This study starts with two theoretical puzzles within the rational choice oriented literature on government formation in parliamentary democracies: the relative importance of constitutional rules and the existence of multiple party goals. From these puzzles stem the research questions that guide the study: First, what is the theoretical and empirical link between constitutional arrangements (including rules) and party goals? Second, what are the goals of political parties and how can these be studied? Third, relative to the goals of political parties and other constitutional arrangements, what is the importance of government formation rules for the empirical record of minority and majority governments?Coalition theory provides the theoretical starting point from which the research questions stem. The historical-institutional strand of new institutionalism is used to guide the general understanding of the importance of institutional context. The rational choice oriented strand is used for a detailed study of the design of the Swedish government formation rules and an analysis of how the formation rules affect the goal seeking (micro-logic) of actors.Based on both cross-national data and an in-depth study of Swedish coalition and government formation, the analysis shows that the answer to research question number one is that the link between constitutional arrangements and party goals is one of co-determination. The answer to research question number two is that party leaders pursue four main goals and that this should be an explicit model assumption. The answer to research question number three is that the government formation rules help determine the parties' bargaining positions and for that reason they are of significant importance for the formation of minority and majority governments. / digitalisering@umu

The New Great Game is a geopolitical competition between regional stakeholders over energy resources in Central Asia. The author seeks to use the expected utility voting model based on Black's median voter theorem for forecasting the New Great Game in Central Asia. To judge the external validity of the voting model, the author uses data from the Correlates of War project data set, to formulate three distinct models based only on the numbers in 1992 and 1993. Capabilities and alliance data were used to develop balance of power positions and compare the outcome of 100 simulations to the actual outcome in 2000 based on Correlates of War project data. This allows us to judge whether the emergence of Russia's weak advantage as well as the continuation of the competition in the New Great Game as of 2000 could have been predicted based on what was known in 1992 and 1993. By using only one year's data to forecast the New Great Game, we are able to eliminate historical and researcher bias and judge the applicability of the model in global policy and strategic analysis.