Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, April 2009.

Thesis (M. Sc (Ichthyology and Fisheries Science))--Rhodes University, 2005.

Thesis (M.A.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2004. / Bibliography: leaves 100-106.

Thesis (M.M.S.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2004. / Restricted until May 2005. Bibliography: leaves 45-50.

Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 2006.

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The following three essays present an analysis that combines well-known models of fisheries management with contemporary theories of international trade and industrial organization. The general theme of the thesis is that countries' fisheries management policies can affect the strategic interaction between their fishing industries. The first essay examines the problem of noncooperative management of international fisheries by analyzing the strategic rent-shifting roles for such well-known national management policies as fleet licensing and effort subsidies. It is shown that the noncooperative equilibrium in each policy takes the form of a prisoner's dilemma with dissipated rents in the fishery. It is also shown that strategic effort subsidies can only lead to incomplete rent dissipation but strategic fleet licensing can lead to complete rent dissipation. The second essay develops a theory of cooperative management of international fisheries by considering negotiation between countries over the same fleet licensing and effort subsidy policies considered in the first essay. The outcomes of negotiation over these policies are compared to the corresponding noncooperative outcomes, on the one hand, and to the efficient outcome on the other. It is shown that negotiation over effort subsidies in the absence of side payments is efficient, but negotiation over fleet sizes in the absence of side payments is inefficient. The third essay develops a two-stage two-period model of a 'domestic' country and a 'foreign' country whose respective fishing industries harvest from separate fisheries for the same international market. The domestic country uses a harvest policy to regulate the harvest by its fishing industry, but the harvest by the foreign fishing industry is unregulated. Two types of fisheries are considered. In the case of schooling fisheries, the domestic country may choose a conservative harvest policy in the first period if it can induce the biological collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period. In the case of search fisheries, the domestic country always chooses a conservative harvest policy in the first period in order to induce the economic degradation of the foreign fishery in the second period. The results suggest that international fisheries trade in the presence of divergent national fisheries management regimes could have unexpected consequences for world fisheries. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

The inland interstate borderfisheries and the arrangements to manage them were identified and described by two surveys. A cartographic survey of the U.S. inland borders (excluding the Great Lakes) identified 62 rivers, 71 impoundments of non-border rivers, and 64 natural lakes, totalling 4.1 million acres. A telephone/mail survey of 48 state inland fisheries chiefs identified 68 interstate arrangements. A typology of interstate arrangements was developed and used to differentiate these along two dimensions -- type of agreement and type of management framework. Fifty-five of the 81 watered borders were covered by a Type IA arrangement that is negotiated directly between two states and does not establish an autonomous institution. Their four major functions were to (1) control fishing, ( 2) control management, ( 3) delimit the scope of the arrangement, and (4) protect the arrangement. Seventeen provisions identified matters to be addressed within each of those four functions, with specifications defining how each matter would be handled. For instance, 59 arrangements controlled the use of the resource; 56 of the 59 included a provision for type of license reciprocity; and 50 of the 56 specified simple recognition of both states' licenses. The Type IA arrangements occurred most often and were most complex on rivers -- the largest borderwater type -- and on borders that were really important to the border states. Some arrangement characteristics were highly regionalized, suggesting that the lack of communication has limited the use of promising arrangement alternatives. / Master of Science

Fung Sing Chung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1980. / Bibliography: p. leaves 64-68.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Wollongong, 2006. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references: p. 291-339.