In this study we examine how bilateral trade flows are affected by regime type. Previous research with the aim to investigate the effect of regime type on bilateral trade has primarily used a binary definition of democracy, and findings have indicated that democracies trade more extensively with other democracies. In this thesis, we add to the existing literature by disaggregating regime types, defining liberal democracies, electoral democracies and authoritarian regimes, and adopt the well-proven methodology of the gravity model of trade in OLS regressions. We use trade data adopted from IMF in the years 2004 and 2014 covering 162 countries. Data on the main explanatory variable, regime type, is defined in accordance with democracy indicator Freedom House’s methodology. Results show that pairs consisting of two liberal democracies have the highest values of trade flows, compared to other combinations of trading regime type-pairs. However, due to methodological discrepancies and ambiguous estimates, the relationship between regime type and trade flows remains uncertain.

The current literature tends to looks at regimes in only two categories; democracy and autocracy. Recognizing that this limits the scope of what is measured, and limited the practical applicability of this research, I chose to combine the current research on war crimes with more modern research on how to measure regime type. I integrate James Morrow and Heyran Jo’s comprehensive dataset on war crimes from 1900 to 1991 with Carston Anckar and Cecilia Fredriksson’s dataset on Political Regimes of the World, and run statistical tests to determine the relationship between these more specific categories of regime type and the types of war crimes they commit. I find that the historical relationship between more specific regime types and certain measurements of war crimes provide few clear answers, but does give us a clear argument against a dichotomous measure of regime type. The relationships seen here provide the basis for more in-depth future research into the characteristics of different regimes, and their behavior in times of war.

Authoritarian states have an extended reach on their populations residing outside of the country borders due to globalization and digitalization. This is part of the explanation of the increase of transnational repression globally. The aim of this paper is to investigate how authoritarian regime type affects the incidence of transnational repression. A bivariate hypothesis test is conducted using large scale quantitative methods and mediation analysis in order to conduct the study and investigate how the effect of regime type on transnational repression is mediated by domestic repression. Personalist regimes are expected to repress more domestically than for example single party regimes and therefore engage more in transnational repression. The results are inconclusive for the different measures of personalist rule. It is also suggested from the results that the effect of regime type on transnational repression is partially mediated by the level of domestic repression in the country.

During the last decade a number of studies have been published that investigate how the most fundamental aspect of political organization, the regime type, affects population health. The results unanimously show that citizens of democracies live longer and healthier lives than citizens of non-democracies. Many explanations for this have been suggested, among these are that democracies redistribute more and invest more in salutogenic resources, and that the tendency of dictatorships to control the media negatively affects the ability to spread information crucial to public health. When these mechanisms are controlled for, however, it turns out that democracy has a large residual correlation with for example life expectancy, which suggests that other mechanisms are also involved. In this paper two new mechanisms regarding the possible psychosocially mediated health effects of the regime type are investigated, namely political repression, and the possible negative effects this might have on the levels of chronic stress, and autonomy, which connects to a large previous literature in social epidemiology. In the paper an ecological cross-country design is used and country-level data, provided mainly by the World Bank and Freedom House, is analyzed with a simple multiple OLS-regression model. The results show that that all residual correlation is captured by autonomy, while there is no evidence for political repression as a mediating factor. This could suggest that the feeling of personal autonomy that democracies can fulfill is an equally important factor to take into account as distribution of resources and access to information.

Det senaste decenniet har en rad studier publicerats som undersöker hur ett lands mest fundamentala politiska organisationssätt, regimtypen, påverkar befolkningens hälsa. Resultaten pekar entydigt på att invånare i demokratier lever längre och friskare liv än invånare i icke-demokratier. Flera förklaringar till detta har förts fram, bland annat att demokratier omfördelar mer och är bättre på att investera i hälsofrämjande resurser, och att diktaturers tendens att kontrollera media går ut över förmågan att sprida hälsofrämjande information. När dessa mekanismer kontrolleras för visar det sig dock att demokrati har en stor kvarvarande samvariation med exempelvis medellivslängden, vilket talar för att andra mekanismer också är inblandade.I denna uppsats undersöks två ytterligare mekanismer som berör de eventuella psykosocialt medierade hälsoeffekter som regimtypen kan ha, nämligen via politisk repression, och de negativa effekter på kronisk stress detta kan tänkas ha, samt autonomi, vilket ansluter till en omfattande tidigare socialepidemiologisk litteratur. I uppsatsen används en ekologisk tvärsnittsdesign och landnivådata, huvudsakligen från Världsbanken och Freedom House, analyseras med enkel multipel OLS-regression. Resultaten visar att all kvarvarande samvariation fångas upp av faktorn autonomi, medan politisk repression inte får något stöd som medierande faktor. Detta kan tyda på att den känsla av personlig autonomi som demokratier kan tillgodose är en minst lika viktig faktor att ta i beaktande som fördelning av resurser och tillgång till information. / During the last decade a number of studies have been published that investigate how the most fundamental aspect of political organization, the regime type, affects population health. The results unanimously show that citizens of democracies live longer and healthier lives than citizens of non-democracies. Many explanations for this have been suggested, among these are that democracies redistribute more and invest more in salutogenic resources, and that the tendency of dictatorships to control the media negatively affects the ability to spread information crucial to public health. When these mechanisms are controlled for, however, it turns out that democracy has a large residual correlation with for example life expectancy, which suggests that other mechanisms are also involved.In this paper two new mechanisms regarding the possible psychosocially mediated health effects of the regime type are investigated, namely political repression, and the possible negative effects this might have on the levels of chronic stress, and autonomy, which connects to a large previous literature in social epidemiology. In the paper an ecological cross-country design is used and country-level data, provided mainly by the World Bank and Freedom House, is analyzed with a simple multiple OLS-regression model. The results show that that all residual correlation is captured by autonomy, while there is no evidence for political repression as a mediating factor. This could suggest that the feeling of personal autonomy that democracies can fulfill is an equally important factor to take into account as distribution of resources and access to information.

Doctor of Philosophy / Security Studies Interdepartmental Program / Emizet N. Kisangani / This study examines the effects of regime type on support to foreign insurgent groups. Theoretically, it relies on structural and normative characteristics of democracies by arguing that leaders in these regimes tend to encounter multiple disincentive mechanisms generally not found in non-democracies. Thus, leaders of democratic regimes are less likely to actively support foreign insurgent groups as a component of strategy below the threshold of military intervention. When they do choose to lend their support, they tend to choose either low-level types of support (simple material support) or high-level support (full military intervention). Leaders of non-democratic regimes, however, can employ the full spectrum of support types to seize strategic opportunities and tailor strategies that are more costly and more risky. The dissertation tests this theory by using both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The statistical analysis of a dyadic, cross-sectional, time-series dataset of 179 countries from 1975 to 2009 provides some support for the proposed hypotheses. Structured, focused comparison of three conflicts with multiple within-case observations (cases) also reveals modest support for the hypothesis that democracies are unlikely to support insurgent groups in general and have multiple disincentives toward providing mid-level types of support that expose the democratic leaders to additional costs and risks. Unexpectedly, the qualitative case studies reveal that in addition to the structural disincentives initially identified, leaders of democratic regimes may have a harder time managing the principal-agent relationship between the supporting state (principal) and the insurgent groups (agents). The need to maintain a large winning coalition to survive as a leader in a democracy presents multiple principal-agent problems and allows rebel leaders and rebel factions to resist integration, prevent the loss of autonomy, and facilitate the establishment of alternative avenues of resource mobilization. While previous literature in political science and international relations provides evidence that structural characteristics of democratic regimes make them good at winning interstate wars, this study provides initial evidence that those same structural characteristics make democracies’ success more elusive when applying unconventional strategies short of war.

No description available.

This thesis attempts to explain why some domestic crises escalate to internationalized civil war, while others do not. Existing research on unilateral intervention in civil war does not pay sufficient attention to the dyadic nature of conflict, and the decision by an actor to resist intervention. Jack Snyder’s (1991) theory of Great Power “regime cartelization” is here adapted to explain why some transitional regimes in small states are less susceptible to immediate, extended deterrence by external actors that support separatist domestic challengers. Cartelized regimes are transitional regimes with relatively weak democratic institutions, and executive decision making influenced by nationalist ideology. The main claim of this thesis is that regime cartelization is positively related to the onset of internationalized civil war, given that secondary party support to the domestic challenger is staunch. This is because cartelized regimes prefer the cost of war over the audience cost of backing down from a contestation. A comparative, qualitative case study of two domestic crises in Georgia 2004-2008, and two domestic crises in Ukraine 2014-2016 supports this claim.

No description available.

戒嚴時期的國民黨與當今的中國共產黨政權對於媒介的控制都放在一個高處管理，兩岸出發自類同的列寧式黨國體制之下，對於文化事業單位的管理方式看似又都嚴密控管，但為何台灣中影得以在1980年代衝撞國民黨黨國體制;而中國中影卻始終產出主旋律電影來為黨喉舌，而這種為黨服務的主旋律電影在市場化下的產量和品質又為何會忽高忽低? 本文藉由對兩岸中影的文獻與數據，來判別這兩種威權體制究竟有何差異，這種政權差異又會如何體現在台灣與中國大陸電影產業當中? 將兩岸中影放在政權性質架構下再做比較，看出黨國體制的對外關係、控制文化事業單位、菁英政策與箝制媒體的力道與方式的不同。 本文研究觀點是台灣中影歷經從硬威權時期轉向軟威權時期，這過渡的區段少有研究台灣民主化學者去關注當中變數，而是將重點放在軟威權時期研究，本文以中影公司案例作為這區段的變數研究;而中國中影則處在後極權發展型國家當中，黨的利益與部門利益形成兩股消長力量。本文再藉由體制的比較，發現台灣中影之所以能突破黨國鐵幕，軟威權政體除了提供政治社會風氣轉型背景之外，很大原因是來自於國民黨的扶持政策與人事決策誤判所導致。當今中國中影在媒介條塊管理與雙重領導體制下，文化事業單位不但無力抗拒上層，外界媒體也無法給予聲援。本文最後提供三種研究意涵:一是黨國體制下的電影產業對政權性質理論的回饋補充;二是台灣中影走向「新電影風潮」給中國電影民主化的啟示;三是發展中與落後國家的電影產業仍然需要有國家的大力扶持，而台灣脫離黨國體制後，缺乏黨國給予的持續補貼，最後禁不起商業的競爭而走向落寞。對照當今中國中影集團，雖有中共黨國的持續保護而壯大，但卻壓抑了電影創作者與整個電影市場的更快發展。 / This thesis study how the KMT under martial law and the Chinese Communist Party today control their cultural institutions ,and the domestication and resistance of the Central Motion Picture Corporation(CMPC) and the China Film Group Corporation(CFGC) controlled by the two parties. Due to people's ideology could influenced by movies, the two authoritarian parties always control their film institutions by funding, personnel and administration affairs. However, the CMPC were still able to publish some radical movies when the parties cannot prevent the managers of culture institutions to ally with non-state-owned film institutions.