model of political representation, in which the people are viewed as a principal and officeholders as their agents. As it is usually formulated, the objectives of the people are defined by the preferences of the majority. I draw on this formulation in chapter 4 to explain why the majority might rationally prefer to delegate authority to a citizens’ assembly instead of an elected legislature and why they might rationally view citizens’ assemblies with distrust, when they are organized and administered by elites. But the standard formulation of the principal-agent model does not provide a coherent standard when the will of the majority is not well-defined. Several chapters on social choice theory explain this problem and why political theorists’ previous responses to it have been unconvincing. In light of this problem, I argue for a revisionary understanding of the principal-agent model, according to which the people and its will are identified not with the preferences of the majority but rather with the decisions of a citizens’ assembly. To motivate this approach I offer a critique of the recent literature on “epistemic democracy,” which describes an alternative form of justification for empowering ordinary citizens. Appeals to expertise and knowledge have historically figured prominently in justifications of political exclusion and hierarchy, but epistemic democrats put them to use in defending participatory forms of democratic politics. Epistemic democrats claim that decision processes in which inexpert, ordinary citizens participate can exhibit greater “collective wisdom” than elite- or expert-dominated decision-making. Chapters 2 and 3 explain why these arguments sit uncomfortably with the nature of disagreements in politics. / Government

The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the thesis, I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure.

This thesis examines some epistemic defences of democracy put forward by David Estlund, Michael Fuerstein, Cheryl Misak, and Fabienne Peter, as well as a critique of democracy raised by Jason Brennan. It then develops an epistemic defence of a moderately non-egalitarian system, which it proposes to call liberal trusteeship. According to the proposed theory, the power to draft laws ought to be separated from the power to enact those drafts into law. The former power ought to be vested in trustees, who are essentially specialists that have inquired extensively into a given matter, and the latter power ought to be vested in a democratically elected parliament. Subsequently, this thesis argues that parliament should nevertheless have the prerogative to ultimately override trustees on ethics and pass its own legislation regulating moral matters; that the criteria for selecting trustees should be determined by jury courts; and that parliament and jury courts should be given some powers to influence the composition of trustee committees, so that the political process can guard against the risk that trustees might be biased or corrupt. The above proposal is grounded on three principal claims. Firstly, this thesis argues that moral authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the political system that strikes the best balance between competence and equality. Secondly, it argues that liberal trusteeship is more likely than democracy to determine correctly what ought to be done in light of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry into a given matter. Thirdly, and as a result, it argues that liberal trusteeship is likely to exercise power sufficiently more competently than democracy, such that its moderate deviation from political equality will be justified. In the light of this, the thesis concludes that liberal trusteeship would strike a better balance between competence and equality than democracy.

Democracy has been encountering an increasing number of critics. Whether it comes from a sympathy for autocrats, free-markets, or the more knowledgeable, this increasing democratic scepticism often takes an epistemic form. Democracy's critics argue that democratic procedures and institutions are unlikely to make good decisions or produce good outcomes in terms of justice or the common good, and should, therefore, be restricted if not completely rejected in favour of its more able alternatives. In the face of such scepticism, this thesis develops an epistemic theory of deliberative democracy. This theory has two principal aims. The first is to analyse and define the epistemic properties of deliberative democracy, and the second is to clarify the possible role epistemic values can play in a wider justification of democratic rule. In accordance with the first, the thesis analyses the ability of deliberative democratic institutions to make good or correct decisions in comparison to a broad range of prominent alternatives. These include traditional rivals such as autocracy and aristocracy, but also more modern and less considered alternatives such as free-markets, limited epistocracy and forms of technical calculation. Through these comparisons, it is argued that we have no good or clear epistemic reason to reject democracy. Deliberative democracy is found to be epistemically superior to many of its alternatives and epistemically equivalent to even its best competitors. The thesis, therefore, mounts a strong reply to democracy's epistemic sceptics. The analysis, however, also helps clarify which form of deliberative democracy is epistemically most valuable, pointing to the value systems approaches which give a prominent role to direct citizen deliberation. The epistemic theory of deliberative democracy also aims to clarify what role epistemic values can play in a wider justification of democratic rule. The thesis argues that deliberative democracy is epistemically superior to many of its rivals and no worse epistemically than even its best alternatives. This suggests that although epistemic values cannot mount a stand-alone defence of democracy, democrats would only be required to defend very weak non-epistemic values to produce a mixed justification. Far from being 'rule by the incompetent many' and therefore highly reliant on procedural values, the thesis will demonstrate that epistemic values can carry significant weight in an argument for democratic rule.