This study asks anew the question: can faith lead to knowledge? The received view about the relationship between faith and evidentialism is that, because faith involves belief without evidence (by definition), and evidentialism requires evidence for knowledge (by definition), evidentialism unequivocally finds faith epistemically valueless. I argue that this conclusion is mistaken on both counts: the concept of faith is too diverse to be encapsulated as belief without evidence, and evidentialism leaves much room for different kinds of evidential processes to be recognized. In other words, depending on what “faith” means in any given case, evidentialism might be more accommodating than is typically thought. This study pursues this conclusion by developing an evidentialist theory of knowledge, rejecting the major alternative of externalism along the way, while defending the continued use of the concept of belief in religious studies discourse, necessary to conducting evidentialist epistemology. It then examines the concept of faith by considering its formal structure, and by cataloguing and comparing many discrete conceptions of faith from historical literatures on this topic, across cultures. Finally, it draws on the typology developed to propose seven ways that faith might be conducive to knowledge under the strict rules of evidentialism, contrary to the received view.

In this study three apologetic methodologies (evidentialism, Reformed epistemology, and presuppositionalism) are analyzed to determine which method is most coherently related to Reformed theology. It is argued that comparing how each methodology relates the doctrine of Scripture with the doctrine of the resurrection can demonstrate which method is best suited to defending Christianity in its Reformed interpretation. The doctrine of Scripture is taken to be that of full plenary inspiration and inerrancy, and the question is which apologetic method can be successful in defending that position. After contemporary arguments for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus Christ are surveyed, each of the three respective apologetic methodologies is subjected to an examination and critique. Each method is intra–systematically evaluated to determine whether it suffers from internal contradictions or incoherencies. Each method is further tested to determine whether, on its own internal principles, it is capable of a logical defense of a high doctrinal view of Scripture. The respective methods are also compared and contrasted with each other. A prominent issue is the direction of the methodology, i.e., its sequence. Some strands of evidentialism attempt to move from the historical fact of the resurrection to their doctrine of Scripture; Reformed epistemologists do not necessarily require any historical argumentation at all; presuppositionalists take their doctrine of Scripture and the resurrection as both necessary and mutually reinforcing points in their worldview. In the final analysis, it is the presuppositional methodology which emerges as that which is most capable of coherently defending a doctrine of Scripture that includes full inspiration and inerrancy. This is due to the transcendental nature of the argument that it presents. It is urged in this study, however, that evidences, historical details, and logical analysis are all critically important for a fully–orbed apologetic system. Presuppositionalism needs to be ramified with evidential arguments, even if they are transposed into a transcendental key, as supporting details in a transcendental framework. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

In this study three apologetic methodologies (evidentialism, Reformed epistemology, and presuppositionalism) are analyzed to determine which method is most coherently related to Reformed theology. It is argued that comparing how each methodology relates the doctrine of Scripture with the doctrine of the resurrection can demonstrate which method is best suited to defending Christianity in its Reformed interpretation. The doctrine of Scripture is taken to be that of full plenary inspiration and inerrancy, and the question is which apologetic method can be successful in defending that position. After contemporary arguments for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus Christ are surveyed, each of the three respective apologetic methodologies is subjected to an examination and critique. Each method is intra–systematically evaluated to determine whether it suffers from internal contradictions or incoherencies. Each method is further tested to determine whether, on its own internal principles, it is capable of a logical defense of a high doctrinal view of Scripture. The respective methods are also compared and contrasted with each other. A prominent issue is the direction of the methodology, i.e., its sequence. Some strands of evidentialism attempt to move from the historical fact of the resurrection to their doctrine of Scripture; Reformed epistemologists do not necessarily require any historical argumentation at all; presuppositionalists take their doctrine of Scripture and the resurrection as both necessary and mutually reinforcing points in their worldview. In the final analysis, it is the presuppositional methodology which emerges as that which is most capable of coherently defending a doctrine of Scripture that includes full inspiration and inerrancy. This is due to the transcendental nature of the argument that it presents. It is urged in this study, however, that evidences, historical details, and logical analysis are all critically important for a fully–orbed apologetic system. Presuppositionalism needs to be ramified with evidential arguments, even if they are transposed into a transcendental key, as supporting details in a transcendental framework. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

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The key issue in recent debates of Christian apologetics is whether there is any common ground of data and criteria between believers and unbelievers. Two main schools are divided on this issue, namely: evidential and presuppositional apologetics. The evidential apologists claim that a common ground exists, and that objective proofs of theism are possible from this common ground. In contrast, the presuppositional apologists argue that there is no common ground; and they maintain that theoretical arguments (including apologetic ones) are unavoidably prejudiced by religious presuppositions. In this study, both sides are claimed to have their own flaws. The former apologetics has the flaw that its epistemic foundation (i.e., “classical foundationalism”) is fatally defective; and it is criticised by the reformational philosophical tradition, as well as secular contemporary (postmodern) epistemology. In contrast, the latter apologetics has the flaw that when the existence of common ground is entirely denied, the problems of circular reasoning (hence, relativism) and total communication breakdown are unavoidable. In order to clarify and deepen the issue, the tradition of reformational philosophy, which is represented by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd and Van Til is first examined; and it is shown that all three scholars struggle with the tension between antithesis and common ground; and they attempt their own solution. Secondly, the contemporary anti-foundationalist epistemology is examined; and it is shown that the same tension exists between “radical” and “moderate” postmodern (anti-foundationalist) epistemologies; and their debate is on-going – without any satisfactory conclusion. As a solution, it is suggested that the notion of common ground should be distinguished by the ontological and epistemological dimensions. From the epistemological standpoint, all knowledge is prejudiced; and no objective conclusion (on the issue of e.g., theism) can be arrived at by so-called “neutral” rational arguments. However, from the ontological standpoint, it is undeniable that all kinds of knowledge are made possible by certain universal (transcendental) conditions, which constitute the ontic common ground. In this distinction, the confusion is caused by the false assumption that the ontic common ground is meant to function as an epistemic neutral criterion. In contrast, this study argues that the ontic common ground functions only as the condition for the possibility of legitimate knowledge (including apologetic arguments). As a result, this study claims that traditional apologetics, based on objective theistic proofs should be abandoned, and that (radical) presuppositional apologetics needs to be modified. Therefore, as an alternative approach, a new “integral apologetics” is proposed – on the basis of Dooyeweerd’s modal theory of reality. This approach emphasizes the need to utilize different types of knowledge, which together could strengthen the apologetic persuasion towards Christian theism, and take into consideration of the whole context of apologetic dialogue. / PhD (International Trade), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The key issue in recent debates of Christian apologetics is whether there is any common ground of data and criteria between believers and unbelievers. Two main schools are divided on this issue, namely: evidential and presuppositional apologetics. The evidential apologists claim that a common ground exists, and that objective proofs of theism are possible from this common ground. In contrast, the presuppositional apologists argue that there is no common ground; and they maintain that theoretical arguments (including apologetic ones) are unavoidably prejudiced by religious presuppositions. In this study, both sides are claimed to have their own flaws. The former apologetics has the flaw that its epistemic foundation (i.e., “classical foundationalism”) is fatally defective; and it is criticised by the reformational philosophical tradition, as well as secular contemporary (postmodern) epistemology. In contrast, the latter apologetics has the flaw that when the existence of common ground is entirely denied, the problems of circular reasoning (hence, relativism) and total communication breakdown are unavoidable. In order to clarify and deepen the issue, the tradition of reformational philosophy, which is represented by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd and Van Til is first examined; and it is shown that all three scholars struggle with the tension between antithesis and common ground; and they attempt their own solution. Secondly, the contemporary anti-foundationalist epistemology is examined; and it is shown that the same tension exists between “radical” and “moderate” postmodern (anti-foundationalist) epistemologies; and their debate is on-going – without any satisfactory conclusion. As a solution, it is suggested that the notion of common ground should be distinguished by the ontological and epistemological dimensions. From the epistemological standpoint, all knowledge is prejudiced; and no objective conclusion (on the issue of e.g., theism) can be arrived at by so-called “neutral” rational arguments. However, from the ontological standpoint, it is undeniable that all kinds of knowledge are made possible by certain universal (transcendental) conditions, which constitute the ontic common ground. In this distinction, the confusion is caused by the false assumption that the ontic common ground is meant to function as an epistemic neutral criterion. In contrast, this study argues that the ontic common ground functions only as the condition for the possibility of legitimate knowledge (including apologetic arguments). As a result, this study claims that traditional apologetics, based on objective theistic proofs should be abandoned, and that (radical) presuppositional apologetics needs to be modified. Therefore, as an alternative approach, a new “integral apologetics” is proposed – on the basis of Dooyeweerd’s modal theory of reality. This approach emphasizes the need to utilize different types of knowledge, which together could strengthen the apologetic persuasion towards Christian theism, and take into consideration of the whole context of apologetic dialogue. / PhD (International Trade), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The purpose of this study is to assess the cogency of Francis Schaeffer‘s apologetic in light of John Frame‘s triperspectival epistemology, giving special attention to the existential perspective evident throughout Schaeffer‘s trilogy. The study achieves this aim by employing the instrumental case study method to meet five specific objectives. First, the study determines the extent to which Schaeffer‘s existential perspective is recognized within the apologetic literature that critically engages with his ideas. Based on these sources, the study determines that this perspective is recognized in Schaeffer‘s work but not as an integral component within a broader perspectival approach to apologetics. Second, the study discovers the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism may be used in analyzing apologetic systems to reveal their strengths, weaknesses and cogency. By giving attention to Frame‘s system as a meta-apologetic, it is evident that this tool is applicable to Schaeffer and to other apologists. This establishes Frame‘s perspectivalism as an appropriate theoretical model to use in an instrumental case study on apologetics. Third, the study analyzes the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism is reflected in Schaeffer‘s trilogy, highlighting the existential perspective. Meeting this objective establishes the central theoretical argument of the study, showing that Frame‘s epistemology reveals the underlying cogency of Schaeffer‘s apologetic credibly (?) and does so most profoundly with respect to the existential perspective. Fourth, the study compares Schaeffer‘s existential perspective with that of E.J. Carnell and secular existentialism, which both apologists confronted. On the basis of Carnell‘s critique of existentialism and his existential apologetic of personal rectitude, credible support is offered for Schaeffer‘s engagement with this philosophical movement and his own existential perspective. Fifth, support is offered for the current relevance of Schaeffer‘s apologetic of personal rectitude by showing how the postmodern situation he anticipated is best addressed using the apologetic tools he offers. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

The purpose of this study is to assess the cogency of Francis Schaeffer‘s apologetic in light of John Frame‘s triperspectival epistemology, giving special attention to the existential perspective evident throughout Schaeffer‘s trilogy. The study achieves this aim by employing the instrumental case study method to meet five specific objectives. First, the study determines the extent to which Schaeffer‘s existential perspective is recognized within the apologetic literature that critically engages with his ideas. Based on these sources, the study determines that this perspective is recognized in Schaeffer‘s work but not as an integral component within a broader perspectival approach to apologetics. Second, the study discovers the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism may be used in analyzing apologetic systems to reveal their strengths, weaknesses and cogency. By giving attention to Frame‘s system as a meta-apologetic, it is evident that this tool is applicable to Schaeffer and to other apologists. This establishes Frame‘s perspectivalism as an appropriate theoretical model to use in an instrumental case study on apologetics. Third, the study analyzes the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism is reflected in Schaeffer‘s trilogy, highlighting the existential perspective. Meeting this objective establishes the central theoretical argument of the study, showing that Frame‘s epistemology reveals the underlying cogency of Schaeffer‘s apologetic credibly (?) and does so most profoundly with respect to the existential perspective. Fourth, the study compares Schaeffer‘s existential perspective with that of E.J. Carnell and secular existentialism, which both apologists confronted. On the basis of Carnell‘s critique of existentialism and his existential apologetic of personal rectitude, credible support is offered for Schaeffer‘s engagement with this philosophical movement and his own existential perspective. Fifth, support is offered for the current relevance of Schaeffer‘s apologetic of personal rectitude by showing how the postmodern situation he anticipated is best addressed using the apologetic tools he offers. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

ABSTRACT A MISCONSTRUAL OF EVIDENTIALISM: ALVIN PLANTINGA AND BELIEF IN GOD Aydin, S&uuml / leyman Ph.D., Department of Philosophy Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. David Gr&uuml / nberg August 2004, 183 pages The evidentialist objection to belief in God is the claim that theists do not have sufficient evidence for the existence of God, therefore are they irresponsible to continue holding their belief in God in the face of insufficient evidence. Alvin Plantinga assumes that evidentialism, being a dogma characterized by classical foundationalism which itself has a faulty picture of rationality, should be set aside altogether in the assessment of epistemic status of belief in God. Behind Plantinga&rsquo / s assumption is the suggestion that the epistemic status of belief in God has been misinterpreted by philosophers, since the vast majority of religious epistemologists have remained within the evidentialist tradition. In my evaluation of Plantinga&rsquo / s assumption, I undertake two tasks: First, I seek to clarify his presumption that classical foundationalism had a faulty picture of rationality: I attempt to show that the insufficiency of classical foundationalism is not as problematic as Plantinga assumes. Secondly, I analyze and evaluate evidentialism in a larger perspective to show that: (1) evidentialism is a broader category than classical foundationalism, (2) evidentialism can not be put aside completely in any epistemological enterprise. I conclude that Plantinga&rsquo / s argument for belief in God is based on a faulty assumption, and I argue that evidentialism can best be seen to be a &ldquo / demand of clarity&rdquo / with regard to knowledge claims which on no grounds can legitimately be escaped altogether.

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