Typescript. / Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1989. / Includes bibliographical references. / Microfiche. / xiii, 191 leaves, bound ill. 29 cm

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, München, 1999/2000. / Includes bibliographical references.

張亦農. / 論文(神學碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院宗敎及神學學部, 1997. / 參考文獻: leaves 71-74. / Zhang Yinong. / Chapter 第一章 --- 緒論 --- p.1 / Chapter 第二章 --- 香港的單親家庭 --- p.5 / Chapter 第三章 --- 牧養個案探討 --- p.30 / Chapter 第四章 --- 家庭 --- p.49 / Chapter 第五章 --- 單親家庭的牧養 --- p.59 / 參考書目 --- p.70 / 附件

published_or_final_version / Social Work / Master / Master of Social Work

published_or_final_version / Social Work / Master / Master of Social Work

published_or_final_version / Social Work / Master / Master of Social Work

published_or_final_version / Social Work and Social Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Social Work and Social Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Social Work / Master / Master of Social Sciences

本論文收錄了三篇有關婚姻和代際關係的研究論文。 / 第一篇文章探討人們如何加強隱性契約。本文在理論分析中引入了情感關係生產函數和假定兒子是老年父母的主要贍養者。我們發現獲得更高的合同金額和加強合同是重男輕女的動機，孝順是為了獲得成人子女的贍養，偏愛孫子體現了祖父母希望向子女提供及時的支援來鞏固合同關係的企圖。我們的經驗分析結果表明，男孩得到更多的投資，男性兒童能激勵他們的父母向祖父母表明其孝道，而有更多兒子的人可以從父母那得到更多的轉移支付。 / 第二篇文章討論人們在不同的資訊條件下如何做出婚姻決策。我們利用同卵雙胞胎與異卵雙胞胎之間的差異來確認整個能力效應，然後利用結婚時的工資與當前工資之間能力效應的構成差異來區分能力的收入效應和能力的信號效應。我們的經驗分析結果表明：（1）第一, 在資訊不對稱的情況下，幸運地擁有高工資的人將結婚較早，而具有美好前景的人將結婚較晚；（2）考慮到能力具有不可觀測性，在資訊不對稱的情況下，能力高的人更容易被低估因而結婚晚；（3）在資訊對稱的情況下，能力高的人結婚早；（4）工資與男子的初次結婚年齡之間存在很強的關係，然而這種關係在女性樣本中很弱。 / 第三篇文章探討婚姻中的討價還價和代際之間的互動的關係。本文強調議價能力不僅影響資源配置，還會影響心理狀態。我們發現情緒效應對代際間的互動有顯著的影響。本文使用夫妻間的相對收入作為議價能力的測量，得到以下結果。非互動式支援：（1）隨著自己的議價能力的提高，人們會更多地支援自己的父母和配偶的父母；（2）隨著子女的議價能力的提高，父母會提供較少的支援給子女，而提供更多的支援給子女的配偶。互動式交流：（1）隨著議價能力的提高，人們會增加與自己的父母的互動交流；（2）議價能力和與配偶的父母的互動溝通的關係是不確定的。我們用中國成人雙胞胎的資料核對我們的理論，獲得的結果與我們的理論預期一致。 / This dissertation is composed of three essays on marriage and intergenerational relationship. / The first essay explores how people enforce implicit contracts. By introducing the production function of the emotional relationship and assuming sons are the main support forces of the elder parents, we provide several strategies to identify the motives behind son preference, filial piety, and grandson preference. Our altruism-assumption and selfishness-assumption models suggest that first, to enhance the contract value and to enforce the implicit contract are two possible motives for son preference; second, one of motives behind filial piety is to gain children’s support in old age; third, grandson preference reflects that the old intends to reinforce the implicit contract by providing increased support to the middle who is more in need of help. Using two Chinese twins datasets, we find that first, parents invest more resources on the son rather than the daughter; second, the male child can motivate his/her parents to demonstrate their filial piety to grandparents; third, individuals with sons can obtain added transfers from parents. / The second essay discusses how individuals make marriage decisions under different information situations. Using Chinese adult twins dataset, we employ the difference between identical and non-identical twins to identify the entire ability effect, and then utilize the different compositions of ability effects between wedding-time wages and current wages to distinguish ability income effect from ability revelation effect. Our empirical results suggest the following findings. First, with information asymmetry, a high-wage individual will marry early, whereas an advantageous-prospect individual will marry late. Second, given that ability is barely noticeable, individuals with high abilities are easily underestimated and generally postpone marriage with imperfect information. Third, under information symmetry, the smartest individual who has the promising future will first of all gain the favor of potential mates. Finally, a strong relationship exists between the wages and men’s age at first marriage; however, such a relationship is weak for females. / The third essay investigates the relationship between bargain within marriage and intergenerational interactions. We emphasize that bargaining power influences not only the resource distribution within marriage but also the personal psychological status. We find that the emotional effect significantly influences intergenerational interactions. Given that several significant differences between non-interactive support (e.g., transfers) and interactive communications (e.g., visitations) exist, and by using the relative incomes of partners as a measure of bargaining power, we obtain the following findings. For non-interactive support: (1) as a child’s bargaining power increases, he/she will offers more help to both parents and parents-in-law; (2) as the increase of own child’s bargaining power within marriage, parents will provide less help to their own child while more to their child’s spouse. For interactive communications: (1) the interactive conversations with parents definitely increase with own bargaining power; (2) the relationship between own bargaining power and the interactive communications with parents-in-law is ambiguous. Using Chinese adult Twins dataset, we obtain results that provide consistent evidence for our theoretical predictions. / essay one. Implicit contract commitment: the motives for son preference, filial piety, and grandson preference -- essay two. Information asymmetry, ability, and age at first marriage -- essay three. Bargain within marriage and intergenerational interactions. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Deng, Weiguang. / Thesis (Ph.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014. / Includes bibliographical references. / Abstracts also in Chinese.