This dissertation considers the possibility of there being such a thing as ethical authority in the modern world, and seeks to give an account of its nature. It begins by expressing a critical stance toward the idea that authority is always dependent upon having a certain kind of theoretical expertise. It raises the suggestion that there are other forms of authoritativeness, based on tradition, the display of superior skill, or impressive discriminative/perceptual powers. The bases of these forms of authority are not primarily, or even necessarily, of an intellectual kind. The idea that ethical authority depends upon something more than intellectual foundations may be traced to Aristotle, who claimed that the practical wisdom of an ethical authority (phronimos) is a matter of being good at deliberation with regard to things that conduce to living well. The model of ethical authority provided here is not that of theoretical expertise but closer to that of practical skill and/or the possession of perceptual powers of a particular kind. Ethical authority in the Aristotelian tradition depends upon intellectual powers, but of the 'practical intellect' and not necessarily (it depends on the context) any advanced theoretical expertise. It then proceeds to argue that there is an important place for practical wisdom in modern ethical life. Many of us live today in modem pluralistic societies where diverse conceptions of goodness and ethical rationality compete. We may well find the idea of reasonable allegiance to local phronimoi, who grasp and can illuminate the value of particular practices and institutions to fellow participants of a shared life, pure anathema. Modern ethical philosophy reflects this stance, and is characterized by a certain faith in rule-centred or procedural ethical theories for guiding human conduct. The argument of the second chapter seeks to show that there is little warrant for rejecting the role of ethical authorities (phronimoi) in contemporary pluralistic societies in favour of ethical proceduralism. Thereafter, in the third, fourth and fifth chapters, it turns to exploring the nature of practical wisdom, in particular, whether or not it is best construed as grounded in a theory of right conduct, or as a form of 'ethical knowledge', or as aiming at an objective truth; and to the task of characterizing a credible conception of the insightful phronimos - or what it might be like if this model of ethical authority is to claim relevance for contemporary life within pluralistic ethical communities.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northeastern University, 2008. / Title from title page (viewed April 1, 2007). Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Psychology. Includes bibliographical references (p. 48-52).

This thesis is an examination of the foundations of practical reason. Building on the later work of Wittgenstein, I argue for a subjectivist view of moral judgment and of judgments about reasons for action. On this view, moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action can be true or false, but they are not objective. The argument for this view has the form of an inference to the best explanation. Using a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, I suggest that moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action should not be construed as referring to an ethical or normative reality that exists independently of us. There are ethical facts and facts about our reasons, but these facts arise as the result of our involvement in a linguistic practice. This provides a new way of accounting for these judgments that differs both from moral realism and expressivism. The view of reasons that emerges is closely related to, but not identical with, reasons internalism as described by Bernard Williams. I reject his argument in favour of internalism and provide a new and independent argument to support this view of our reasons. In the course of spelling out that argument, I show why internalism as described by Williams should be modified, and why this does not commit us to externalism. In the final chapters, I show that there is an important parallel between our practical predicament and the account of our epistemic condition as portrayed by Wittgenstein. The inference to the best explanation is completed by considering a number of objections to subjectivism that are based on the idea that a subjectivist account of moral judgment and of reasons fails to do justice to the ethical phenomena. I reject these objections, and suggest that a subjectivist can both be reflectively aware of his subjectivism and continue to live well.

My aim in this essay is wholly constructive: it is to present the lines along which a satisfactory utilitarianism may be developed. Such a theory is satisfactory in respect of its being able to over, come or evade objections to previous utilitarianisms, specifically, to previous act_utilitarianisms; I have picked several of these objections to form the rock upon which the strength of a utilitarian is to be tested. The objections in question all center around the question of whether, given his consequential account of rightness, an act_utilitarian can support the useful social rules and institutions of our society; or whether his position, because of its consequential account of rightness, commits him to acting in such a way as to undermine these rules and institutions. I shall argue that a new form of act_utilitarianism, which I call tempered act_utilitarianism, can both retain its consequential account of rightness and yet can (a) accommodate these rules and institutions within it, (b) allow its proponents on act_utilitarian grounds to advocate adherence to them, as providing us with the beet chance of doing the right or optimific thing, (c) cater to the views of the 'plain man' in this important respect, and (d) achieve all this without recourse to rule_utilitarianism.

Thesis (M. Ed.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 108-115).

Thesis (M.Ed.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 108-115). Also available in print.