The practice of inquiry, in which we seek and pursue true beliefs by forming justified beliefs, is important to us. This thesis will address two questions concerning the significance of this practice. These are the question of what explains our preference for this particular belief-forming practice, and whether this value can be explained by the value of true belief alone. To answer these questions I will examme a variety of our intuitive commitments to particular values, assuming their general accuracy. I will use an inference from the goal of a practice to the value of a practice, an inference based on the assumption that when we pursue something it is valuable. I will discuss our intuitive commitments to the value of justification. I will also rely on the implications of the presence of pride and admiration in relation to the outcome of an inquiry (especially in situations where a belief is difficult to form). By using this methodology, I will argue for three sources of value that explain the unique significance of the value of inquiry. The first is the value of its unique role in our being able to form reliably true beliefs. Second, I will argue for Wayne D. Riggs' account of epistemic credit; Riggs defends the value of our being responsible for true beliefs, they are our achievements. Third, I will argue for an additional the value of delivering a skilful epistemic performance, another kind of achievement. I will show that although the value of true belief plays a role in explaining some of the values, the third value for inquiry is independent of the value of true belief. This means that there are intellectual rewards, which can be gained from this practice, that extend beyond the value of true belief. / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in

Plato’s “Socratic paradoxes” state that no one does wrong voluntarily and that virtue is knowledge. Outside of moral psychology, the importance of the Socratic paradoxes has been neglected. My dissertation defends two related proposals that showcase their importance in ancient epistemology. The first proposal is that they are a major motivation for Plato to develop a unique view of epistēmē (knowledge or understanding) as an infallible and robust cognitive power that is set over a special class of objects. The second proposal is that understanding the influence of the Socratic paradoxes can help us see how epistēmē improves our doxai (beliefs or opinions) about the world around us, solving a long-standing problem in Plato’s epistemology. I will start by examining the Hippias Minor, in which we see Plato seeking to embrace the Socratic paradoxes (rather than already assuming them) and looking to develop his notion of epistēmē as a result. I will then move to the Protagoras, in order to show Plato proceeding with this project by embracing epistēmē as something that produces good action and involves measurement. I will show the Protagoras’ picture to be fully developed in the Republic, in which epistēmē emerges as something that measures the truth of our doxai and has clear practical benefits as a result. Finally, I will compare this account to Aristotle’s treatment of virtue and epistēmē in the Eudemian Ethics, in order to consider the legacy of the Socratic paradoxes after Plato.

As it is generally conceived, knowledge belongs to the individual: we imagine how a lightbulb suddenly illuminates above the scientist's head, a muse whispers in the philosopher's ear, cogs slide into place as wheels turn in the thinker's mind, and, "Eureka!" an idea is born. As an individualistic experience, knowledge is secure in the repository of the mind, a "steel trap" as it is so often referred, which can only be breached by the most sophisticated and precise methods. From these popular representations of knowledge, one can extrapolate further to conclude that knowledge is not made, it is received. All of these metaphors of knowledge present a passive subject waiting for knowledge to be imparted from the Cosmos. Much like knowledge, a disability and, reflexively, the knowledge of disability, is an individually sited matter; disability is something to be had, possessed, or owned, not shared. Similar to knowledge, disability is not actively produced, it just "is." And disability, too, is internally located, often being attributed as the outcome of physiological malfunction. It follows then, that because both knowledge and disability are separately regarded as individualistic phenomena, as located with(in) the individual, and as existing independently of him or her, that knowledge of disability would also share these characteristics. This study's objective, however, is to prove just the opposite: to position disability as a form of knowledge, and therefore, the knowledge of disability as the endpoint of an ongoing process of social interaction. I use discourse analysis to analyze interviews conducted with staff members of a university office responsible for providing academic accommodations to students with disabilities, in conjunction with documents authored and disseminated by this organization. My study conceives discourse as language in action. By this I mean that discourse creates the very social structures it is presumed to describe. I also understand discourse as reflexive, meaning that embedded within discourse are larger social and moral norms. Believing that analyzing discourse allows for normative beliefs on knowledge and disability to be clearly displayed, I ask the following questions: By what assumptions do members organize disability in their daily practice? What role does communication play in these processes of social organization? What resources or forms of evidence are necessary to determine, to produce knowledge of, disability? And does everyone have equal access to these resources? This study's findings hold broad implications for diverse stakeholders. For the field of Communication, this study affirms the need for revised ways of understanding communication, as it shows how antiquated ideations of communication as a linear exchange of information narrowly define what counts as knowledge. Additionally, this study also contributes to Disability Studies in that rather than arguing disability as a social artifact from an exclusively conceptual standpoint, it empirically makes a case for disability as the product of social interaction. For the organizational members consulted in this study, I offer recommendations for their praxis. The final, and arguably the most important, party that this study has implications for is the student with a disability. Because this study promotes a more inclusive approach to disability, and because it encourages a lesser burden of proof with respect to knowing disability, this study is of particular interest to the individuals who are classified as "disabled."

Title from title page of PDF (University of Missouri--St. Louis, viewed Febuary 22, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-39).

Thesis (Ph.D.) - Carleton University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 375-405). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 236-240).

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Missouri University of Science and Technology, 2008. / Vita. The entire thesis text is included in file. Title from title screen of thesis/dissertation PDF file (viewed May 28, 2009) Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.Comp.Sc.-Res.)--University of Wollongong, 2007. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references: leaf 57-62.

The present thesis explores talk in institutional settings, with a particular focus on how institutionality and institutional norms are constructed and reproduced in interaction. A central aim is to enhance our understanding of how institutional agendas are talked into being. In line with the ethno­methodological approach, norms are viewed as accomplished in everyday interaction, whereas institutionality represents dimensions of talk where participants demonstrably orient to particular contextual constraints. Five studies were conducted using Conversation Analysis (CA), focusing on how institutional constraints impact sequential trajectories and shape different opportunities for participants. The data consists of two corpora of video recordings: group tutorials at a Swedish university (UTs), and performance appraisal interviews in an organ­ization (PAIs). The thesis pays particular attention to the interactional management of knowledge, entitlement and stance, and analytic foci include how speakers manage epistemic claims and rights at a certain point in interaction, and how they accomplish social positioning. The UT studies examine the negotiation of rights to speak for others in a group (Study I), and how diver­ging understandings of the institutional activity-at-hand can be negotiated on the basis of students’ advice-seeking questions (Study II). In Study III, orientations to institutional and sociocultural norms are investigated in the PAIs, where managers and employees treat negative stances on stress as problematic. The relationship between theory and institutional practice in the use of question templates in PAIs is also examined, through an analysis of the delivery and receipt of a particular question in different interviews (Study IV). Focusing on different adaptations of a preset item, this analysis shows how the same question sets up for a variety of subsequent actions. Finally, deployment of the verb känna (‘feel’) in managing epistemic access and primacy is examined (Study V). It is argued that ‘feel’ allows for a reduction of accountability when making epistemic claims. The studies highlight the relationship between linguistic formats and social actions and illustrate how institutional agendas have consequences for participant conduct. Attention to the details of actions in institutional interaction can thus shed light on social and linguistic underpinnings of the enactment of institutional norms.