In recent years, Russia’s nuclear weapons program has been widely discussed among policymakers, think-tank analysts, and academics. Some argue that Russia pursues an increasingly assertive weapons policy and has lowered its threshold of using them in conflict. On the other end of the spectrum, there are scholars who argue that Russia’s nuclear weapons modernization is proceeding at a normal pace, and in extension, that there is little reason to be concerned about Moscow’s at times confrontational nuclear rhetoric. This thesis seeks to contribute to that debate by addressing to central questions: (1) How has Russia’s nuclear weapons policy evolved in the last two decades? (2) What explains the evolution in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy? Towards that end, the thesis first conducts a historical analysis, which provides a detailed overview of the changes and continuities that have characterized Russia’s nuclear weapons policy in the last 20 years. Building on this, the thesis then seeks to explore the underlying drivers and objectives of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy via the lenses of offensive realism, defensive realism, and constructivism. The thesis concludes that the evolution of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy is best explained by two factors: the attempt to uphold a secure- second-strike capability (defensive realism) and an attempt to defend its status as a major global power (constructivism).