This paper investigates time-varying characteristics of illiquidity and the pricing of its risk using a liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (L-CAPM). Collecting data from a pool of Eurozone countries between 1990 and 2018, we employ Markov switching models to assess the degree of persistence of illiquidity shocks. Contrary to prior research, which largely makes use of autoregressive (AR) processes, we provide strong evidence that illiquidity is time-varying and the persistence of shocks determines two distinct regimes characterised by high and low illiquidity. We assess pricing of illiquidity risk by developing and empirically testing a conditional L-CAPM model, where different regimes constitute priced risk factors for the cross-section of stock returns. We extend previous unconditional versions of L-CAPM models and we show that the various channels through which illiquidity affects asset returns and price of risks are time-varying. We find strong support for our conditional L-CAPM and our results are robust to alternative specifications and estimation techniques. These findings have important implications for portfolio management practices and are relevant to portfolio and risk managers and regulatory institutions.

The Eurozone has been the object of much controversy recently. Both on the member-state and on the EU level, policies are being made to cope with the many problems of the Eurozone. In this paper we state that academic economics is often unable to give the right advice for policymakers in the case of the Eurozone crisis, because this is a new situation where academics are disagreeing fundamentally about the best remedy for the problem. We come to this conclusion by first showing how one of the most prominent theories about monetary unions (the Optimum Currency Area theory) is unable to give any good advice to policymakers. After that we make a country-comparitive study between the ten new EU members in Central and Eastern Europe that joined in 2004 and 2007, which shows us that these countries respond fundamentally different on the Eurocrisis and that these reactions are more based on political and public support and national economic performance than on formal academic economics.

<p>In this paper, we are going to study the relations between France, the European Unionand the Eurozone. The involvements of France in the European Union and the Eurozone aswell as the effects of the European evolutions in France. As France has played many roles indifferent areas for the European Union, the relations are social, political, juridical andobviously economic. We cannot analyse these relations without interest in the historicalpart, which shows the chronological involvements of France in the EU, from the firstagreement in 1951 to the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. Beside this, our analyse needsalso to focus on the European Union as several institutions; as well as the Eurozone and itseconomic consequences in Europe and in France. To do so, we are going to raise monetaryand institutional questions and develop the most important European stakes as theenlargements, the European budget, the common policies and the European institutions.France can be considered as a founding father of the European Union, and in spite ofsome difficulties; both France and the European Union have had positive influences on eachother and the European Union could not have grown in this way without France.</p>

In this paper, we are going to study the relations between France, the European Unionand the Eurozone. The involvements of France in the European Union and the Eurozone aswell as the effects of the European evolutions in France. As France has played many roles indifferent areas for the European Union, the relations are social, political, juridical andobviously economic. We cannot analyse these relations without interest in the historicalpart, which shows the chronological involvements of France in the EU, from the firstagreement in 1951 to the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. Beside this, our analyse needsalso to focus on the European Union as several institutions; as well as the Eurozone and itseconomic consequences in Europe and in France. To do so, we are going to raise monetaryand institutional questions and develop the most important European stakes as theenlargements, the European budget, the common policies and the European institutions.France can be considered as a founding father of the European Union, and in spite ofsome difficulties; both France and the European Union have had positive influences on eachother and the European Union could not have grown in this way without France.

In Meinungsumfragen äußern zwei Drittel der Polen ihre Angst vor einem Beitritt ihres Landes zur Eurozone. Die damit verbundenen Befürchtungen sind vielfältig und durch die europäische Wirtschaftskrise noch verstärkt worden. Allerdings hat sich Polen im EU-Beitrittsvertrag zur Mitgliedschaft in der Eurozone verpflichtet, sobald die entsprechenden Voraussetzungen vorliegen.

Polen trat am 1. Mai 2004 der Europäischen Union bei. Artikel 4 der Akte über die Bedingungen des Beitritts bestimmt, dass jeder neue Mitgliedstaat ab dem Tag seines Beitritts als Mitgliedstaat, für den eine Ausnahmeregelung im Sinne des Artikels 139 AEUV1 gilt, an der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion teilnimmt. Das bedeutet für Polen langfristig die Notwendigkeit, die Gemeinschaftswährung Euro zu übernehmen.

Das wichtigste Motiv des polnischen Diskurses zur wirtschaftlichen Zukunft der Europäischen Union bleibt zweifelsohne die Übernahme des Euro, wozu sich Polen im Jahr 2004 bei seinem EU-Beitritt verpflichtet hat.1 Der Beitritt zur letzten Etappe der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion bringt zahlreiche Vorteile mit sich, ist aber auch mit Kosten verbunden.

The acceptation of a single currency has an influencial impact on the economy of the country, especially on its financial market. This work examines all parts of finacial market of the Eurozone, assesses their state of development and compares it with the situation in the Czech Republic. The work also tries to estimate the impacts, that the acceptance of a single currency will bring to Czech financial market, and where it is possible, it uses the experience of Slovenia, which has adopted euro in 2007 and its economy is very similar to that of Czech Republic. The work finds out that the Eurozone has achieved a significant progress in the integration of its financial market, an improvement in its liquidity, costs of security issues and other aspects as well. Adoption of the euro in Slovenia has been successfull and it was not accompanied by substantial problems, except for an increase in inflation. However, the expected progress in the development of financial market is not observable yet, althought this fact may be attributed to many other external reasons, too. Finally the conslusion of this work implicates, that the Czech Republic has the oportunity to benefit from participating in a large integrated financal market and achieve a progress, that would never be possible if it remained separate.

Yes / We examine the process of inflation transmission among GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and Germany. Our findings suggest that inflation spillovers have increased since 2001. We also find that peripheral economies are (dis‐)inflation transmitters to the core. This finding is significant for policy formulation, given the very low inflation environment that currently exists in the Euro area and the macroeconomic implications that arise from this.

In the course of eurozone exit, the underlying stocks of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) would be redenominated from euros into the new national currency. We exploit ADR investors’ exposure to currency redenomination losses to derive a novel measure of eurozone exit risk. We find that while domestic bank stocks are not significantly affected by domestic exit risk, there is a negative exposure to exit risk of other countries that is channeled through bilateral credit risk. For the real sector, exposure to eurozone exit risk is heterogeneous among industries and is less negative for more indebted companies.