published_or_final_version / Housing Management / Master / Master of Housing Management

Financial contagion, in this study, refers to spreading of crisis across markets in different locations. The observable consequence is usually in the form of increase in co-movement of asset prices in two markets after a crisis event. The causes of financial contagion have been studied for over twenty years, however, up till now, results have been mixed. One unsettled issue is whether market fundamentals alone can explain financial contagion. Pure fundamental based explanation suggests that the financial, economic and trade linkages are solely responsible for the transmission of crisis across markets. On the other hand, the behavioral finance researchers propose that herding behavior also plays an important role in explaining financial contagion. This issue cannot be easily resolved since it is difficult to empirically distinguish linkage effect and herding behavior. This thesis contributes to this unresolved issue by examining financial contagion in the stock market and indirect real estate market. In the stock market, both fundamental linkages and herding are likely to exist. However some securities are less prone to herding than others. Herding across international markets is likely to be less serious when there is less information asymmetry between investors and management. In addition, compared with foreign investors, local investors are more confident in the link between market fundamentals and the corresponding securities. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are likely to suffer from less information asymmetry problem since the REITs market has more stringent regulatory requirements for information disclosure. Furthermore, the pricing of real estate asset, the main type of assets held by the REITs, often requires local knowledge. Local investors investing in REITs are less likely to mimic the investor behavior in another overseas REITs market. Listed property companies also share some similarities with REITs, although they are less immune to herding compared with REITs as information disclosure is less stringent for listed property companies. Since the asset prices of real estate are affected by the economic performance, fundamental linkages amongst all indirect real estate still likely to exist and are similar to other types of listed companies. If market fundamental is the only source of financial contagion (i.e. no herding), financial contagion in the global stock and indirect real estate markets should be similar. This thesis uses the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) as the crisis event to examine financial contagion across the world’s major equity markets. Our empirical results show that financial contagion is stronger in the entire stock markets than in the indirect real estate markets and that financial contagion is the weakest in the REITs markets, which support the herding behavior hypothesis and reject the pure fundamental explanation. This reasoning does not require indirect real estate to be totally immune from herding. All that is needed is that indirect real estate is less prone to herding compared with the common stocks. Herding behavior can be rational or irrational. The latter refers to revision of asset prices by following the pricing behavior of other markets irrespective of market fundamentals. Our empirical evidence cannot reject irrational herding behavior in the indirect real estate market since contagion effect becomes stronger when windows of observations are lengthened. That is when more time was allowed for investors to react to the pricing behaviors in other markets, financial contagion became stronger. However, no similar results were found in the stock market. This impl\ies that compared with the indirect real estate market, herding is more serious in the stock market but such herding is also more rational than that in the indirect real estate market. / published_or_final_version / Real Estate and Construction / Master / Master of Philosophy

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The aim of this thesis is to identify and assess the reasons of the Turkish financial crises based on various crises model explanations including the first, the second and the third generation models. It is argued that following factors played a crucial role in triggering crises in Turkey. Firstly, under the weak sustainable fiscal policies, implementation of the exchange rate based stabilization program caused the increase in vulnerabilities in the sectoral balance sheets and thus increased the prospective deficit considerations. Secondly, as seen on the international evidence, over-appreciation of the domestic currency put pressure on the current account deficit and other macroeconomic indicators. Thirdly, domestic and external factors also worsen the perceptions on the sustainability of the disinflation program leading to sharp capital outflows. Within this context, fiscal and current account sustainability are empirically tested under the light of the structural break analysis and it is found that fiscal stance and the current account deficit are both weakly sustainable implying the necessity of policy regime changes before the crises period. Having assessed the structural problems of the government, corporate and banking sector&rsquo / s balance sheets, intersectoral risk matrix was constructed to analyze the risk accumulation in the sectors considering the impacts of the exchange rate based disinflation program and the ongoing economic imbalances. Both mismanagement of the risks and the structural weaknesses of some banks led to the deterioration of the expectations about the continuity of the program, by increasing tensions and prospective deficit perceptions in the markets. With speculative attacks, a sharp capital outflow was triggered the crises. It is concluded that the causes of the 2000-2001 Turkish financial crises can be interpreted as an example of financial crises model encompassing all elements of the earlier models except seignorage issues.

In this thesis I examine, within a behavioural finance framework, the impact on stock prices of order and trade imbalance in three separate but related studies. The first study, chapter two, begins with a question that plagues behavioural finance theories???do the investors most likely to be influenced by the behavioural biases described in the literature, i.e., individual investors, affect stock prices? My data enable me to consider the impact of net individual investor trading for the entire market over several years. I find that net individual investor purchasing Grangercauses stock price changes. The correlation is negative, however, contradicting common sense by demonstrating that individuals investor buying pressure makes prices go down and selling pressure forces them up. More investigation is required. Chapter three references order imbalance results from experimental finance. I use field data to test a robust laboratory model and my modified versions. My findings suggest that, with appropriate modifications, laboratory results can be applied to real financial markets. Chapter four combines the data from the chapters two and three to revisit the question of individual investor impact on stock prices. Other studies have argued that individual investor influence is strongest in smaller capitalization stocks. Moreover, various theories propose that individual investors are the driving force behind the irrational stock prices of a bubble. I focus on the stocks from chapter three, bubble stocks, and ask whether, in the context of the trading of the entire market, individual investor trades are influential. Once again I find Grangercausality, but in the wrong direction. Moreover, the activity and volume of the individual investor category of the holdings data is completely overshadowed by that of the two large investor categories, domestic and foreign institutions. I conclude that individual investor trades are not influential in determining stock prices. This conclusion has important implications for some behavioural finance models of asset pricing. I suggest that emphasis might be better placed on educating individual investors about the errors to which they are prone, rather than on trying to explain market anomalies with those errors.

In this thesis I examine, within a behavioural finance framework, the impact on stock prices of order and trade imbalance in three separate but related studies. The first study, chapter two, begins with a question that plagues behavioural finance theories???do the investors most likely to be influenced by the behavioural biases described in the literature, i.e., individual investors, affect stock prices? My data enable me to consider the impact of net individual investor trading for the entire market over several years. I find that net individual investor purchasing Grangercauses stock price changes. The correlation is negative, however, contradicting common sense by demonstrating that individuals investor buying pressure makes prices go down and selling pressure forces them up. More investigation is required. Chapter three references order imbalance results from experimental finance. I use field data to test a robust laboratory model and my modified versions. My findings suggest that, with appropriate modifications, laboratory results can be applied to real financial markets. Chapter four combines the data from the chapters two and three to revisit the question of individual investor impact on stock prices. Other studies have argued that individual investor influence is strongest in smaller capitalization stocks. Moreover, various theories propose that individual investors are the driving force behind the irrational stock prices of a bubble. I focus on the stocks from chapter three, bubble stocks, and ask whether, in the context of the trading of the entire market, individual investor trades are influential. Once again I find Grangercausality, but in the wrong direction. Moreover, the activity and volume of the individual investor category of the holdings data is completely overshadowed by that of the two large investor categories, domestic and foreign institutions. I conclude that individual investor trades are not influential in determining stock prices. This conclusion has important implications for some behavioural finance models of asset pricing. I suggest that emphasis might be better placed on educating individual investors about the errors to which they are prone, rather than on trying to explain market anomalies with those errors.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-100). Also issued online.

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2003.

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2007.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 138-145).