This thesis explores the circumstances under which party discipline damages parliamentary democracy in the Canadian House of Commons. It uses omnibus budget implementation legislation as a case study of an instance when party discipline damages parliamentary democracy. While party discipline is central to parliamentary democracy, it can also undermine it if imposed too strictly. This thesis establishes a model of parliamentary democracy in which the House of Commons is meant to scrutinize, deliberate on, and occasionally amend legislation. It then identifies omnibus budgets as a trend in Canada through the following data on budget bills: number of pages, number of amendments, and length of debate. Finally, this thesis describes three key ways that omnibus budget legislation damaged the model of parliamentary democracy outlined at the beginning. The passage of omnibus budget legislation is a perfect illustration of the “parliamentary decline” thesis and provides a useful departure for future efforts at the reform of parliament to enhance the role of backbench members.

Abstract: This thesis investigates the recursive relationship between strategic culture, security policy-making, and Swedish security policy, aiming to provide further insights into change and continuity in policy norms and practices. Using a case-study methodology, and Bloomfield’s (2016) norm-dynamic framework, it analyses the Swedish Parliament deliberations regarding two, ‘mid-range’ defence and security cooperations with NATO.  The  results show how security policy is influenced by political actors, who actively assume roles to defend and contest security policy, depending on temporal and institutional contexts. Furthermore, the study has proven valuable for understanding both what lies behind a smaller state’s policy status quo, and its steps towards more momentous security-policy decisions. The recursive relationships within and aspects of security policy-making, underscores the significance of strategic culture as contextual. The thesis hopes to invite research into other ‘mid-range’ decisions for broadening this insight.

This study starts with two theoretical puzzles within the rational choice oriented literature on government formation in parliamentary democracies: the relative importance of constitutional rules and the existence of multiple party goals. From these puzzles stem the research questions that guide the study: First, what is the theoretical and empirical link between constitutional arrangements (including rules) and party goals? Second, what are the goals of political parties and how can these be studied? Third, relative to the goals of political parties and other constitutional arrangements, what is the importance of government formation rules for the empirical record of minority and majority governments?Coalition theory provides the theoretical starting point from which the research questions stem. The historical-institutional strand of new institutionalism is used to guide the general understanding of the importance of institutional context. The rational choice oriented strand is used for a detailed study of the design of the Swedish government formation rules and an analysis of how the formation rules affect the goal seeking (micro-logic) of actors.Based on both cross-national data and an in-depth study of Swedish coalition and government formation, the analysis shows that the answer to research question number one is that the link between constitutional arrangements and party goals is one of co-determination. The answer to research question number two is that party leaders pursue four main goals and that this should be an explicit model assumption. The answer to research question number three is that the government formation rules help determine the parties' bargaining positions and for that reason they are of significant importance for the formation of minority and majority governments. / digitalisering@umu

This dissertation attempts to explain why cross-national variation exists in government approaches to dealing with illegal drugs. As other scholars have shown, several domestic and international political factors do account for some of this variance. However less is known of the effect that bureaucratic dominance and political institutions may have on drug policy. This research argues that bureaucrats define problems in ways that make their services the best possible solution to policymakers. Mediating the ability of bureaucrats to influence drug policy outcomes are political institutions. Certain institutional structures foster a competitive policymaking environment while others foster a more cooperative policymaking environment. In the former of these, law enforcement approaches to the drug problem are often retained as the status quo because competition between policy actors prevents consideration of alternatives. In the latter environment however, prevention, treatment, and harm reduction approaches to the drug problem are developed because cooperation between policymakers allows other actors. namely public health bureaucrats.to influence drug policy decision making. To test this argument, I constructed an original dataset that includes over 4,000 observations of drug policy in 101 democracies. Institutional data on intergovernmental relations, regime type, political bargaining, electoral design, and cameralism were regressed on 6 different drug policy indices: law enforcement, deterrence-based prevention, abstinence-based treatment, educationbased prevention, substitution-based treatment, and harm reduction. While controlling for government resource capacity, severity of the drug problem, international pressure, and political ideology, I found that institutions explain a portion of the variance in drug policy outcomes. Providing in-depth information about these phenomena is a large amount of field data I collected while interviewing 155 politicians, bureaucrats, interest group leaders, and service providers. Respondents from all four of the case countries examined in this research.including United States, Canada, Austria, and Netherlands.report that bureaucrats play a major role in the formation of drug policy. Which bureaucrats have the most influence on policymakers is largely a function of domestic political conditions, international political factors, and political institutions.

Several interesting findings emerged from this study. First, strong labour movements still failed to successfully bargain for employment protections due to resistance from employers to encroachments on their institutionalized managerial prerogatives. Second, governments favoured a policy of abstentionism and acquiescence to the collective-laissez-faire tradition until the critical juncture of the 1960s and 1970s. Third, the increasing power resources of trade unions and a deteriorating socio-economic climate created a window of opportunity for bold government action to improve industrial relations, albeit without the consent of employers, and at first, unions. Fourth, contrary to the liberalizing pressures one would expect to find in an archetypical free market economy, the UK has implemented far more statutory protections than deregulatory reforms. Fifth, in contrast to its traditional non-intervention in industrial relations and reputation for worker-protective regulations, Swedish governments have enacted numerous statutes, both restricting and freeing managerial prerogatives in the hiring and firing process. Sixth, statutory employment protections became an independent set of institutional power resources for unions in the long run, serving their organizational and representational interests in important ways. Seventh, unions and left parties consistently defended and advanced the policy preferences of their core constituencies in secure employment by privileging the job security of regular contracts. Eighth, employers and parties on the right of the political spectrum consistently opposed restrictions on the managerial capacity to hire and fire at will, especially for small businesses. Nineth, to increase flexibility without threatening the stability of regular contracts, reforms over the years had to foster atypical forms of work, creating a regulatory gap between permanent and temporary employment, particularly in Sweden. Tenth, differences exist between job security in the statute books and job security in action, particularly in the UK where this gap pervades all aspects of the unfair dismissal system. These findings suggest employment protection legislation has developed in ways far more complex, dynamic and contradictory than is commonly assumed by prominent theories of comparative political economy. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis examines how and why employment protection legislation developed in the United Kingdom and Sweden in the ways that it did from its early beginnings to the present period. It hopes to offer answers to questions about the initial impetus for statutory regulation, the number, content and impact of significant legislative changes and the preferences of key stakeholders with material interests in the policymaking process. It does this by drawing on a variety of both primary and secondary source materials, including employment protection databases, parliamentary records and research publications. At the same time, it assesses the explanatory merit of dominant theories in the political economy literature by testing them against voluminous empirical evidence and provides a multi-factorial account to fill the gaps in the existing body of knowledge.