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To the best of my knowledge, there has not been any academic study about capital structure of Turkish REITs so far. This study attempts to fulfill this gap in the literature by analyzing the capital structure choices of Turkish REITs which are listed in Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) over the period of 1998 - 2007. The key contribution of this study is to understand whether the firm specific, institutional and country specific factors that affect the capital structures of all institutional firms including REITs in developed and developing countries are also applicable to the Turkish REITs sector. The data analysis demonstrates that Turkish REITs employ little long term debt in their capital structure and there exists strong short term debt dominance in the sector. Employing Tobit regression and panel data models, it is concluded that capital structure determinants that are significant in developed and developing countries are also significant in Turkish REITs&amp / #8217 / debt financing choices. However, we observe inconsistency in the sign and significance of some factors which give a way to understand the different institutional and country specific factors of Turkish real estate market and Turkish REITs.

The aim of this thesis is to explore the diversification of a major oil company into the. petrochemical business and then through thorough analysis to recommend the appropriate corporate strategies to be followed by the petrochemical subsidiary of such a company in the 1980's and the 1990's. The petrochemical industry has undergone great changes during the last decade. In the early 1970's it entered a new era of maturity, however due to the misplannings of the late 1960's extending to the early 1970's the industry was suddenly faced with significant overcapacity which has persisted to the present date and is expected to last well into the 1980's. The 1974 oil crisis caused a further decline in the growth of demand, hence exacerbating the situation. During the seventies the industry has had to operate under increasing material prices, unlike the past, which when coupled with the problem of overcapacity and the resulting deterioration of prices, has caused considerable decline in the financial ability of the companies to finance their capital expenditure programmes through internal cash generation (which was the case in the industry's 'golden era'). This situation is threatening the long term viability and survival of the petrochemical businesses. A System Dynamics model for a hypothetical petrochemical subsidiary of a major oil company has been constructed which embodies all the policies inherent in such a system. The dynamic behaviour of the model closely resembles that expected from the real system such as the declining financial ability, which is mostly due to the inflationary conditions. Through thorough analysis, the impact of varying inflation level on the performance of the system was explored, and the need for adopting suitable accounting policies which would take account of the replacement costs of assets, during periods of high inflation, was proposed. The adoption of a number of policies led to a certain degree of improvement in the financial performance of the system, and these are recommended concerning the corporate strategy of the company for the next two decades. Finally it was discovered that due to the low level of growth of demand (compared to the past), the large economic sizes of the petrochemical plants and the market share consensus, the companies will have to go into joint ventures in the future.

This dissertation includes two related chapters that investigate corporate governance. In the first chapter, we examine the effectiveness of board monitoring on CEOs. It is widely believed that outsider boards are better monitors. In fact, regulations now require that the board of directors of publicly traded firms be composed of a majority of independent directors (or outsiders). However, this paper documents that an insider-dominated board can monitor the CEO just as well as an outsider board can when the firm's CEO is hired from outside. The results suggest that what matters is not so much as the structure of the board, but the "independence" between the board and the CEO it monitors. Specifically, we find that insider boards monitor more of their firms' CEOs if the CEO is hired from outside than from within. In addition, outsider boards monitor both inside and outside CEOs the same way. We also find little difference between insider and outsider boards when they monitor outside CEOs. The main contribution of this paper is to show that an insider board can be an effective monitor as long as it is independent of the CEO. In other words, what is important is board independence, not board structure per se. In chapter two, we examine the relation between the change in a firm's value and its CEO selection sources: internal promotion versus external hire in both high and low product competition environments. Our results show that firms will be better off hiring an outside CEO (external hire) when the firms operate in a low product competition industry. Specifically, the evidence shows that hiring an outside CEO for a firm in a low product competition industry will increase the firm's value by about 3% for the entire tenure of the CEO. The main contribution of this paper is to show that product market competition is an important factor in CEO selection.

I examined how politics affects corporate policies and value in two dissertation essays. In my first essay, we investigate whether diversity in points of view within corporate boards, as captured by the diversity in political ideology of board members, can affect a firm's performance. We employ personal political contributions' data to measure political ideology distance among groups of inside, outside directors and the CEO. Our empirical evidence strongly supports the notion that outside directors' monitoring effectiveness is more likely to be enhanced when their viewpoints are distinct from those of management. We find that ideologically diverse boards are associated with better firm performance, lower agency costs and less insiders' discretionary power over the firm's Political Action Committee (PAC) spending. Taken together, our results lead us to conclude that multiplicity of standpoints in corporate boardrooms is imperative for board effectiveness. In my second essay, we document that firms surrounded by high degrees of policy risk generated by local politicians' legislative activities present significantly high stock returns, indicating investors' perception of policy risk. We find that the diverse political strategies firms implement 1) successfully mitigate such policy risk, 2) help firms to acquire more lucrative procurement contracts, and 3) even get firms in trouble with legal issues. Additional results reveal that poor stock performance related to litigation is significantly recovered by political connections. Overall, our results reflect that investors view corporate political activities as effective hedging strategies against policy risk. Collectively, politics plays a critical role in determining corporate policies and/or value.

In theory, all relevant information is incorporated in stock prices timely and completely and therefore prices respond related news quickly in efficient financial markets. In today's information age, technological advances provide investors with fast access to a vast number of information resources. One can argue that these advances can help market efficiency due to easy and quick access to relevant information. On the other hand, these technological advances not only facilitate availability of relevant information but also facilitate availability of all types of information--both relevant and irrelevant information signals. In essence, one can argue that there is (over)exposure to information which may come with a cost in the form of distraction and limited attention to relevant information. After considering these previous points, this study sheds more light on investor distraction and its impact on stock prices in two essays. My first essay introduces a new type of investor distraction, which arises from the discrepancy between investors' mood state and the content of the firm news. My second essay shows the importance of culture to explain investors' information processing .Moreover; the findings of my second essay are consistent with an investor distraction effect caused by cultural factors which are assumed as irrelevant factors in investors' information environment. In my first essay titled "Overexposure to Unrelated News and Investor Distraction: Earnings News and Big Sports Games", I use mood-generating events - proxied by big sports games -that contain no information on firm fundamentals but occur concurrently with earnings vi announcements to test the hypothesis that investors' attention shifts away from financial news that is incongruent with investors' mood states, thereby leading to underreaction. I empirically confirm the existence of mood-conflicting distraction. I find stronger post-earnings announcement drift and delayed response ratio, and weaker immediate volume reaction, when the earnings announcing firm's local investors' sports mood is inconsistent with the earnings news' content (good vs. bad). This effect strengthens with firm's proximity to the location of the mood source. In my secon essay titled "Post-Earnings Announcement and Religious Holidays", I show the role of culture, proxied by religion, in financial information processing and the impact of culture on financial outcomes through investor inattention. I examine whether and how the religious holiday calendar affects investors' information processing by investigating price reactions to U.S. firms' earnings announcements that occur during Easter week. I find different patterns for short-term and delayed responses to Easter week earnings surprises. Moreover, there is a stronger immediate (delayed) reaction to good (bad) news, primarily found in less religious, predominantly Protestant areas. The results are consistent with a religion-induced investor distraction effect. The findings also show the role of religious characteristics in firms' information environment and the locality of stock prices.

I examine how political geography affects firms' cost of debt. Policy risk, measured by proximity to political power reflected in firms' position in the country's political map, is negatively related to corporate bond ratings and positively related to firms' cost of debt. I find firms' policy risk can be mitigated by engaging in corporate political strategies like making campaign contributions or lobbying. Consistent with the view that such political strategies effectively protect firms against uncertainty about future policies, I find policy risk has less of an impact on the cost of debt of firms that support more powerful and well-connected politicians in the legislative co-sponsorship network or that spend more money on lobbying. Using a sample of state pension funds' equity holdings, I find that state pension funds exhibit not only local bias but also bias towards politically connected stocks. These politically connected local firms held by state pension funds do not exhibit better performance compared with their local benchmarks not held by these funds before the holding period, and the overweighting of politically connected local firms is negatively related to pension fund returns. My results do not support the information advantage hypothesis that state pension funds exhibit overweighting of local firms because they have an information advantage about home-state firms. I further examine the factors that explain local bias from political perspectives. My results show that local bias is related to public policy integrity and local politicians' congressional connections.

In the first essay, we examine the link between CEOs political ideology - conservatism - and their firms' investment decisions. We focus on the effect of CEO conservatism on M&A decisions. Our evidence indicates that politically conservative CEOs are less likely to engage in M&A activities. When they do undertake acquisitions, their firms are more likely to use cash as the method of payment, and the target firms are more likely to be public firms and to be from the same industry. Conditional on the merger, CEO conservatism appears to have a significantly positive impact on long-run firm valuation. However, we find no evidence that conservative CEOs create value in the short run. All our results hold after controlling for CEO overconfidence. In the second essay, we investigate the impact of difference in local political ideologies between acquirers and targets on the likelihood of deal completion and announcement returns over the period of 1981-2009. We posit that increase in political ideology distance between acquirer and target leads to greater risks/costs associated with the integration process. This increase in distance is less likely to allow for the completion of deals and elicit less favorable market response to merger announcements. We find that when political ideology distance between acquirer and target in a merger are minimal, deals are more likely to be completed. We also find that acquirer which are politically proximate to their targets earn significantly higher returns than distant acquirers. After controlling for the geographic effect and other determinants of announcement returns, the political ideology effect still exists. Overall, the evidence suggests that corporate political ideology plays an important role in completing deals and determining announcement returns.

We reexamine the stock price drifts following open-market stock repurchase announcements by differentiating actual repurchases from repurchase announcements and by controlling for the repurchasing firms' earnings improvement in the announcement year relative to the prior year. Our results show that only firms that actually repurchase their shares exhibit a positive post-announcement drift. More importantly, we find that these repurchasing firms have the same post-announcement drift as their matching firms that have similar size and earnings performance but do not repurchase. Further analysis indicates that the post-repurchase announcement drift is not a distinct anomaly but the well-documented post-earnings announcement drift in disguise. In addition, previous studies suggest that the market perceives IPOs as bad news (i.e., competitive threats) to existing firms in the same industry. At the same time, the market has a tendency to be overly optimistic about IPO prospects, especially during hot IPO markets. Thus, the negative industry rival reaction could be the result of investors' over-optimism toward the IPOs' growth prospects and underestimation of the competitive positions of industry rivals. Our findings show that rival firms use repurchases as a means to signal their firm quality, as well as to correct the market's overreaction to the bad news. These IPO-induced repurchases are stronger when the rival firms are in a concentrated industry and experienced poor stock performance in the previous year.

In the first essay we examine the effect of concurrent lending and underwriting on IPO withdrawal, we find that IPOs underwritten by the firms’ concurrent lending banks are significantly more likely to be withdrawn. The result is robust to controlling for the common factors that affect IPO withdrawal and also for endogeneity using a propensity score matching portfolio. Our evidence suggests a cost to IPO firms’ hiring concurrent lending banks as underwriters despite the potential benefit of informational scope economies such intermediaries may provide. It is consistent with an alternative argument that a current lending and underwriting bank has less incentive to help sell its client firms’ securities because of its lock-in of the firms’ subsequent borrowing needs even when it fails to sell the securities. In the second essay, we examine the investment decisions of second-time IPO firms after successfully going public. Our findings show that, contrary to first time IPOs, second-time IPOs are not active acquirers and spend significantly more on CAPEX and R&D than first-time IPOs. Unlike acquisitions in the post-IPO period, CAPEX and R&D spending benefit second-time IPOs’ long run performance.