Student Number : 0311005K - MA dissertation - School of Social Sciences - Faculty of Humanities / In this paper I track the work of Alvin Goldman, the American epistemologist, from 1979 to 1992 to assess its adequacy as a theory of justified belief. Many philosophers have pointed out that the theory faces problems, the three most important of which I consider. The first is the “clairvoyance problem.” In this case we intuitively deny the status of “justified” to certain beliefs produced by the reliable process of clairvoyance. This indicates that reliable belief formation is not sufficient for justification. The “generality problem,” the second problem, concerns the correct identification and description of the process forming each belief. If the process cannot be identified, then no assessment can be made of a belief’s epistemic status. Moreover, if the process is described too narrowly such that each process only has one output belief, then all true beliefs will be “justified” and all false beliefs “unjustified,” an unacceptable result. If the process is described too broadly then all output beliefs of that process will share an equal epistemic status, also an unacceptable result. Finally, it is possible to challenge the necessity of reliable formation for justification using the case of a cognizer in an evil demon world such that his unreliable visual beliefs are intuitively “justified” since those beliefs are produced by the same reliable processes in our world where they produce justified beliefs. I defend Goldman against these challenges by elucidating subtleties in Goldman’s work that answer these problems and by adding three necessary conditions to his theory. I argue that by modifying Goldman’s early work and rejecting parts of his later work, we can formulate a version of his theory that counts as an adequate theory of justified belief immune to the foregoing problems.

Först presenteras metafysisk funktionalism. En Ramseysats för smärta spelar en central roll som en implicit definition av ett mentalt tillstånd över sensorisk input och beteendemässig output. Därefter presenteras reliabilismen som en teori om kunskap. Några allmänna kunskapsteoretiska problem, samt några av reliabilismens problem presenteras. De mest relevanta problem är följande: fallet med en elak demon, klärvoajans samt Mr. Truetemp, och generalitetsproblemet. En formell och schematisk presentation ges för reliabilism som en teori för kunskap, eller möjligen tillskrivande av kunskap, och processreliabilism som en teori för epistemiskt rättfärdigande. Därefter exponeras strukturella likheter mellan funktionalism och processreliabilism. Det får anses plausibelt att det råder ett nära släktskap mellan dessa teorier då Ramseysatser för rättfärdigade trosföreställningar presenteras. Dessa analyseras sedan utifrån möjliga fall. Med ny teoretisk bakgrund prövas reliabilismens problem ånyo inom ett funktionalistisk ramverk. Nya sätt att bemöta problemen presenteras genom en analys av det Kinesiska Rummet. Det svårlösta generalitetsproblemet kan ses som ett frameproblem och hanteras med hjälp av enveloping. / Firstly, a presentation of metaphysical functionalism. A Ramsey sentence plays a central role as an implicit definition of a mental state over sensory input and behavouristic output. A presentation of reliabilism as a theory of knowledge. A summary of some general epistemological problems and some specific to reliabilism; the main ones are the evil demon, clairvoyance and Mr. Truetemp, and the generality problem. A formal and schematic presentation of reliabilism as a theory of knowlege, or possibly knowlege attribution, and process reliabilism as a theory of belief justification. Structural similarities between functionalism and process reliabilism are exposed. A close kinship between these two theories seems plausible because of the possibility to present Ramsey sentences for justified beliefs. These Ramsey sentences are then analysed over possible cases. This new theoretical background, warrents another look at problems for reliabilism. New ways to counter these problems are presented via an analysis of the Chinese Room. The elusive genrality problem is seen as a frame problem and treated using enveloping.